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PREFACE
When, upon my return from Bern, Switzerland, it was suggested to me to consider the publication of my Ph.D. dissertation1 in its original 
English version, frankly I was caught by a huge surprise. I wrote that manu-
script almost thirty years ago and haven’t looked at it ever since. Nostalgia 
or not, but I liked the idea.
After rereading the text, I realized that it needed additional work. 
Some parts needed to be revised; new chapters had to be added; certain 
passages had to be rewritten. As it often happens, it turned out that this task 
required much more time and effort than I had initially thought. 
And I enjoyed every minute of it.
Memories started to pour back. I stepped on the soil of the USA for 
the first time in the summer of 1979 determined to continue my studies 
at an American university, despite the fact that I knew absolutely nothing 
about the American educational system. In my junior year at the Belgrade 
Law School, I’d decided to take a trip overseas. First I visited Harvard where 
I met Dr. Adam Ulam, a political scientist and Sovietologist; then I went to 
Stanford, where I talked to Dr. Wayne Vucinich, a Balkan historian, and to 
Hoover, where I was received by Dr. Milorad Drachkovitch, Fellow and Ar-
chives Director. My last stop before returning home was UCSB. After gradu-
ation and taking the GRE and TOEFL tests, I managed to get enrolled in the 
graduate program in History at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
In all fairness, that was made possible due to the most generous support and 
1 I received my doctorate in History from the University of California, Santa Bar-
bara, in 1987. My Ph.D. advisor was Dr. Dimitrije Djordjević; the chairman of the 
Ph.D. Committee was Dr. Joachim Remak, and the remaining two members were 
Dr. Nancy Gallagher and Dr. Peter Merkl.
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warmest recommendation provided by Dr. Dimitrije Djordjević, my dear 
„čika Mita“,2 a professor over there, my future teacher, mentor and guru. He 
was a Serb by origin, a democrat, anti-communist and patriot, a former in-
mate of a Nazi concentration camp,3 who had, persecuted by Tito’s regime,4 
fled from Yugoslavia in 1970 in order to take up a permanent teaching po-
sition at UC Santa Barbara. I arrived in California in late October of 1980. 
The following six and a half wonderful years I spent studying and working 
with him.
In Communist Yugoslavia, notions like political parties, free elec-
tions, freedom of public speech, democracy, civil liberties etc. were highly 
unpopular, if not entirely prohibited. Since I was drawn to politics due to 
my family background and personal curiosity, history, čika Mita and Santa 
Barbara seemed like a perfect choice.
I made up my mind about the topic of my doctoral dissertation even 
before I arrived in the USA. My great-grandfather Stojan Protić5 was among 
the leaders of the People’s Radical Party and its chief ideologue from its very 
inception (1881) until the early 1920s. Frankly, this was quite an inspiration 
for a young man of my character and interests. Coming from Law School, 
having a solid grasp of political, constitutional and legal sciences (albeit it 
mostly Marxist), this particular theme appeared to me as an excellent mix-
ture of history and political theory. Fortunately, my Ph.D. advisor immedi-
ately agreed to my proposal.
This was realized thanks to the unique gesture of Mr. Petar 
Dimitrijević,6 who provided an initial grant so that I could pursue my 
dream of studying in the United States. Later, I got a job as a teaching and 
research assistant and was able to finance both my studies and my living in 
California.
Most of the research for this book was done: in Paris, in the Archives 
of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d’Orsay), the National li-
brary and the Library of the Faculty of Political Sciences; in Belgrade, in 
2 „Čika“ is a Serbian word for uncle; „Mita“ is a nickname for Dimitrije (Dimitry).
3 Mauthausen-Gusen concentration camp was located in Upper Austria. He was 
imprisoned there in 1942/43.
4 He was sentenced to four years of prison as a member of the royalist resistance 
movement in Yugoslavia during WW2.
5 Serbian and Yugoslav politician, journalist, minister and prime minister (1857–1923).
6 Another Serbian political emmigrant who had escaped Communism in 1945. The 
son of a general loyal to the Monarchy and a Harvard graduate, Mr. Dimitrijević 
made a fortune in the pharmaceutical industry. I met him in Cavtat, a sea resort 
near Dubrovnik(Croatia) in 1977 upon his first visit to Yugoslavia.
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the Serbian Archives, Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, and the National Library of Serbia; at the Hoover Institution Library 
and Archives at Stanford, CA; and at the UCSB Library (the Nikic Special 
Collection).
The actual writing process took a little over a year. Encouraged by 
my colleagues from the History Department,7 I decided to write in English 
rather than to write in my native Serbian and translate it into English. Of 
course, some serious proof-reading was necessary. Still, the language and 
style were not of the highest quality. It was pretty obvious that it was written 
by a foreigner.
I took my Ph.D. written and oral exams in November 1983. In 1984/85 
I spent eight months doing research in Paris, France. I submitted the final 
version of my dissertation in February 1987 and was awarded my Ph.D. in 
History from UC Santa Barbara on March 21 of the same year.
In 1991/92, I was invited to take a visiting professorship at the His-
tory Department at UCSB, teaching several courses in modern European 
and Balkan history as well as a seminar for graduate students of history and 
political sciences. I was back to my school, my department, my place. It felt 
as a homecoming.
Since 1985, I have been employed in the capacity of Research Assis-
tant and Research Fellow at the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade.  
7 Nick Vucinich, Lenny Friedman, Elpida Hadjidaki, Bill Wrightson, Tahib el-
Baloul, Kim Francev, Eric Knudsen, Bernd Fischer, Linda Nelson, Rick Spence, 
Francine Bloom and Greg Graves.
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PROLOGUE
Radicalism1 was a political ideology of 19th-century Europe. It belonged to the corpus of liberal thought and stood on its left wing2. In the spec-
trum of political ideologies, it could also be placed on the right side of So-
cialism3. In its later stages, Radicalism became increasingly conservative, 
moving to the center-right of the political landscape in most countries where 
radical parties survived on the political stage throughout the 20th century. 
In some countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Oceania,4 Radicalism 
branched out into separate political parties, whereas in others it remained 
within the formal framework of liberal parties.5 
1 Derived from the Latin “radix”(root). Not to be confused with the contemporary 
use of the term “radicalism”, denoting extremism or fundamentalism.
2 An interesting example in this respect is the Liberal-Radical Party of Switzer-
land. In German they call themselves the Liberals (Die Liberalen), while in French 
the same party is referred to as the Liberals-Radicals (les libéraux-radicaux). 
See: Clive H. Church, The Politics and Government of Switzerland, Palgrave Macmil-
lan, London, 2004. 
3 In France the full name of the party was: The Republican, Radical and Radical-
Socialist Party (Le Parti républicain, radical et radical-socialiste).
4 Political parties under this name exist(ed) in France, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Ukraine, Switzerland, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Ar-
gentina, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, India and New Zealand.
 Between 1854 and 1877, there was a wing within the Republican Party of the US 
that was called the “Radicals” or “Radical Republicans”. Critical of Lincoln’s concil-
iatory politics, they advocated immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery 
and full respect of civil rights for all freed men. 
5 Namely in the UK, Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914).
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Understandably, political ideologies of those radical parties world-
wide varied considerably in several aspects: programs, history, longevity 
and electoral potential. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that they have all 
developed from a common origin and hence share the same name. 
* * *
The industrial revolution reached its peak in Western Europe in the 1800s. 
Along with the dramatic changes in the way of life, economy and society in 
general, certain adjustments appeared in the ways people perceived politics. 
The map of the Continent was going through a period of such deep and 
complex transformation that its magnitude stayed incomprehensible to the 
great majority of contemporaries. The world was in turmoil.
In the 19th-century, Europe was marked by two dominant and long-
lasting phenomena: the rise of nationalism or the pursuit of nation-states 
(the principle “one nation – one state”) and the mushrooming of political 
ideologies from the Right to the Left.
In that respect, the French Revolution stood out as a turning point. 
It represented a decade-long historical laboratory of political ideas and ide-
ologies which, in subsequent years, expanded into various political parties 
and movements across the Continent.
Yes, the French Revolution had shed the blood of thousands of 
men and women, guilty and innocent alike. But, aside from its extremely 
violent exterior (“Le Terreur”), it was the birthplace of numerous theories 
about freedom, equality, democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and 
governance.
Napoleonic wars, the Restoration, the Revolution of 1848, the Crime-
an war, colonialism, the Franco-Prussian war, the unifications of Italy and 
Germany – these historical events were the landmarks of 19th-century Eu-
rope. Demands for universal suffrage, free elections, public control, govern-
ment accountability, equality before law, political liberties, constitutional 
limitations, social justice, civil unrest, violence and more violence – both 
external and internal – formed the face of Europe in the 1800s.
In a nutshell, these were the traits of the century before last.
Masses of ordinary folk marched onto the European political scene, 
reshaping our perception of reality for good. Popular armies of citizens, 
peasants, workers, employees and others became the decisive factor in Eu-
ropean politics both in war and in peace. The struggle for dominance be-
came a game of numbers. 
Modern political parties with huge followings of activists and voters 
were, in fact, vast unions of people gathered around a political program, 
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
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organized most effectively, sharing the goal of winning elections, forming a 
government and implementing their ideas.
The era of the rule of the privileged – absolute or enlightened mon-
archies and oligarchies of all sorts – was over, no question about it. But, this 
did not mean that democracy had prevailed. On the contrary, in the course 
of the 1900s, the activism of masses proved an instrument of responsible 
governments as well as a vehicle for dictatorships.
The identity of the 19th- century European man was twofold. On one 
hand, he identified with his roots, his kin, his ethnicity, his nation. On the 
other, he developed an individualistic consciousness based on his compre-
hension of personal interest. Social collectivism, in terms of an identifying 
and unifying force, was only at its early beginnings. 
* * *
The Balkans had been occupied by the Ottomans since the 14th century. It 
represented the most western of the Empire’s territories, often referred to as 
“Turkish Europe” or “European Turkey”. Most of the local population was 
of Eastern Christian faith, while Islamization took a massive toll in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria, Mace-
donia and Montenegro. 
The 19th-century awakening of national consciousness had reached 
the Balkans during the first several years of the century. The Serbs started 
their revolt against the Ottomans in 1804, and again in 1815, eventually 
achieving their autonomous status in 1830. The Greek War of Indepen-
dence broke out in 1821 and lasted until 1831. The formation of national 
movements among Romanians, Bulgarians and Albanians ensued. By the 
beginning of the 20th century, the Balkan peoples were overwhelmed with 
ideas of building their own nation-states, arguing among themselves about 
territorial issues. The concepts of Greater Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and 
Albania were merely the blueprints of particular European nationalisms, 
namely German and Italian. These competing nationalisms threatened to 
jeopardize the stability of the region. No European power showed much 
understanding for these aspirations of the Balkan peoples. They favored 
order over self-determination. Just as the Ottomans were being pushed out 
from the area, the Habsburgs marched in. After 1878, Austria-Hungary 
entered into the central provinces (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandjak) and ex-
tended its political influence on governments in Romania, Bulgaria and 
Serbia. 
In view of the controversies among European states, escalating sub-
stantially and forming two opposing military camps, the Continent was 
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clearly on the brink of war. It was not by chance that the Balkans was nick-
named “the powder-keg of Europe”. It ruptured where it was the thinnest.
The relationship between Europe and the Balkans could be best de-
scribed as follows: “Do not look at what we do, listen to what we say”. The 
ancient Latin proverb states that: “Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi”. In this 
case, these proverbs ring even truer. 
* * *
The People’s6 Radical Party in Serbia and Yugoslavia7 represented the lead-
ing political force in the country during the last two decades of the 19th and 
the first half of the 20th century. It played an important role in all historical 
events of the period. It shaped the political environment of both states – 
fundamentally so. Its popularity among the Serbian population remained 
unmatched throughout those years, as evidenced by the fact that it lost the 
elections only on two occasions.8
The Serbian Radical Party was the first modern political organization 
in Serbia and one of the oldest in the Balkans. Its structure spread all over 
the country, covering virtually every village with its local board or indi-
vidual activist. The Radicals were the first to employ political campaigning 
in the form of direct agitation by their candidates and public presentation 
of their political agendas. Their party’s newspaper was distributed to every 
municipal branch and read at regular party meetings.
The Radicals’ sudden success among the Serbian peasantry was due to 
political concepts that were quite popular with the general public. Its leaders 
soon became masters of demagoguery and “sweet talk”. Peasants – forming 
the great majority of the overall population and having been left out of the 
political process for decades, subjected to heavy taxation and deprived of 
political rights – proved to be the best consumers of the Radical aggressive 
propaganda. Among local party leaders, a few were of peasant background; 
having been elected to the national Parliament, they heralded the voice of 
the Serbian peasant. Most of the Radical leadership in small towns and vil-
lages, however, was comprised of local priests, teachers or lawyers. 
The top management of the party came mostly from a provincial pet-
ty bourgeois background, and had acquired higher education at European 
universities (Russia, France, and Switzerland) thanks to state-sponsored 
6 In the sense of popular (national).
7 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) was created at the 
end of World War One, in December 1918.
8 Once in Serbia (1905) and once in Yugoslavia (1920). 
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Between Democracy and Populism 15
scholarships. They belonged to the second generation of 19th-century Ser-
bian intelligentsia.
* * *
Generally, the birth of the Radical Party coincided with two crucial events 
in Serbian history of the period: the signing of the so-called “Secret Conven-
tion” with the Habsburg Monarchy (1881)9 and the proclamation of King-
dom (1882).10 
* * *
The topic of this treatise is not the general history of the People’s Radical 
Party in Serbia. Rather, it is concerned with the history of the People’s Radi-
cal Party’s ideology. This means that it is more a study in the realm of ideas 
than a study of real political developments. Primarily, it is an insight into 
what the Serbian Radicals believed in, what they thought should to be done. 
It is also an investigation into the results and achievements of their political 
practice and the degree of their consistency. The balance between the sphere 
of the imagination and the sphere of reality turned out to be of utmost im-
portance for the completion of this work.
9 This treaty (duration of ten years, re-signed in 1889 for an additional ten years) 
established full political and military subjugation of Serbia to Vienna; it was kept 
secret until early 20th century.
10 Serbia was a Principality since achieving independence at the Congress of Berlin 
(1878).
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Chapter One
THE ORIGINS
In modern European historiography, it is widely accepted that the 19th century was a period of intense nationalism. However, this period was 
also characterized by the development of strong political ideologies. In the 
period from the French Revolution to World War One, political develop-
ment was marked by the growth of numerous movements and ideologies, 
ranging from the far right to the far left. This process reached its peak in 
Europe after the revolutionary events of 1848. The second half of the cen-
tury in European political history was characterized by sharp contrasts and 
contests of political doctrines manifested through vast political movements. 
Thibaudet was correct when he claimed: « La politique, ce sont des idées ».1 
The great majority of modern political concepts had their origins in 
philosophical teachings which preceded the French Revolution. Together 
with the Revolution itself, this period represents a great historical and po-
litical laboratory resulting in various political experiments. The entire nine-
teenth century merely continued to develop the initial ideas and doctrines 
born during the great revolutionary age. In the course of the century before 
last, these concepts clashed, contended and competed with each other and 
gradually developed into full-scale political movements based on well-de-
fined ideological foundations.
Radicalism lies somewhere in the spectrum of political doctrines, 
ranging from conservatism to revolutionary anarchism. Its origins are to be 
found in the beginnings of the French Revolution.
1 Bloch Roger, Histoire du parti radical-socialiste, Paris, 1968, 39.
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 However, the term “Radical” was first used in England in 1776,2 
when Major Cartwright founded the first political party bearing this name.3 
Although Major Cartwright’s party proved short-lived, his efforts were not 
insignificant. In 1776, he organized a political party designed to represent 
the interests of the two most numerous social groups in England: workers 
and peasants. In his political program, Cartwright insisted on an electoral 
reform and argued vigorously for secret ballot. In his opinion, this would 
have caused a fundamental change in English politics by providing a pow-
erful voice to the largest and most politically excluded social groups.4 The 
second important point of Cartwright’s  program included freedom of press 
and equal rights for all citizens.5
The impact of the British Radical Party in European history is more 
symbolic than substantial. The Party started a tradition and provided a 
certain – albeit vague – basis for the future Radical doctrine. Still, there is 
no historical continuity between this small political grouping in England 
and the later Radical movements in Europe – especially in France, where it 
would become the strongest. Its short existence and relatively modest im-
pact on English politics of the time only supports this fact. 
Much more significant for the origins and basic foundations of Radi-
calism were the contributions of two British political thinkers from the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century: Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. They 
provided the philosophical background to democratic Radicalism.6
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) was a British philosopher and jurist. 
His political theory of “utilitarianism” is explained succinctly in Bentham’s 
own famous sentence:
The object of all legislation must be “the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people”. In his political writings, Bentham advocated an-
nual elections, equal electoral districts, a wide suffrage, and secret ballot. In 
1792 Bentham was made a French citizen.
Among his works of great importance were The Introduction to Prin-
ciples of Morals and Legislation (1789) and The Catechism of Parliamentary 
Reform (1817).7
2 Jammy Schmidt, Idées et images radicales, Paris, 1934, 21.
3 Ibid, 21.
4 Elies Halery, La formation du radicalisme philosophique, vol. 1, Paris, 1900, 215.
5 Ibid, 216–217.
6 Gaston Maurice, Le parti radical, Paris, 1928, 19.
7 Jammy Schmidt, Idées et images radicales, 22.
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James Mill (1773–1836) was the founder of what scholars have 
dubbed “philosophical Radicalism”. His writings on government and his 
personal influence among the liberal politicians of his time characterized 
the transition from French Revolutionary theories of human rights and ab-
solute equality to the claiming of securities for good government through 
a wide extension of the franchise. In 1808, Mill became acquainted with 
Jeremy Bentham and was for many years his closest companion and ally.8
The Radical doctrine undoubtedly belongs to the left side of the 19th-
century political spectrum. Probably the best way to describe the creed of 
the democratic essence of philosophical radicalism would be to quote the 
following sentence of Condorcet’s: “Toutes les institutions sociales doivent 
avoir pour but l’amelioration sociale et physique de la classe la plus nom-
breuse et la plus pauvre”.9
Nineteenth-century France witnessed the appearance, growth, and 
development of the Radical political movement and its ideology. Its im-
portance and impact on French politics grew steadily until it became the 
dominant force in the country’s society. According to French authors, the 
origins of Radicalism are to be found in the revolutionary years of the late 
18th century. Most of them identify Condorcet, one of the distinguished fig-
ures of the Revolution, as the father of French Radicalism, although they 
acknowledge the existence of similar ideological traces in the Jacobin politi-
cal experience.10
The Radicals from the 1880’s often emphasized the revolutionary 
origins of their movement. Very illustratively, Leon Gambetta stressed the 
continuing line in the history of French Radicalism, stating:
« La Révolution française, c’est l’affrechisement  de toutes les créa-
tures vivantes, non seulement comme individues, mais comme 
membres d’une société collective.
De telle sorte, Messieurs, que pour ceux qui poursuivent l’etablisse-
ment de la justice, il n’y a rien au-dessus ny’endehors de la Révolution 
française. »11
And again:
8 Halevy, 219.
9 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes thèses radicales, Paris, 1928, preface by Edouard Her-
riot, iv-v.
10 Ibid. 
11 Pierre Barral, Les fondateurs de la troisième république, Paris, 1968, 9–12.
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« Qu’est-ce qu’on voulu, en effet, nos prédécesseurs, les auteurs de la 
Déclaration des droits? Qu’est-ce qu’on voulut Mirabeau, Saint-Juste 
lui-même, Robespierre, les esprits rendus exclusive par la passion et 
par cette étroitesse d’esprit qui fait les combattants? Ils ont surtout 
voulu dans leurs jours de sérénité dans laquelle les frères ainés c’est 
à dire ceux qui sont arrivé seraient les instituteurs, les patrons, les 
guides, les protecteurs de ceux qui placés au-dessous, n’avaient pu 
recevoir les bienfaits de l’éducation de la fortune, mais qui avaient 
leurs droits, eux aussi. »12
It was the same feeling of affiliation with the Great Revolution that inspired 
Camille Pelletan when he cried out at the First Congress of the French Radi-
cal Party in 1901: “Nous sommes tous les fils de la Révolution!”13 Moreover, 
Edouard Herriot, a Radical leader in the interwar period, wrote about the 
revolutionary roots of the Radical doctrine in France:
« On pourrait soutenir, sans paradoxe, que Voltaire et Diderot furent 
des radicaux. Condorcet, en tout cas, trace avec vigueur la voie ou 
s’engageront les fondateurs de notre doctrine moderne. Dans l’œuvre 
de Benjamin Constant je rencontre plus qu’une thèse qui s’incorpo-
rera dans notre programme… »14
The second wave of Radicals in France emerged during the July Mon-
archy in the 1830s. It was in 1832 that the word “Radicalisme” was used for 
the first time in France to denote a specific political ideology. More pre-
cisely, the republican newspaper “Le Temps” used this term in its issue of 
February 20.15
In these early days, the Radicals were gathered around a political 
group known as La Société des Droits d’Homme, organized also in 1832, 
whose program was based on the Declaration of Civil Rights of 1793 
and which espoused the republican political orientation. This group was 
led by the leading Radical of the second generation – Alexandre Auguste 
Ledru-Rollin.
The entire second phase in the history of the French Radical move-
ment was closely connected with Ledru-Rollin, a famous lawyer, writer, 
revolutionary and politician.
12 Ibid., p.51.
13 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 2.
14 Ibid., v-vi.
15 Claude Nicolet, Le Radicalisme, Paris, 1957, 15–16; Albert Milhaud, Histoire du 
radicalisme, Paris, 1951, 17–19.
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Ledru-Rollin was born in Paris in 1807 (according to some historians 
in 1808) into a well-known and established family. While his political career 
began only in the 1830s, by the 1840s he had already become one of the 
most distinguished leaders of the movement of the Left.
He soon joined Louis Blanc, and actively contributed to Blanc’s news-
paper “La Reforme”. In the years preceding the Revolution of 1848, Ledru-
Rollin formulated his understanding of the Radical concept in numerous 
newspaper articles and public appearances. Beyond doubt, it was he who 
laid the basis for the powerful French Radical movement. In 1847 he defi-
ned the term « Radical »:
« Nous sommes des ultra-radicaux, si vous entendez par ce mot le 
Parti qui veut faire entrer dans la réalité de la vie le grand symbole de 
la liberté, de l’égalité et de la fraternité.16
It appears obvious from these lines of Ledru-Rollin’s that his political 
convictions were still very dependent on the traditional revolutionary slo-
gans, and that his thoughts grew from the ideas of 1789.
The ideas of Ledru-Rollin were influenced by the philosophy of soli-
darism. Contrary to the growing Marxist ideology which stressed the strug-
gle of social classes and the fundamental struggle between capital and labor, 
solidarism defended the idea of union and collaboration between the two. 
Ledru-Rollin rote:
« Il faut proclamer l’importance de la question sociale et le danger 
de la domination du capital: la solution est dans l’union du capital 
et du travail car LA PROPRIÉTÉ EST BONNE ET DEVRAIT ÊTRE 
ÉTENDUE Â NOUS. »17
Solidarism and other Ledru-Rollin’s ideas were vigorously attacked 
by Karl Marx. Solidarism did not accept the Marxist neglect for the intel-
lectual sphere of human development. Thus, Marx saw the leader of French 
Radicalism as nothing more than a petty bourgeois politician. For Marx, 
there could be no barrier among men but money. 
«  Oublierait-on les barrières du savoir et de l’ignorance?  » asked 
Ledru-Rollin.18
During the 1848 Revolution, Ledru-Rollin joined the union of the 
Left which consisted of three major groups: the moderates led by François 
Arago, Lamartine and Marrast, the radicals represented by Ledru-Rollin 
16 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 59–60.
17 Nicolet, 20–22.
18 Milhaud, p. 21.
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and Flocon and the socialists (extrème gauche) headed by Louis Blanc and 
Albert Martin. In the provisional government, Ledru-Rollin accepted the 
post of minister of interior. As his main goal, he established the introduc-
tion of universal suffrage, which he regards as “arbles de la liberté”.19
« La République est le gouvernement du peuple par le peuple, la na-
tion fallait elle-même ses affaires . . . Appelez tous les habitants d’une 
même patrie à nommer leurs magistrats…20
Ledru-Rollin best expressed the revolutionary spirit of his ministerial 
actions in the message to provincial police prefects:
« Vos pouvoirs sont illimités. Agents d’une autorité révolutionnaire 
vous êtes révolutionnaires aussi . . . Vous êtes des missionnaires des 
idées nouvelles . . . Que votre mot d’ordre soit partout.21
Ledru-Rollin became a candidate for the President of the Republic in 
December of 1848 together with his rivals Louis Napoleon and Cavegnac. 
Despite the fact that Ledru-Rollin lost the elections, winning a modest 5% 
of the votes,22 he came out with a completely defined political program. This 
platform, outlined in five principal points, represented the basis for future 
radical political programs. His message of 1848 was later included in the 
foundations of French Radicalism of the Third Republic.23 
The program of Ledru-Rollin could be summarized as follows:
1) Executive power is totally subordinated to legislative power.
2) The establishment of absolute freedom of the press, association, 
and public speech.
3) Secular, free and compulsory education.
4) Proportional and progressive tax system.
5) Complete application of the elective principle for all public offices.24
In the entire political career of Ledru-Rollin, there were two main 
points which determined his political views. As already noted, the first re-
ferred to his understanding of the relation between capital and labor. Ledru-
Rollin insisted on the union of the two as the only possible path to social 
prosperity (philosophy of solidarism). The second important point of Rol-
19 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 116–118.
20 Ibid., 120.
21 Jean-Thomas Nordmann, Histoire des radicaux, 1820–1973, Paris, 1974, 43.
22 Milhaud, pp. 48–49.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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lin’s political program was constitutionalism. He emphasized the idea of 
constitutionalism (limitation of power) as the supreme political and legal 
document, whose force must be superior in order to provide a secure demo-
cratic process. He believed that the constitution must be defended by all 
means even if that required the use of arms.25
In 1871, Ledru-Rollin was elected delegate in the French National 
Assembly together with 80 Radicals, among which were Clemenceau, Flo-
quet, Brisson, Lackroy, and others.
In his old age, he led the third generation of Radicals to the parlia-
mentary stage and assisted in the creation of the French Radical Party.26
In the words of His Majesty Victor Hugo:
« Trois illustres esprits représentent cette époque mémorable: Louis 
Blanc en est l’apôtre. Lamartine en est l’orateur. Ledru-Rollin en est 
le tribun. »27
Throughout the great revolutionary age, the radical cause remained 
incorporated in the republican issue and was not clearly visible as a separate 
political concept. In the 1830s and 1840s, the process of emancipation of 
radicalism from the ideological tutorship of republicanism began.28 Radi-
calism was gradually emerging as a complete political doctrine, in which 
republicanism represented only one point, albeit a very important one. The 
crucial figure in this process of separation was Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-
Rollin. His political actions and ideas, which were finally crystallized in his 
presidential program, represent the initial ideological definition of radical-
ism—although the process of emancipation would go on until the 1870s.
Throughout the history of French radicalism, the movement was al-
ways closely tied to the Republic.
This relationship was both inevitable and logical. However, until the 
appearance of Ledru-Rollin, this relationship could be described as paren-
tal, in favor of the republican idea. Under his influence, radicalism in France 
became a full and complete political movement which consistently grew in 
both numbers and importance. This, of course, does not mean that radical-
ism came into conflict with republicanism.
On the contrary, the second half of the 19th century witnessed an 
original kind of parallelism between the two, now entirely defined and orga-
nized into political concepts and movements. Ledru-Rollin represented the 
25 Nordmann, 47.
26 Milhaud, 52.
27 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 184–185.
28 Milhaud, 16.
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transition between the period in which radicalism had existed within the 
republican ideology, and the period in which it acted as a separate political 
movement. The history of 19th-century France was marked by the continu-
ing struggle between the Republic and the Monarchy.
Once the Republican system was finally achieved in 1871, it provided 
fertile ground for the development of various political movements within 
the Republic. Among these movements, Radicalism emerged as the most 
important and the most mature. The pivotal figure in this process was none 
other than Ledru-Rollin.
* * *
In the early 1870s, the French suffered a painful defeat in the Franco-Prus-
sian war (1870–71). Moreover, serious political unrest and crisis culminated 
in the Paris Commune (1871), the promulgation of the new Constitution 
(1875), and the final victory of the republican principle (1877). France had 
entered a period of frequent political change and general instability.
Among many political impulses which exploded in French politics of 
this period, the Radical movement undoubtedly occupied a distinguished 
place. The rise and growth of modern Radicalism in France started some-
time in the late 1860s. Two important documents marked the beginning of 
Radical activity. The first was the work of Jules Simon, a well-known po-
litical author who wrote La Politique Radicale (1868).29 Also, the celebrated 
Belleville program, authored by Léon  Gambetta, was made public in 1869.30 
This second document clearly defined the Radical political platform and 
served as the guideline for future political actions of the Radicals.
The 1870s and the 1880s were also years of political fermentation and 
differentiation within the Republican movement. The Republican move-
ment in France, as previously mentioned, consisted of different political 
groups, ranging from conservative republicans to socialists – including, 
of course, the Radicals. In the 1870s the Radicals appeared as a separate 
and clearly visible political element headed by a group of representatives in 
the French National Assembly, who fought for the ideas expressed in their 
program.31
By the early 1880s, the Radical movement in France broke up into 
two independent camps. On one side stood the so-called moderates led 
by Gambetta, who argued for the postponement of radical socio-political 
29 Nordmann, 56.
30 lbid., 58–59. See also Milhaud, 57–58 and Nicolet, 161–162.
31 Nordmann, 87.
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reforms for a more opportune time: they were hence named the “oppor-
tunists.” On the other side, the radical-socialists, headed by Georges Clem-
enceau, advocated the immediate application of the Radical political and so-
cial program.32 The division of the movement occurred during the elections 
held in 1881. The Radicals were divided into two large groups: L’Union re-
publicaine (opportunists) and L’Extrème gauche radicale-socialiste headed by 
Clemenceau, Louis Blanc, and Camille Pelletan. Between these two oppos-
ing factions stood a third grouping called La Gauche Radicale which refused 
to accept the split. Distinguished members of this option were Allain-Targé, 
Floquet and Brisson.33 Léon Gambetta died soon after the split (in 1882) 
and the Radical movement continued to exist as a radical-socialist bloc.
What makes these events in the history of French Radicalism even 
more complex is the fact that throughout this period the Radicals were not 
officially organized as a political party, although they essentially acted as 
one. The formation of the Radical Party in France did not occur until 1901. 
The reasons for the belated creation of official party organization will be 
discussed later in this chapter. In order to paint a full picture of the French 
Radical movement and its ideology from the late 1860’s to 1903, one ought 
to consider primarily its political activities and written documents as well as 
its social structure and its informal structure. 
Jules Simon’s La Politique Radicale was the first work which attempted 
to crystallize Radical political beliefs. Simon was a professor of philosophy 
at the Sorbonne, who was forced to retire by the Empire on account of his 
liberal political views. In 1863 he became the deputy of Paris in the Corps 
Législatif. As witnessed by Albert Milhaud, Simon argued for the separation 
of Church and State, absolute freedom of the press and communal autono-
my.34 In La Politique Radicale, Jules Simon gave very important explana-
tions regarding the fundamental ideas of Radicalism and, at the same time, 
offered definitions and established relations between Radicalism and other 
political ideologies:
« Le titre des « radicaux » signifie seulement hommes des principes. 
Il convient, donc, d’ajouter que le radicalisme dont il s’agit ici est le 
radicalisme dans le sens de la liberté. »35
Simon was very specific when expressing his thoughts on Radical 
policies. His style was characterized by positive simplicity and neatness of 
32 Jammy Schmidt, Idées..., 58–61.
33 Nicolet, 30.
34 Nordmann, 57.
35 Ibid.
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ideas as well as by intellectual dynamism. As one of the leading French au-
thorities in the field of philosophy, Simon succeeded in producing a brilliant 
piece of work in which he combined two basic elements, and managed to 
achieve two primary goals.
On one hand, he gave fundamental theoretical generalizations con-
cerning the Radical political doctrine. On the other hand, he dealt with very 
practical problems of Radical activities and future policies, as well as Radical 
views on particular questions of everyday politics. Simon defined the Radi-
cal policy in few words, covering both its theoretical and practical aspects:
«  En fait de politique: comme origine la souveraineté nationale; 
comme mesure la moindre action; comme garantie la publicité et la 
responsabilité a tous les degrés. »36
The work of Simon had great importance for the development of the 
French Radical movement: it marked the beginning of organized Radical 
action in the last three decades of the 19th century; it stood as the first writ-
ten work to define the Radical political program; finally, it served as a model 
for future Radical manifestos and programs.
The Belleville program, made public in April 1869, was the first of-
ficial political manifesto of French Radicalism. It served as a major political 
program of Radicalism until 1905.37 The Belleville program became a sort 
of supreme criterion for Radical political consistency. Loyalty to Belleville 
meant, at the same time, commitment to the Radical movement as a whole. 
It was regarded as the source of the Radical ideology and action for more 
than thirty five years. All subsequent political programs which followed the 
Belleville document depended heavily on this first and principal manifesto 
of French Radicalism.
The Belleville program was written in twelve points – very precisely, 
concisely and clearly. As major issues of Radicalism, this document empha-
sized: universal suffrage, individual freedom secured by the law, abrogation 
of the law on general security, legal responsibility of all public officials, ab-
solute freedom of press, absolute freedom of reunion and public discussion 
of all matters, complete separation of Church and State, secular, free and 
compulsory primary education, reduction of the standing army for financial 
reasons, the principle of election for all public officials and the introduction 
of social reforms according to the principle of justice and social equality.38
36 Nordmann, 58.
37 Tony Revillon, Camille Pelletan, Paris, 1930, 20.
38 Nordmann, 58–59.
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Essentially the same set of political demands was repeated in Louis 
Blanc’s appeal to the electorate in 1876. In this proclamation, Blanc insist-
ed on universal suffrage, compulsory, free and secular primary education, 
communal autonomy, unique and proportional tax system, and on absolute 
freedom of the press, reunion, and association. In this appeal to the citizens 
of Paris, Louis Blanc proclaimed that “the acceptance of this program means 
being a member of the Radical Party”.39 Prior to the elections of 1881, which 
had had special meaning for French Radicals due to the split and the ideo-
logical clarification that followed the break, two prominent Radical lead-
ers came out with their political programs. Both Georges Clemenceau and 
Camille Pelletan declared publicly their “action-platforms” for immediate 
political reform.
In his campaign for the 1881 elections, Clemenceau insisted on vital 
political changes which included the revision of the Constitution (dissolu-
tion of the Upper Chamber – the Senate), unlimited freedom of press, asso-
ciation and public reunion guaranteed by the Constitution, strict separation 
of the Church and State, compulsory, secular and free primary schooling, 
substitution of standing armies by national militia, free and equal justice 
for everyone, elective and magistrates on all levels, universal male suffrage, 
personal and criminal accountability of all public functionaries, administra-
tive decentralization according to the principle of communal autonomy and 
progressive tax system on capital and revenue.40 In the section dealing with 
social issues, Clemenceau stressed the need for the reduction of working-
day hours, responsibility of the patron in case of an accident, participation 
of trade unions in public affairs and the introduction of a ban on exploita-
tion of prison labor.41
Although expressing similar ideas as that of Clemenceau, Camille 
Pelletan’s program was much more detailed and specific. It stands as the 
best example of Radical political and socio-economic ideology in the early 
1880s. Pelletan, like Clemenceau, emphasized the revision of the Constitu-
tion as his primary demand. This revision would abolish both the Senate 
and the Presidency of the Republic. Pelletan’s governmental reform included 
the establishment of a unicameral National Assembly (House of Deputies) 
which was designed to deal with matters of national interest. General coun-
cils were to act as supreme representative bodies on the level of departments 
and to decide about the issues of departmental interest. Pelletan applied the 
39 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 185–187.
40 Maurice, 119.
41 Ibid.
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same pattern on the level of municipalities (rule of self-government).42 He 
advocated an administrative system comparable to the so-called “system of 
Convent” based on the principle of representation and local self-govern-
ment – a kind of governmental pyramid of elective representative bodies on 
each level of the administrative structure. This system, he thought, would 
provide a full and complete democratic mechanism of decision making. Pel-
letan founded the entire state organization on the principle of communal 
autonomy, wherein “the commune is to be the master of its administration, 
finances and police”.43
Like all previous Radical programs, Pelletan’s electoral agenda stressed 
unlimited freedom of press, association and public reunion, the separation 
of Church and State, compulsory, secular, and free primary education, as 
well as revision of the tax system and application of universal suffrage as the 
supreme guarantor of national sovereignty. Like Clemenceau, Pelletan sug-
gested substitution of professional militaries by national guards.
In the chapter of his program dealing with judicial reforms, Pelletan 
insisted on the revision of all legal codes according to the principles of jus-
tice and equality. In the last point of his political program Camille Pelletan 
demanded that the exclusive right of declaring war should be granted to the 
entire nation, insisting, simultaneously, on a pacifist policy.44
The economic section of Pelletan’s electoral program limited the 
working day to ten hours, and prohibited work for children under the age 
of fourteen. He insisted on the establishment of retirement funds for older 
workers and the disabled. Again, like Clemenceau, he asked for the respon-
sibility of patrons in cases of accident and the abolition of labor exploitation 
in prisons. Pelletan directly called for nationalization of mines and railroads 
and for reorganization of the French National Bank.45
More than any other Radical political document, Camille Pelletan’s 
program of 1881 defined in detail the policy of French Radicalism. It em-
bodied all elements of the Radical political doctrine in its full complexity. 
It suggested a number of extremely important political reforms, while also 
emphasizing significant socio-economic changes. Opposed to growing so-
cialist – especially Marxist – ideologies, which demanded conflict between 
social classes, the Radicals suggested the collaboration of the two, accompa-
42 Revillon, 44–47.
43 Ibid.
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nied by a shared effort to secure a better social and political position for the 
working class within the existing socio-economic order.
These two political programs of 1881 represented the most illustra-
tive examples of Radical policy, and systematically expressed the platform of 
French Radicalism for the next twenty years.
In 1901, during the founding congress of the French Radical Party 
in Paris, essentially the same points were repeated. Most of them were in-
cluded in the final document of the Congress. The Radicals insisted on uni-
versal male suffrage, national sovereignty and the revision of the Constitu-
tion, equality in education, tax system reform. They also advocated social 
changes in favor of the “working world,”46 as well as a peacemaking policy 
in international relations.47 In 1901, the Radicals gradually turned towards 
the problems of rural France, emphasizing the need for fiscal reforms be-
cause “les taxes immobilisent la propiets rurale.”48 Finally, they concluded 
that « les taxes sont beaucoup trop lourdes sur la masse des cultivateurs qui 
forment la majorité et la force du pays. »49 It seems obvious and logical that 
the Radicals felt it necessary to stress the socio-economic position of the 
French peasantry, asking for the improvement of its material life.
Instead of making generalizations about the political ideology of the 
French Radical movement or more precisely about Radical views on the 
most sensitive political issues, one may, at least, try to find and describe 
certain general points which characterized Radical political thought from 
Ledru-Rollin to Clemenceau.
The Radicals in France were always and uncompromisingly opposed 
to the Monarchy. Their beliefs grew out of the Republican movement, and 
they always remained unwavering republicans. The highest of their politi-
cal demands was the principle of universal male suffrage. This principle led 
them to the very foundations of democracy, which they grew to regard as 
the only path that could lead to social and political equality and prosperity. 
They understood democracy to mean equality in rights. The Radicals were 
always fervent opponents of legal inequalities and advocates of mobility and 
cooperation among social classes. Their understanding of social mobility 
meant the preference of unconditional justice over unconditional equal-
ity. The prominent Radical historian Jammy Schmidt was most illustrative 
when defining the Radical political philosophy:
46 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 227–228.
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« Assurer pour l’homme le maximum de liberté et de bien-être 
individuels dans le maximum d’organisation social harmonieuse et 
solidaire. »50
* * *
The organization of the Radical movement in France was somewhat pecu-
liar. It was not formed as an official political party until 1901, although the 
movement existed, grew, acted and played a significant role in French poli-
tics throughout the last quarter of the 29th century. During this period, some 
of the politicians who considered themselves Radicals even entered the gov-
ernment51, thus directly influencing French politics. Despite the fact that 
the Radical movement had remained unstructured, it was still referred to 
as a political party even prior to 1901.52 Throughout the period in question, 
the Radicals were present and active in the Lower Chamber of the French 
National Assembly.53 In 1877, for example, there were 100 Radical deputies 
within the Republican bloc. In 1881, 46 Radicals entered the French Parlia-
ment, and in 1885 this number had risen to 60. By 1889, there were 110; in 
1893 – 140, and in 1898 – 178 Radical representatives entered the National 
Assembly. By 1902, the Radicals had become the largest political force in the 
French Chamber, winning 261 seats in the House.54
In view of such massive representation, it is even more intriguing why 
the Radicals hesitated to create a party structure and hierarchy. The reason 
could easily be that the spirit of libertarian individuals among them seeped 
through to their local, independent committees, who were opposed to any 
kind of registration and the discipline of an organized party (Clemenceau, 
Pelletan, and Noquet). Georges Clemenceau even boycotted the First Con-
gress of the Radical Party in 1901.55
Regardless of the fact that the vertical organizational structure of the 
Radical Party did not exist until 1901, a number of municipal or depart-
mental autonomous committees were formed, first in Paris and later across 
the entire country. They provided fundamental organizational entities for 
the Radical membership. According to Albert Milhaud, in 1885 there were 
three major Radical committees in Paris: Le Comité de la rue Cadet, whose 
50 Jammy Schmidt, Idées..., 33.
51 See Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes..., 242; Nicolet, 89; Nordmann, 137.
52 Jammy Schmidt, Les grandes...,56–60.
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members were Clemenceau and Pelletan, L’alliance républicaine des comités 
radicaux et progressistes headed by Brisson and Floquet, and Le comité cen-
tral des groupes républicaines radicaux – socialistes de la Seine.56 In addition 
to these three committees, Nordmann mentions another two groups which 
had been organized later, in 1894. According to him, these committees had 
a decisive impact on the movement:
Le comité de la rue Tiguetonne which became the central committee 
of all local Radical groups and Le comité d’ action pour les reformes républic-
ains headed by Léon Bourgeois, the leading Radical intellectual and writer 
during the 1890s.57 By 1901, the Radical movement in France consisted of 
476 local committees covering the entire country. Each committee had at 
least “dix membres cotisants”.58
During the First Congress of the Republican and Radical-Socialist 
Party in Paris (June 21–24, 1901), the organizational structure was finally 
established. Each commune had a committee with at least 10 members. All 
communal committees were represented by a cantonal committee, and in 
each department there was a Departmental Federation. These federations 
were represented in regional federations which were organized in every 
region of France.59 At the top of this vertical structure was the Congress, 
which was to assemble every year. Between congresses, the Party was head-
ed by the Executive Committee, consisting of thirty-three members.60 The 
formative congress of the French Radical Party was attended by 1132 del-
egates including 78 Senators, 201 representatives in the Assembly, 155 free 
masonic lodges and 215 political newspapers.61
* * *
A special feature of the French Radical movement was its social structure. 
First of all, it is important to note that all segments of the French so-
ciety had become completely stratified by the late nineteenth century, and 
that all of them were present in the Radical movement.
56 Nordmann, 96.
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They differed, however, in number and significance within the Radi-
cal ranks. The only exception in this respect was the old aristocracy, which 
naturally never joined the Radical Party. The working class, peasantry, and 
certain layers of bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were all represented in the 
movement.
By 1871, in the beginning of modern Radicalism in France, Léon 
Gambetta appealed to the French peasantry, recognizing it as the most nu-
merous social stratum in French society. He was, of course, very well aware 
of the benefit of attracting peasants for the Radical republican cause. In his 
appeal, Gambetta argued for « une chambre rurale, dans le sens profond 
et vrai de ce mot (...) car c’est avec des paysans éclaires et libres, optes a 
se représenter eux-mêmes qu’on fait une chambre rurale ».62 Despite these 
early attempts to win over the peasant majority, this rapprochement was a 
long and gradual process due to the traditional conservatism (religious, po-
litical and social) of the French rural population. Deep Catholic beliefs and 
devotion to the Monarchy were a result of simplified identification of state 
authority with the personality of the ruler. The same type of bond, if not 
stronger, had developed between the French peasantry and their Church.
As these conservative convictions started slowly eroding as a conse-
quence of socio-economic and cultural changes and the penetration of the 
Radical ideas into the countryside, the French rural population started to 
join the Radical movement, first individually and then in large numbers. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the major social force of Radicalism in France 
was coming from the capital’s suburbs: petty bourgeoisie and middle class 
intelligentsia.
More precisely, the Radicals had the strongest appeal among the Pari-
sian working class, small proprietors and entrepreneurs. As far as the work-
ing class was concerned and its membership in the Radical movement, it 
would be interesting to quote the famous Clemenceau biographer, Zevaes:
« A ce moment-là (1881–1884, M.St.P), Clemenceau a pour lui l’im-
mense majorité de la classe ouvrière qui lui est reconnaissante de ses 
efforts pour l’amnistie et qui considère en lui le représentant de la 
démocratie la plus avancée. »63 
The bulk of the Radical movement was composed of lower-class ur-
ban population, small businessmen and local officials. Their vitality and 
62 Nordmann, 166.
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sense for politics were guarantors of prosperity and perseverance of their 
political organization.64
The leadership of the Radical movement was solely of intellectual ori-
gin and orientation, although the Paris intelligentsia was represented in all 
political parties and, moreover, stood at the top of most of them, especially 
of the most extremist ones.65 Georges Clemenceau, Camille Pelletan, Jules 
Simon, Léon Bourgeois, Stephan Pichon, Georges Laguerre were all intellec-
tuals – physicians, lawyers, teachers, authors or politicians by profession.66
It is interesting to note that it was not until 1895 that the Free Ma-
sonry started joining the Radicals. Until then, it had largely belonged to the 
Opportunist wing of the Republican bloc.67
* * *
Standing on the left side of the political spectrum, the French Radicals ar-
gued in favor of state interventionism, which meant an active role of the 
public sector in fostering social reforms, keeping the socio-economic stabil-
ity and safeguarding social justice.
In their own words:
« L’état a le droit et le devoir s’intervenir pour faire respecter la 
volonté et pour prévaloir l’intérêt supérieur de la communauté »,68 
stated Clemenceau in 1884.
The second Radical point was the so-called “associationalism”. In the-
ory, this term incorporated mutualism, syndicalism and cooperation among 
various segments of society. 
Solidarism represented the central social principle of French Radical-
ism. It meant the social amelioration and intellectual emancipation of the 
society in its entirety. 
Here is what they said on the subject:
« Délivrer l’homme des chaînes d’ignorance, l’affranchir du des-
potisme religieux, politique et économique(...), régler par la seule 
justice la liberté de son initiative . . . c’est ainsi seulement qu’on assu-
rera le triomphe définitif de la révolution politique, économique et 
64 Zevaes, 53–54, 126.
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sociale inaugurée par nos pères, puisque l’émancipation intellectuelle 
est le vrai fondement de l’émancipation économique. »69
Secularism (Laicism) stands as the fourth major item of the Radical 
socio-political agenda. The Radicals were sharply opposed to any religious 
impact in education, science, or knowledge in general. Their anti-clericalism 
was best expressed in their constant emphasis on the separation of Church 
and State. In their opinion, the principle of secularism had two fundamental 
effects: first, it secured free development of democracy with no religious 
interference whatsoever; second, it served as the basis for educational prog-
ress of the whole nation.70 Finally, the Radicals were uncompromising ad-
versaries of the French colonial policy. As a leftist party, they reckoned that 
this policy had been profitable only for a handful of capitalists and, more 
importantly, that it had become an obstacle on the road to internal change, 
both political and social.71 This element of Radical social ideology could 
also be described as Radicalist pacifism. 
Let us quote Georges Clemenceau again:
« La grande formule de la Révolution, liberté, égalité, fraternité, qui 
contient dans ces trois mots les droits d l’homme, toutes les réformes 
sociales, toutes les préceptes de la morale, se résume dans une for-
mule encore, La Justice. »72 
69 Nordmann, 81.
70 Nordmann, 98.
 See also Jammy Schmidt, Idées..., 39.
71 Revillon, 69
72 La Justice, No. 1, January 16, 1881
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Chapter Two
THE HISTORY
Following the Serbian-Turkish wars in the 1870s, an outburst of dynamic political events ensued in the early 1880s, culminating with the forma-
tion of modern political parties in Serbia. 
This phenomenon was the result of several key preconditions. Al-
though the promulgation of the Constitution in 1869 had not yet estab-
lished full parliamentary democracy, it had secured a political environ-
ment in which larger portions of the nation could take an active part in the 
process of political decision-making.1 This particular legal act expressed a 
compromise between the Crown and the National Assembly by dividing 
legislative authority, eliminating the previous oligarchical political tradition 
and almost unlimited power of the ruler. Secondly, after the assassination of 
Prince Mihailo Obrenović in 1868, Serbia was ruled by his underage neph-
ew Prince Milan Obrenović, who was represented by the Royal Regency. 
The Royal Regency was dominated by the strong political personality and 
later founder of the Liberal Party, Jovan Ristić, a graduate of the Heidel-
berg University.2 Facing opposition from both inside and outside, the Ser-
bian ruling circles had to do something. They decided, therefore, to adopt 
certain – albeit rather limited – democratic reforms from Western political 
experience. Thirdly, as a consequence of the Serbian-Turkish Wars and the 
stipulations of the Congress of Berlin (1878), Serbia became an internation-
1 Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 1, Beograd, 1934, 230–31. See also 
Miroslav Djordjević, ed., Ustavni razvitak Srbije u XIX veku, Leskovac, 1970.
2 Ibid.
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ally recognized independent state with all sovereign prerogatives, including 
the required internal constitutional structure. Fourthly, during this period 
a number of young Serbian students were sent to European universities to 
receive higher education. Exposure to European political developments, 
movements, and ideas accompanied them back to Serbia. Finally, Serbia had 
politically matured in the process, but had nevertheless kept its old partisan 
struggles and personal rivalries.
The predominantly rural Serbian society passed through several 
stages in the development of its national consciousness. The Serbs began by 
opposing Ottoman rule and building the foundations of a future modern 
nation-state in the early nineteenth century; they progressed by opposing 
the authority of that very state (peasant uprisings throughout the 1830s and 
1840s), ending with the final push against the Ottomans in 1876 (joined by 
Russia in 1877) and achieving full independence in 1878.
Until the early nineteenth century, Serbia was an egalitarian society 
composed almost entirely of the peasantry. 
Serbian peasantry matured during the subsequent decades, gradually 
learning to articulate its own views and interests. By the 1880s, Serbia was 
able to develop a thin, but quite vibrant layer of urban bourgeoisie, whose 
members had originated from the village and still had a largely peasant con-
sciousness, but coupled with rudimentary entrepreneur-like and merchant-
like mentality. At the same time, a third social layer grew within the Serbian 
society consisting of local intelligentsia (teachers, doctors, priests, local state 
authorities), who shared the social destiny of the peasantry, but had quite a 
defined political awareness. Headed by Belgrade intellectuals, this was basi-
cally the composition of the Serbian society in the 1880s.3
* * *
The People’s Radical Party was officially founded in 1881 as the first orga-
nized political party in Serbia.4 In its formative period (until 1903), Ser-
bian Radicalism passed through several stages of political and ideological 
development. 
The first period (1869–1880) could be described as the period of in-
troductory Radicalism or pre-Radicalism. In terms of its organization, the 
3 See Dimitrije Djordjević, “Srbija i srpsko društvo 1880-ih godina”, Istorijski časopis 
29–30 (1982–83), 413–426.
4 Živan Živanović, Politička istorija Srbije, II, Beograd, 1923–25, 161.
See also Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, II, 317; Živan Mitrović, 
Srpske političke stranke, Belgrade, 1935, 71; Michael Boro Petrovich, History of 
Modern Serbia 1804–1918, II, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976, 411.
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 The Ottoman Empire, 1801
movement was formally unorganized; in terms of its ideology, it encom-
passed the ideas of socialism, anarchism and peasant democracy. 
The second period, the period of militant (revolutionary) Radicalism 
(1881–1886), was marked by the organized and uncompromising opposi-
tion to the ruling system and the Crown, which culminated in the Timok 
Rebellion of 1883. Basically, this was an attempt to depose the government 
by force, which ended in complete disaster. The party was destroyed, some 
of the local leaders were killed; all of its leaders were imprisoned, except for 
the two who managed to flee.
The aftermath was marked by the Radicals’ wavering between armed 
resistance and legitimism. The period of pragmatic (compromising) Radi-
calism (1886–1894) was a time of general recuperation and reorganization 
of the movement, followed by its gradual inclusion into the existing order; 
the Radical Party was moving towards the position of a legitimate political 
force; coming to power for the first time (1887) and heading the govern-
ment (1887 onwards); the new Constitution of 1888, which was chiefly in-
fluenced by Radical ideological concepts; political deals with other political 
factors in Serbia, including the Crown. Then came the period of overpow-
kv
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ered (restrained) Radicalism (1894–1903), wherein, on one side, the Radi-
cals made serious compromises with rival parties and the King, reducing 
temporarily their political demands, and started competing for power while 
preserving their basic ideology; on the other hand, they were implicated in 
the so-called Ivanjdan5 assassination attempt and accused again of subver-
sive activities against the Obrenović dynasty.
As any other periodization, this one could be subjected to criticism 
of various sorts. Its major criteria, however, were the stages in the ideologi-
cal development of Radicalism in Serbia and their relation to the historical 
challenges of the time and vice versa. (Of course, in order to correspond to 
the central topic of this study.)
The period 1903–1914 was often labeled as the Golden Age in the 
history of the People’s Radical Party and the Kingdom of Serbia in general. 
After the assassination of the last ruler from the House of Obrenović 
(May 29, 1903)6 and the dynastic change, Serbia entered a period of full 
parliamentary democracy based on a slightly revised Constitution of 1888. 
From 1903 to 1914, the Radicals were in power most of the time, leading 
the country towards the European socio-economic and political model. 
Through twenty years of political struggle, persecution and temptation, the 
party had definitely matured, faced numerous impasses and dilemmas, clar-
ified and modified its ideological and structural foundations, and became 
capable of playing the key role in the process of Serbia’s modernization and 
Europeanization.
After the end of World War One and the creation of Yugoslavia, the 
Radical Party continued to exist and act as a political movement until 1941. 
However, general political, social, and cultural circumstances became so 
different that it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to consider it the same 
movement before and after 1918.
* * *
The group led by Svetozar Marković burst on the Serbian political scene 
in the late 1860s, and remained active until 1875.7 Svetozar Marković was 
a young political theorist and politician who had studied in Serbia, Rus-
sia, and Switzerland but was more focused on politics than science. He had 
devised a political doctrine combining elements of Russian socialism, the 
5 St John’s Day.
6 For more details see Dragiša Vasić, Hiljadudevetstotreća, Beograd, 1925.
7 See Slobodan Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, Beograd, 1920; Jovan Skerlić, Svetozar 
Marković, njegov život, rad i ideje, Beograd, 1922; Woodford McClellan, Svetozar 
Marković and the Origins of Balkan Socialism, Princeton, 1964.
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experience of the Russian “narodniki” movement and anarchism with West-
ern European socialist views, including some traces of Marxism.8 Having 
returned to Serbia in 1869 with a group of his fellow Serbian students from 
Switzerland, he launched a robust political action in Kragujevac, a town in 
central Serbia. Marković and his associates published a number of political 
newspapers and organized a dynamic political force. Through innumerable 
articles and writings, Marković developed his own socio-political teaching, 
which, although incomplete and at times inconsistent, represented the first 
radical-socialist philosophy not only in Serbia, but in the entire Balkan re-
gion as well.9 His theories were somewhat futuristic, romantic, and unreal-
istic, but they nevertheless had a strong impact on contemporary and future 
Serbian political events.
Marković’s teaching could be roughly divided into three major sec-
tions: his political concept, his socio-economic doctrine, and his national 
program.10 
In his political agenda, Svetozar Marković stressed several key points. 
His concepts included a very strong anti-bureaucratic sentiment. He argued 
in favor of abolition of a professional administration, which he regarded 
as the main obstacle on the road to economic and cultural emancipation 
of the Serbian population: “I consider the destruction of the bureaucratic 
system as the first necessity in Serbia.”11 Marković also underscored the sig-
nificance of municipal and regional self-governmental organization instead 
of the professional administrative apparatus. He preferred elected and col-
lective bodies in communes and regions to be supreme authorities in their 
respective areas. According to Marković, communal assemblies incorporate 
all democratically chosen officials in the commune: not only the adminis-
trators, chief of police, public prosecutor and the judge, but also the doc-
tor and the teacher.12 The whole structure of state establishment was to be 
derived from the slogan that “the question of bread is the question of local 
self-government”.13
The last of Marković’s political objectives, the supreme authority of 
the National Assembly, logically followed the principle of local self-govern-
8 Sofija Škorić, “The Populism of Nikola Pašić: the Zurich Period”, East European 
Quarterly, vol. XIV, no. 4, Winter, 1980.
9 McClellan, 168.
10 Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, 21–30.
11 Svetozar Marković, “Srpske obmane”, Zastava, Novi Sad, 1869.
12 Svetozar Marković, Odabrani spisi, Beograd, 1969, 82.
13 Ibid.
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ment. Marković argued that the National Assembly, completely elective on 
regional basis, represented the ultimate legislative authority. Consequently, 
this line of reasoning brought him to the “Convent system” of government 
and, further on, to republicanism.14 
The socio-economic portion of Svetozar Marković’s opus suggested 
the abolition of private ownership and the establishment of communal 
property. His economic concept was based on the traditional patriarchal 
family cooperative, the so-called Serbian “zadruga” (cooperative).15 Fasci-
nated by its authentically democratic organization and spirit, Marković put 
it at the center of his socio-economic theory: “The modern economic ideal 
is very close to the economic mechanism of the Serbian zadruga”.16 In his 
opinion, it represented “the most advanced communism of ownership, work 
and pleasure”.17 Marković was heavily influenced by Nikolai Chernyshevsky. 
This Russian socialist discovered the perfect model for his economic system 
in Russian traditional institutions -the Russian “mir” and “obshchina”.18 Fol-
lowing his teacher, Marković also built his system on the Serbian concept of 
“zadruga”.19
The national concept of Svetozar Marković was focused on the defeat 
of both empires present in the Balkans, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ot-
toman Empire. Moreover, he pleaded for the liberation of all Serbs and their 
free association with other Balkan nations in a federation achieved through 
an armed uprising:20
“The Serbian people have no choice but to launch a revolution in the 
Balkan Peninsula, a revolution which would end in the disappearance 
of all states which exist today on the road to the unification of free 
peoples and workers in a union of communes, regions – or states... ”21
In the early 1870s, political fermentation in Serbia was mirrored in 
two parallel processes. On one side, the group led by Svetozar Marković, 
which included a handful of young, European-educated and politically 
very conscious men – leaning towards radical-socialist ideas – developed 
14 Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, 112.
15 McClellan, 239.
16 Svetozar Marković, Javnost, no. 20, Kragujevac, 1873.
17 Ibid.
18 Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 
1974.
19 McClellan, 241.
20 Svetozar Marković, Celokupna dela, vol. II, Beograd, 1892–1921, 35–36.
21 Svetozar Marković, Srbija ne Istoku, Beograd, 1872, 167–168.
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a rather well-organized action, especially through political newspapers 
such as Radenik (Laborer), Javnost (Public), Rad (Labor) and Oslobodjenje 
(Liberation).22 At about the same time, in 1874, in the National Assembly 
appeared a group of representatives, attracting attention by their peasant ap-
pearance, outspoken attitudes, and public speeches in which they defended 
the interests of the Serbian peasantry.23 These representatives came from 
the countryside and from various regions of the Serbian territory, but all 
were gathered around the same political objective – the improvement of the 
socio-economic position of Serbian peasantry.24
Thus, in the politically underdeveloped Serbian environment, these 
two trends found common grounds for joint action: young intellectuals at-
tracted to European socialism which they vigorously tried to implement in 
Serbia, and the group of peasant deputies, expressed the simplified and es-
sentially hostile attitude of the peasantry towards the government. But, as 
much as this combination appears peculiar and confusing, it does have an 
obvious explanation. Without any traces of working class or capitalist eco-
nomic relations as a dominant socio-economic factor, no idea of European 
socialism could find fertile soil in Serbia. Consequently, the promoters of 
socialist ideology were forced to look for supporters among the peasants, as 
they made up the most numerous social stratum in Serbian society.
As a result of this mutual influence, the young Serbian socialists toned 
down their ideological exclusiveness and the peasant element obtained a 
solid theoretical guideline for future political action. The best illustration of 
the common origins of these two trends is the fact that Svetozar Marković, 
the leader of the socialist group, and Adam Bogosavljević, the dominant 
figure among peasant Assembly members, had both attended Velika škola 
(Belgrade Grand School, the predecessor of the University of Belgrade) at 
the same time in the early 1860s.25
As early as 1875, the group led by Adam Bogosavljević26 came out 
with a defined program, which was mainly focused on anti-bureaucratism 
and included three major points: reduction of state officials’ salaries, ab-
olition of district offices,27 and the establishment of regional self-govern-
22 Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, 98.
23 Restislav Petrović, Adam Bogosavljević, Beograd, 1972, p42.
 See also Skerlić, 174.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 For a short biography, see Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
27 “Okružna načelstva” – regional branches of the central government.
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ments.28 At the same time, they insisted on a constitutional reform which 
would guarantee exclusive legislative powers to the National Assembly, as 
well as the standard principles of democracy (freedom of press, association, 
and public reunion).29
The point is that the program of Adam Bogosavljević’s group was 
heavily influenced by Svetozar Marković’s ideas. However, Bogosavljević 
adopted only the political, anti-bureaucratic, aspect of Marković’s teachings 
and left out his socio-economic deliberations. This was primarily because 
the latter held no appeal to Serbian peasantry.
Historically, both of these political movements ‒ the radical-socialist 
program of Marković’s group and the activities of Bogosavljević’s group in 
the Parliament ‒ proved rudimentary and short-lived attempts at building 
a democratic society. Their importance, however, lies in their role as pre-
decessors of subsequent political developments. Basically, they served as 
preliminary, yet very valuable, experiences of the people who would later 
initiate the founding of the People’s Radical Party in Serbia. Certain ideas 
incorporated into the Radical political program had been presented al-
ready in the course of these early efforts. To a certain degree, both groups 
(Marković’s and Bogosavljević’s) suffered from political naiveté, leftist ideal-
ism and simplification of complex issues of state building. Perhaps the most 
serious problem of their radical-socialist orientation was their inability to 
cope with Serbian realities: the real, everyday troubles of the Serbian popu-
lation, and overly optimistic expectations of the Serbian peasantry. Radi-
cal-socialist ideas imported from abroad could hardly correspond to the 
politically, economically and socially underdeveloped Serbian society. On 
the other hand, the group of Adam Bogosavljević pointed out certain fun-
damental discrepancies in the Serbian political system, but was incapable of 
developing its own positive political alternative. Its attitudes were essentially 
negative and offered no viable option.
The radical-socialist venture of Svetozar Marković’s group did not last 
more than few years. After the death of its front man in 1875, the movement 
slowly started to fall apart. Its sole attempt at revival in 1876 also failed (the 
so-called “Red Banner” affair).30
The city of Kragujevac in the heart of Serbia was the center of socialist 
and radical-socialist action of Marković’s group. In February 1876, the con-
flict between government forces and the radical-socialists over local elec-
28 Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, 61.
29 Jaša Prodanović, Istorija političkih stranaka i struja u Srbiji, Beograd, 1947, 373.
30 Velizar Ninčić, Pera Todorović, Beograd, 1956, p. 47–50; Živanović, II, 137–140; 
Prodanović, p. 402–406, V.
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tions ended in massive demonstrations and open confrontation. The dem-
onstrators, led by radical-socialist activists and followed by workers from 
the Kragujevac armament factory, raised a red flag with the word “Samou-
prava” (self-government), thus expressing their Markovićevist ideological 
inclinations.31 The same evening, the incident was ended by the energetic 
reaction of the police and military forces. Among the conspirators of the 
demonstrations, who were later found guilty and sentenced to prison, were 
old collaborators of Svetozar Marković and future founders of the Radical 
Party: Pera Todorović and Pera Velimirović.32 They, however, managed to 
flee from Serbia before their trial and were pardoned in 1880.33
After that, the activities of this particular political group gradually 
lost momentum until it eventually disappeared. Due to the war with the 
Ottomans (1876–1878), which had mobilized all mental and physical forces 
of the Serbian people, as well as the later diplomatic developments which 
chiefly determined the future of Serbia (opposition to the San Stefano Treaty 
and achieving independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878), the internal 
political contradictions were put aside. The radical-socialist movement, as 
it had existed in the previous period, was never reborn. Nevertheless, indi-
vidual motions and actions of former Markovićist parliamentarians con-
tinued.34 In the late 1870s, this faction gradually grew in importance and 
numbers, becoming an outspoken voice of the minority opposition in the 
Serbian National Assembly.
* * *
The late 1870s and the early 1880s brought a drastic political polarization 
among the members of the Serbian National Assembly. The Parliament be-
came the “grand stage” of Serbian politics and the place from which each 
and every political party originated. Serbia’s underdeveloped political struc-
tures led to a kind of parallelism of powers: the Ruler and the Assembly 
turned into bitter adversaries, often resulting in a political gridlock.35
31 Prodanović, 402.
32 Živanović, p. 141–142.
For personal details about these two, see Chaper 6 (The Leaders).
33 Prodanović, 403–104.
34 Raša Milošević, Timočka buna 1883. godine, Beograd, 1923, 13–18; Živanović, II, 
158; Prodanović, 437–440.
35 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, III, 411; See also: Milivoje Popović, 
Borbe za parlamentarni režim u Srbiji, Beograd, 1939, 54.
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At the beginning of the 1880s, three major political camps formed in 
the Serbian Parliament. Although not yet completely defined in organiza-
tion and ideology, these informal blocs of assembly members, who some-
times switched from one side to another, represented the nucleus of future 
political parties.
The Liberals were the oldest political group in Serbian politics. They 
emerged from the St. Andrew Assembly in 1858 and dominated Serbian 
politics from 1868 to 1880.36 Led by the well-educated and influential Jovan 
Ristić, they brought certain Western liberal ideas to Serbia, even though 
their nationalism was much more pronounced than their quest for free-
dom. Influenced by nationalist ideologies from abroad (mainly German), 
the Serbian Liberals sought internal progress through national liberation 
and unification. Their rule was marked by two crucial achievements: the 
Constitution of 1869, which opened the door for semi-parliamentarism and 
semi-democracy, and the attainment of international recognition and state 
independence in 1878.37
The Young Conservatives, who later formed the Serbian Progres-
sive Party, included some of the most brilliant scholars and intellectuals in 
Serbia38 and formulated a program of modernization through moderate re-
forms implemented from above. Oriented towards the elite of the Serbian 
society, they sought national growth through collaboration of the intelligen-
tsia and the Crown. Despite the name, its conservatism was “combined with 
liberal ideas”.39 The problem, however, was that the Young Conservatives 
(Progressivists) did not believe in the capacity of the Serbian “backward and 
illiterate” peasant to make the right decisions in the realm of public affairs. 
The necessary advancement of Serbia had to come from the top, since it 
was only the elites, together with the King, that could lead the nation to a 
brighter future. Disappointed by the Russians’ behavior towards Serbia,40 
they championed the closest relations with the Habsburgs. 
The third group were the Radicals, who began in coalition with the 
Young Conservatives (1879–1880), thus forming a powerful opposition 
bloc to counter the ruling Liberal government. This coalition was, however, 
36 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, Ill, 412. See also: Gale Stokes, Legiti-
macy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian 
Politics, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1975.
37 Ibid.
38 Milutin Garašanin, Milan Piroćanac, Stojan Novaković, Čedomilj Mijatović, Mi-
lan Milićević, etc.
39 Jovanović, Vlada Milana ..., II, 311.
40 The San Stefano Treaty of March 1878 stipulated the creation of Greater Bulgaria.
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temporary and not based on similar ideological grounds, but rather on a 
common interest in undermining the government. As a result of their joint 
pressure, the Radicals and the Young Conservatives were able to topple the 
Liberal government. Subsequently, the Young Conservatives formed their 
first cabinet41 in late 1880.42 In those days (prior to the final split), the Radi-
cals often used the Young Conservative newspaper Videlo (The Mirror) to 
publish their proclamations and political statements.43
The beginning of 1881 was marked by the most decisive moment in 
the history of Serbian Radicalism. On January 8, 1881, the first issue of the 
official organ of the People’s Radical Party Samouprava (The Self-govern-
ment) appeared, announcing the formal creation of the new political orga-
nization.44 This was the first political party officially founded in Serbia. It 
was immediately followed by the formation of the Serbian Progressive Party 
later in January, and the Liberal Party in October 1881.45
The first issue of Samouprava contained a general proclamation of the 
Party’s leadership, defining reasons for its foundation, as well as its major 
political stands. The Radical Party’s political program was published in the 
first issue of Samouprava and signed by thirty eight Assembly members, 
including Nikola Pašić, Aca Stanojević, Raša Milošević, Kosta Taušanović, 
Dimitrije Katić and Ranko Tajsić46 – followed by another 38 “fellow repre-
sentatives in the National Assembly”.47
Immediately after its inception, the Radical Party began a se-
ries of dynamic and full-fledged activities. Through daily articles in their 
newspapers,48 they launched vigorous attacks on the government, the 
Crown, and their policies. They focused primarily on practical, daily issues 
and political problems. The period from 1881 to 1883 was chiefly marked 
by the Radicals’ activities. At the same time, the movement was growing 
41 Presided by Milan Piroćanac, a lawyer.
42 Živanović, II, 155.
43 “Prijeteljima naroda”, Videlo, no. 138, November 21, 1880.
44 Živanović, II, 161; see Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, II, 317; Živan 
Mitrović, Srpske političke stranke, Beograd, 1939, 71; Michael Boro Petrovich, 
410–411.
45 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, II, 318–320.
46 See Mitrović, 71–75; Alex Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pašić, Yugoslavia, Rutgers 
University Press, New Jersey, 1976, 163; Michael Boro Petrovich, 411.
For biographical data, see Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
47 Živanović, II, 161–162.
48 Besides Samouprava, the Radicals published another newspaper – Rad (Labor) 
and a satirical weekly Ćosa (Beardless). 
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rapidly, mostly spreading among the provincial intelligentsia and peasant-
ry.49 A result of this growth of the movement was the first convention of 
the Radical Party, held under the open sky50 in the summer of 1882. With 
over one thousand people present, the caucus elected the Party’s leadership 
or rather its Main Board, as it was then called.51 Nikola Pašić52 became the 
first Chairman of the Radical Main Board, and Pera Todorović was elected 
Vice President.53 By 1883, the Radical movement had spread all over Serbia, 
becoming the country’s most numerous political organization. The Radicals 
felt strong enough to seize power. If they could not use legal democratic 
means, they were ready to use other available methods. By a machination of 
the Crown and the Progressivists, the Radicals were prevented from form-
ing their cabinet, although they won a clear majority at the elections in 
1882. By 1883, the conflict between the Radicals and the King had become 
so sharp that a clash seemed inevitable. On one side, there was a young, 
impatient movement, whose leadership was eager to seize power and imple-
ment a series of fundamental political reforms; on the other, there were the 
ruler and his supporters, who wanted to preserve the status quo in which 
their predominance would not be jeopardized.
The revolutionary dreams of the Radicals were finally realized in Oc-
tober 1883. After an article in Samouprava, in which the Radicals advised 
the population not to surrender its arms to the government,54 although such 
a demand had been announced, the peasants in Eastern Serbia started an 
armed revolt, which was soon named the Timok rebellion.55
The rebellion was led by local Radical leaders, the most distinguished 
of whom were Aca Stanojević, Žika Milenović, Ljuba Didić and Priest 
Marinko Ivković.56 Once the garrison stationed in the town of Paracin was 
called in, the uprising was crushed in a few days. The members of the Radi-
cal Main Committee, although not personally involved, were all taken into 
49 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 176.
50 Viline Vode near Kragujevac.
51 Milošević, Timočka buna..., 144–150.
52 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
53 Milošević, Timočka buna..., 144–150.
54 Anon., “Disarmament of the Popular Army”, Samouprava, July 30, 1883; Anon., 
“How to Get Rid of Illegal Elections”, Samouprava, August 30, 1883.
55 For more details see: Milošević, Timočka buna...; Dragutin Ilić, Zaječarska buna, 
Beograd, 1909; Momčilo Veljković, O Timočkoj buni 1883 godine, Beograd, 1936; 
Dimitrije Djordjević, “The 1883 Peasant Uprising in Serbia”, Balkan Studies, 20, 2, 
Thessaloniki, 1979.
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custody, except Nikola Pašić and Aca Stanojević57 who managed to flee to 
Bulgaria.58 The local leaders of the uprising were either court-martialled 
and sentenced to prison in Zaječar or managed to escape over the Bulgarian 
border.59 The Radical leadership was also tried. Three of its members – Pera 
Todorović,60 Raša Milošević61 and Nikola Pašić – were sentenced to death; 
Kosta Taušanović was sentenced to seven and Pavle Mihailović to five years 
in prison; Giga Geršić62 and Andra Nikolić63 were freed.
The trials left the Radical Party in ruins and disarray. 
At that crucial point in the history of the Radical Party, several im-
portant characteristics regarding its very nature could be singled out. First, 
the Radicals proved capable of building a political infrastructure and a spe-
cific agenda in a very short time span. Secondly, it showed its potential in 
both political views and manpower. Thirdly, its members became conscious 
of their own strength, challenging the supreme authority of the Crown and 
displaying fervor to take power at any cost and by any means. Still owing to 
their socialist and anarchist past, the Serbian radicals were playing around 
with prospects of a revolution and they paid a dear price for it. There was, 
however, a positive side to these events: they had matured through the 
process.
In the period of 1883–1889, the Radical Party remained largely in-
experienced in practical affairs and overwhelmed by its visionary ideas of 
revolution. The Timok Rebellion had been ill-organized and doomed to 
failure. The power of the state apparatus, the military and, above all, of the 
king’s personal authority were simply too great for a spontaneous uprising 
of the peasantry led by local Radical leaders and amateur commanders. The 
Radicals had stood no chance.
The Timok episode revealed another feature of the movement: the 
basic difference in mindsets between the Belgrade leadership and their ru-
ral followers. Although there were proposals among members of the Main 
Board to join the rebels, at the secret meeting on the eve of their arrests,64 
they all remained at a safe distance in the capital. On the contrary, the local 
57 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
58 Milošević, Timočka buna..., 109.
59 Ilić, 52.
60 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
61 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
62 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
63 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
64 Milošević, Timočka buna..., 110–111.
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Radicals took immediate command of the rebellion, personally taking up 
arms. It was a sign that the Radical Party – or its top leaders at least – was on 
the way of “embourgeoisement”.
The final aspect of the Timok Rebellion disaster was the fact that it 
had never spread throughout Serbia. It remained localized in the eastern 
part of the country and was hence a lost cause from the very beginning.
Even the largest town in the area, Zaječar, was not caught up in the re-
volt.65 This particular circumstance indicated a certain disharmony between 
the local citizens and the insurgents.
Hence, the period from the formation of the Radical Party in 1881 to 
the Timok Rebellion in 1883 brought the rapid rise of Serbian Radicalism 
and its even more rapid downfall. Still, it served as a valuable experience for 
the future of the Radical movement. The following years were marked by 
two parallel processes: by attempts to recuperate and reorganize the Party 
through legitimacy and legalism, and by the activities of the Radical emi-
grants in Bulgaria preparing for another armed uprising in Serbia. This di-
chotomy was symptomatic for the state in which the Radicals had found 
themselves after the Timok tragedy. The two tendencies showed the two 
different faces, or more precisely, the dual nature of the Radical political 
mentality: the old – revolutionary; the new – democratic. It became obvious 
that violence was not the answer. People got killed, the Party was destroyed; 
in a word, nothing was accomplished. One must admit, though. The Radi-
cals were good learners. 
In his first manifesto after he had left Serbia (December 1883), Nikola 
Pašić called for a new armed insurgency:
“Legal and constitutional means are not sufficient to suppress the 
violence, abuse and betrayal of the King and his supporters. Laws 
prevail over lies, robberies and crimes only when committed by or-
dinary people, but when committed by those who were supposed to 
protect the people – in that case only weapons can help.”66
In a letter to Nikola Pašić sent from Belgrade (February 1884), an anony-
mous Radical also emphasized the importance of a violent act:
“.... but I know that our ‚parliamentary struggle’ has to be merely 
formal, or at least secondary in importance; our main goal has to be 
the uprising.”67
65 Ilić, 67.
66 Letter of Nikola Pašić, December 18, 1883, private collection.
67 Letter to Nikola Pašić from Belgrade (probably by Andra Nikolić), April 15, 1884, 
private collection.
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During these crucial years after the Timok calamity, the other opinion 
within the Radical Party argued in favor of a gradual and prudent recovery 
of the Party structure, and shifting the focus on political issues; avoiding 
potentially dangerous confrontations and cessation of assaults against the 
King’s person. Some of the Radical leaders from Belgrade criticized their 
comrades in exile for their harsh statements. Stojan Protić wrote to Nikola 
Pašić concerning this problem:
“I cannot understand you, Aca (Stanojević, M.St.P.) and Žika 
(Milenović M.St.P.), but you especially, for making such mistakes.
Why and how come that you came out so openly against the King? I 
can, but only partially, explain the foolishness of your action by your 
desperate situation and your psychological condition.”68
Instead of a new armed revolution, the Belgrade Radical group sug-
gested to Pašić the founding of a political newspaper which would be de-
signed to reestablish broken relations among the Radical leadership and its 
rank and file, and to serve as the basis for future Radical work.69
During 1884, these two factions confronted each other, the conflict 
becoming particularly unpleasant among the Belgrade Radicals. In a letter 
to Nikola Pašić, one of them wrote:
“I decided to approach our closest friends in Belgrade Djaja70 (Jovan, 
M.St.P.), Stojan71 (Protić, M.St.P) and others ... to decide once and 
for all: do they think that our Party could accomplish its program 
under the rule of King Milan, without an uprising.
A lot would depend upon this. Accordingly, our future work should 
be organized with them or without them.”72
Finally, on September 15, 1885, Nikola Pašić called for another armed 
rebellion. This was his message to the Serbian nation:
“Dear compatriots! The time has come to stop and cast off the yokes 
of our masters: they have abolished freedom; they have neglected the 
rights of the people; they have separated Serbia from Serbdom and 
Slavophilism...
68 Letter to Nikola Pašić from Belgrade (probably by Stojan Protić), February 15 
1884, private collection.
69 Ibid.
70 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
71 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
72 Letter to Nikola Pašić from Belgrade, February 11, 1884, private collection
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Stop any communication by mail, telegraph or messengers . . . Form 
units, battalions and armies and go to Belgrade or Niš, wherever the 
King happens to reside. We are about to cross the border and come to 
your aid . . . The army should be with the people; it should not heed 
any commands against the people, its freedom and fatherland”.73
According to Sl. Jovanović, the highest authority on Serbian political history 
of the nineteenth century, Pašić spent the entire first period of his emigra-
tion in Bulgaria (until 1885) preparing for violent action.74 By the summer 
of 1885, Pašić had managed to secure the resources and weaponry for the 
upcoming revolution. According to Sl. Jovanović again, this plan was dis-
rupted by the Plovdiv coup75 in Bulgaria.76 If Jovanović’s assumption is cor-
rect, and it appears to be, then it would support the theory that the Radical 
leadership in Belgrade had indeed been dramatically divided.
By early 1886, however, the Radical Party definitely abandoned its 
revolutionary projects. There were several reasons for this crucial shift in its 
political strategy. First, on January 1, 1886, the Radical leaders who had been 
imprisoned for their involvement in the Timok Rebellion were pardoned 
and freed. The Serbian Crown was forced to back off because the country 
had suffered a humiliating defeat in the war against Bulgaria (November 
1885).77 Second, Nikola Pašić and other Radical emigrants in Bulgaria de-
cided to renounce their rebellious and subversive activities for good. Third, 
the Radical Party had already been revitalized and restructured. The pro-
cess of its reentering Serbian politics was well underway, especially through 
its newly launched newspaper Odjek (The Echo), published since the fall 
of 1884. By early 1885, it had already acquired 900 regular subscribers.78 
Although quite restrained in comparison to its predecessor Samouprava, 
Odjek had an instrumental role in popularizing Radical ideas, as well as in 
legalizing and legitimizing the Party after the Timok blunder.
The Radicals clearly expressed their tendency towards appeasement 
in two announcements to the membership published in 1886:
73 AS, fund of Milutin Garašanin, B6, no. 837.
74 Slobodan Jovanović, “Pašić u emigraciji”, Srpski književni glasnik, vol. XXI, Bel-
grade, 1927, pp. 509– 511.
75 Unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885.
76 Jovanović, “Pašić u emigraciji”, 512.
77 Stojan Novaković, Dvadeset godina ustavne borbe u Srbiji 1883–1903, Belgrade, 
1912, 202.
78 Stojan Protić, Odlomci iz ustavne i narodne borbe, Belgrade, 1911–12, 196.
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“The position of our Party vis-à-vis present circumstances should be 
neither emotional nor inspired by great hopes and moral beliefs; in-
stead, it should be limited to cautious waiting and unanimous readi-
ness for hard political work”.79 
In a second set of instructions concerning the upcoming elections of 1887, 
the Radical leadership advised its followers in the following direction:
“...To avoid everything that could be used as an excuse or provoke 
more severe countermeasures by the government... not to listen 
to anyone... To exploit shrewdly and jointly the advantages of in-
dividual electoral rights... To act prudently and within strict legal 
limitations.”80
The Radicals had undoubtedly grown up through the years of fierce 
political struggle and unrest. They reemerged as champions of constitution-
alism and parliamentary democracy. Along with revolutionism, the People’s 
Radical Party dropped its last socialist overtones.
* * *
The period of pragmatic Radicalism in Serbia roughly spanned the years be-
tween 1886 and 1894. This period was notable for the final acceptance of the 
Party into the legitimate political system. Moreover, the Party’s actions were 
aimed at achieving essential reforms through that system. The Radicals’ first 
success in that respect was the deal they concluded with the Liberals in the 
spring of 1886.81 The deal was motivated by two key factors: the need to de-
criminalize the Radical Party and an opportunity to enter the government. 
This could be achieved only through an agreement with the other opposi-
tion party, in spite of their profound differences in programs and ideology.
The Radical-Liberal agreement, however, did not signal any substan-
tial rapprochement between the two political parties.82 It was rather a short-
term compromise before the upcoming elections, including the prospect 
of a potential coalition in case of electoral victory.83 The major task of the 
Liberal-Radical cabinet, which was formed on June 1, 1887 and presided by 
old Liberal Jovan Ristić, was to initiate a constitutional reform.
79 ASANU, doc. no. 13682.
80 Ibid.
81 ASANU, Jovan Avakumović, Memoirs, unpublished manuscript, no. 9287, 5.
82 Ibid. 
See also Živanović, III, 405.
83 ASANU, Avakumović, 58–65.
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For the first time in their history the Radicals entered the govern-
ment, receiving the following ministerial sectors: Sava Grujić – army, 
MihailoVujić – finances, Pera Velimirović – public works and Svetozar 
Milosavljevic – education.84 85 But the coalition did not last for long. Six 
months later, in December 1887, the Radicals formed their first exclusively 
Radical cabinet86 under the presidency of General Sava Grujic. Still, the 
conflict with the King continued to escalate, forcing the Radical govern-
ment to resign in April 1888.87
If the failure of the Timok Rebellion had been a victory of the King 
over the Radicals, than the promulgation of the new Constitution in De-
cember 1888 was a Radical triumph over the ruler. Soon after this docu-
ment’s approval in the Serbian National Assembly, the King abdicated and 
left Serbia.88 A Royal Regency was created in order to represent the sover-
eign rights of King Milan Obrenović’s underage son Aleksandar.89
The 1888 Constitution was indeed the result of the efforts of all three 
political parties, but its spirit essentially reflected the program of the Radical 
Party. It stood among the more liberal constitutions in Europe of that time, 
paving the way for full parliamentary democracy and opening the door for 
the development of a truly modern political system in Serbia. (To be dis-
cussed in detail in later chapters, as its provisions reflected the key ideas of 
Serbian Radicalism.) Therefore, the constitutional act of 1888 could be said 
to have been the implementation of the Radical political program.
Soon after the King’s abdication, Nikola Pašić and other Radical emi-
grants were finally pardoned and allowed to return to Serbia. Pašić came 
back in 1889 after six years in exile and immediately took over the helm of 
the Radical Party.
The period from February 1889 to August 1892 was the longest pe-
riod (prior to 1903) during which the Radicals were in power. During these 
three-and-a-half years of uninterrupted rule, they were able to instigate a 
robust legislative activity according to their program and interests. This pe-
riod of Serbian history is aptly named The first Radical regime.90
84 ASANU, Avakumović, 8.
85 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
86 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 233–235.
87 Živanović, III, 240–244.
88 February 22, 1889.
89 Ibid.
90 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 190–200.
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By the Electoral Act (March 1890), the Radicals introduced virtu-
ally universal male suffrage without any tax restrictions. This act also in-
troduced several important changes which secured a fair and democratic 
electoral procedure: secret ballot, supreme authority of electoral boards and 
a detailed penal code for cases of electoral abuse.91
Perhaps the two other pieces of legislation passed during Radical rule 
can shed more light on the Radical understanding of democracy. The Min-
isterial Responsibility Act (January 1891) established parliamentary control 
of the cabinet members, with ministerial accountability becoming both po-
litical and criminal.92 The Communal Prerogatives Act (November 1889) 
was designed to set up the principle of local self-government as the funda-
mental principle of decentralization of state power. This particular reform 
of the country’s territorial organization meant the accomplishment of the 
original Radical program of 1881.
Upon his return to Serbia, Nikola Pašić was elected President of the 
National Assembly in 1889 and soon formed his first cabinet. The cabinet 
resigned in August 1892 and was succeeded by the Liberal cabinet of Jovan 
Avakumović.93 The Radicals were in opposition again, waiting eagerly for 
the next elections as their new chance. The changes of the electoral sys-
tem, which denied voting rights to all indebted citizens, resulted in a close 
vote. The Liberals managed to keep their power by a tight margin (1892).94 
Within a year (April 1, 1893), the minor Aleksandar Obrenović, while din-
ing with the members of the Royal Regency, backed by the army and some 
members of the government, proclaimed himself King and took the royal 
prerogatives. The coup ended in the collapse of the existing power struc-
ture, but without violence. The young ruler appointed his former teacher 
(member of the Radical Party, but friendly with the Court) Dr. Lazar Dokić 
as Prime Minister.95 The Radicals received this sudden twist with vigor and 
acclamation. It was reported, with obvious cynicism, that “the Radicals ac-
companied the King all over Serbia cheering and calling him the first Radi-
cal and Alexander the Great”.96 Except for the military sector, the cabinet 
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Živanović, vol. III, 253.
94 Ibid.
95 For more details see: Raša Milošević, Državni udar odozgo i Prvi april 1893: 
svrgnuće krnjeg kraljevskog namešnistva, Beograd, 1936.
96 ASANU, Avakumović, 12.
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of Dr. Lazar Dokić was comprised exclusively of Radical Party members97. 
Once again, the collaboration proved short-lived. The Radical cabinet was 
forced to resign and, moreover, the Radicals and the King entered into an 
open confrontation. Radical public meetings were banned, their member-
ship being labeled “the simple crowd gathered to disturb public peace and 
order”.98 The King’s final move was his decision to abolish the 1888 Con-
stitution (May 1894).99 A déjà vu ensued: Serbia was pushed into a peri-
od of monarchical personal rule and, furthermore, into Royal autocracy. 
The Radical achievements were annulled, legislation overturned, reforms 
suspended. Their partnership with the King proved to have been a terrible 
decision, detrimental to their interests and reputation, as well as badly mis-
judged. The only positive aspect of the events was that the top radical lead-
ers had stayed away from the affair, never joining the government.
The period of pragmatic Radicalism seems to have been crucial in 
many ways. 
The Radical Party was moving forward in the aftermath of the Timok 
Rebellion, passing through the painful process of political and tactical re-
orientation, becoming a viable and unavoidable political factor. By the same 
token, however, it started to lose its political “virginity”, as well as its ideo-
logical staunchness. 
Nevertheless, this period was characterized by several significant tri-
umphs of the Radical Party in the implementation of parliamentarism and 
modern democracy. Beginning with the 1888 Constitution and followed by 
a series of legal acts deriving from it, the Radicals came close to fulfilling 
their basic political program.100 After all, they proved capable of reaching 
compromises and working in coalitions. This meant that their partisan se-
lectiveness which, in all fairness, still existed among certain circles of the 
Party was generally fading away. The Radicals entered the historical phase: 
the stage in which they understood and accepted the rules of the political 
game: they were no longer as innocent and unsullied as they had been in 
1881. Instead, they had become successful, mature and ready to rule. Yet, 
there were still a few more barriers on the road to this ambitious goal.
97 Ibid.
98 ASANU, Avakumović, 174.
99 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, II, 203–221.
100 Milivoje Popović, Poreklo i postanak ustava od 1888 godine, Beograd, 1939, 
90–91.
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* * *
From 1894 to 1903, during the period of “overpowered Radicalism”, 
Serbian Radicalism was marked by further attempts to return to power. The 
political efforts of the Radical leaders were mainly focused on journalistic 
activities. Through its leading political publication Odjek, the newly found-
ed Narod (The People)101 and the literary-political magazine Delo (The 
Opus),102 the Radicals were able to maintain their presence in daily poli-
tics. Besides writings on everyday issues, their attention turned to questions 
of European political theory and practice. During this period, the Radicals 
fully espoused the theory of British parliamentarism, relying on the work of 
two of their leading theorists: Stojan Protić and Milovan Dj. Milovanović.103
And again, the major Radical objective was the demand for a new 
constitution. The government’s efforts to form a constitutional committee 
with the representatives of all three political parties definitely failed in 1896 
as a result of the Radicals’ strong opposition to the Progressivist govern-
ment led by Stojan Novaković,104 as well as their insistence on reinforcing 
the 1888 Constitution.105
The summer of 1896 was marked by a massive Radical meeting orga-
nized in Belgrade on July 28. According to Odjek, between 35 and 40 thou-
sand people were present at the rally.106 Most of these men were peasants 
who had come from all over Serbia.107 Živan Živanović, a prominent Liber-
al, claimed that this had been the most massive political rally ever organized 
in Serbia.108
In late 1896, the Radicals briefly re-entered the government. After an 
arrangement with the King, Djordje Simić, one of the less important Radi-
cals in the Party hierarchy and a member of its least militant wing, formed a 
government consisting of neutrals and the most moderate Radicals.
101 Started in 1896.
102 Started in 1894.
103 Slobodan Jovanović, Moji savremenici, Windsor, Canada, 1953, 128.
104 Stojan Novaković was a famous Serbian scholar, linguist and historian, who of-
fered his own (ill-fated) constitutional proposal. The compromise solution submit-
ted by Novaković turned out to be unacceptable to both sides: neither the crown, 
nor the radicals were willing to endorse it (1896).
105 See: Novaković, 110–112.
106 Odjek, July 30, 1896.
107 Ibid.
108 Živanović, III, 309–310.
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The Radical ministers were Mihailo Vujić, Pera Velimirović, Andra 
Nikolić and Milovan Milovanović.109 Behind this group stood the omni-
present Nikola Pašić, political strategist of the first rate, who acted as the 
“secret advisor of the government”.110 As a part of their agreement with the 
Crown, the Radicals agreed to postpone the constitutional reform for a year. 
The Party’s pragmatism became evident: in order to remain in power, they 
temporarily betrayed their most important political objective – the demand 
for the reinstitution of the 1888 Constitution. This cabinet was forced to 
resign in the fall of 1897, when the former King Milan Obrenović returned 
to Serbia. The subsequent years were marked by King Aleksandar’s personal 
regime, supported and advised by his father, who actually ran the country. 
The government was headed by Milan’s close old friend and long-time ally, 
Dr. Vladan Djordjević. Despite their previous attempts to cooperate with 
the Crown, the Radicals were again out of power, and, more importantly, 
out of the main political stream. The majority of the laws passed during the 
Radical rule were changed or rescinded.
What was supposed to be the final blow against the Radical Party 
came in 1899. An unsuccessful assassination attempt on the life of former 
King Milan by a youngster from Bosnia was used by the government as a 
pretext to arrest the Radical leadership, accusing them of inspiring and or-
ganizing the plot. The imprisoned Radicals were Nikola Pašić, Stojan Protić, 
Ljubomir Živković and Kosta Taušanović.111
The documents provided by the prosecution stated Nikola Pašić had 
openly threatened the life of former King Milan Obrenović at a meeting 
of his Party’s Main Board; that Ljubomir Živković was the author of the 
brochure “The Demon of Serbia” which alluded to Milan and praised Kar-
adjordje, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection; and that the public 
activities and writings of Stojan Protić were of revolutionary nature.112 The 
incident was meant to destroy the Radical Party altogether.113 At first, the 
prosecution insisted on death penalties for Pašić and Taušanović as a re-
prisal for past and present conflicts and insults. But, when the Serbian and 
European (especially Russian) public, as well as their governments, reacted, 
former King Milan decided to bargain with Pašić. Pašić agreed to accuse 
109 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, III, 148–151. For more details about 
these individuals, see Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
110 Ibid.
111 AS, fund of Vladan Djordjević, B9, no. 27.
112 Ibid.
113 lbid.  See also Kosta Jezdić, Ivandanski atentat i Nikola Pašić, Beograd, 1926.
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Milan St. Protić 58
some of his comrades (namely Protić and Živković) of anti-dynastic atti-
tudes and even of possibly having inspired the assassination. In return, his 
and Taušanović’s lives were spared. Finally, the accused Radicals were sen-
tenced to twenty years of hard labor; Taušanović got nine years of prison 
and Pašić five.114 These measures were accompanied by organized attacks 
on the Radicals. They were fired from their jobs, persecuted, and purged 
throughout Serbia.
In 1901, however, after the death of its nemesis the former King Mi-
lan Obrenović, the Radical Party re-emerged in Serbian politics. And again, 
as they had done so many times before, the Radicals demanded constitu-
tional reform.
Ever since 1894, the country had been virtually without a Constitu-
tion. The 1888 Constitution had been rescinded in favor of the old 1869 
Constitution, but without official proclamation. In February 1901, some 
Radical leaders entered the government, namely Mihailo Vujić and Milovan 
Milovanović. In late March, Vujić formed a coalition cabinet with the Pro-
gressivists, immediately tackling the question of the Constitution. The King 
octroyed the new Constitution in April 1901. This event was preceded by a 
Radical-Progressivist agreement, known as the “Fusion”, on King Aleksan-
dar’s request.115 The Constitution was a compromise solution, an amalgam 
of the previous two: the constitutions of 1869 and 1888. The 1901 Constitu-
tion stipulated a bicameral Parliament with a Senate and a National Assem-
bly. The Senate as the upper house was only partially elective – the majority 
of its members was appointed by the Monarch (30), while the remaining 18 
would be elected by the voters.116 The legislative initiative was divided be-
tween the Monarch and the Parliament. The Constitution enlarged the pre-
rogatives of the State Council as the supreme administrative-judicial body. 
Secret ballot was re-introduced, and the Constitution guaranteed limited 
civil liberties.117
The union with the Progressivists (“The Fusion”) and the conces-
sion on the constitutional issue became the main cause for the ensuing split 
within the Radical Party. A group of prominent Radical intellectuals left the 
bulk of the Party and created their own Independent Radical Party (Party 
of Radical Democracy) in 1901.118 This, however, was the result of a break 
between the older generation and the younger radical members rather than 
114 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, III, 352–355
115 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, III, 381–385.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, 391–394.
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an ideological division between the two groups. It was evident that the move 
with “the Fusion” had been tactical and not strategic. Still, the Independent 
Radicals insisted on a return to the original political program of 1881 and 
on the restoration of the 1888 Constitution. From that point on, the Inde-
pendent Radical Party played an extremely important role in Serbian poli-
tics. After 1903, the Old Radicals and the Independent Radicals became the 
two main rival political camps in Serbia. The old political groups, the Pro-
gressivists and the Liberals, gradually lost their power and significance, and 
eventually disappeared from the political scene. 
The Independent Radicals were led by three Ljubomirs: Ljubomir 
Živković, Ljubomir Stojanović and Ljubomir Davidović.119
* * *
1903 was a watershed year in modern Serbian history. It was marked by 
the murder of King Aleksandar and Queen Draga by a group of young 
officers.120 This tragedy put an end to the Obrenović dynasty, which had 
reigned over Serbia for over seventy years in total (1815–1842; 1858–1903). 
The motives behind the assassination were a combination of personal griev-
ances and dynastic rivalries. The truth of the matter is that its background 
remains somewhat unclear to this day. What has been established beyond 
reasonable doubt is that no Radical was implicated in the conspiracy.
More importantly, the 1903 regicide resulted in the dynastic change 
(the Karadjordjevićs replaced the Obrenovićs) and, simultaneously, enabled 
the realization of a constitutional reform, re-instituting the system of par-
liamentary democracy. In June 1903, merely a month after the death of the 
royal couple, the new Constitution was passed by the Grand National As-
sembly (a slightly revised version of the 1888 text). Petar Karadjordjević, the 
grandson of Karadjordje Petrović,121 became the new King of Serbia. 
The Radical Party entered its prime. After more than twenty years of 
struggle, rebellion, crisis, setbacks, frustrations and small victories, it finally 
grew into a powerful and mature political organization. In the following de-
cades, it would lead Serbia towards the European model, not only in terms 
of politics, but also in the fields of economy, culture and social development. 
119 Ibid.  All three were successive Party Chairmen.
120 For more details see: Dragiša Vasić, Hiljadudevetstotreća, Beograd, 1925.
121 Karadjordje Petrović, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection against the 
Turks (1804–1813), founder of the Karadjordjević dynasty. He was murdered in 
1817 by his arch-rival Miloš Obrenović, the leader of the Second Serbian Insurrec-
tion against the Turks (1815–1830) and the founder of the Obrenović dynasty. That 
is when and how the feud had begun.
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Chapter Three
THE SOURCES
From a phenomenological point of view, every political party or move-ment has two essential aspects: its theory and its practice. The theoreti-
cal aspect includes ideology, understood as a set of ideas which define the 
party’s political and philosophical stand on various issues. The practical as-
pect refers to its functioning and activities in an actual historical context, 
defined and particular circumstances, time and space. It is this dual nature 
of political organizations that give them their complex historical character. 
The two aspects are often so intertwined that it seems almost impossible 
to separate them and analyze them independently of each other. In other 
instances, they seem so contradictory to each other that it is virtually unfea-
sible to determine their common denominator and establish relationships 
between the theory and practice of a given political organization.
The inherent discrepancy between words and deeds, a major char-
acteristic of individual human behavior, is even more applicable to politics 
and political parties. Ideologies, in general, are slightly distorted images of 
reality, subjective enough to serve the purpose, but not to undermine the 
basic sense of reality. This is not always a question of sincerity. Sometimes, 
there are historical conditions that determine political moves in a certain 
direction, regardless of the principles proclaimed. Often, of course, this in-
herent discrepancy comes from plain dishonesty or self-interest.
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* * *
The sources of the ideology of Serbian Radicalism1 were twofold: im-
ported and original. The imported (or foreign) influences arrived in three 
great waves. The first wave came from European (especially Russian) social-
ist, anarchist, and populist traditions, mainly influencing the group around 
Svetozar Marković, and covering the initial period of pre-Radicalism in Ser-
bia. The second wave came from the French Radical movement, which had 
a strong impact on Serbian Radicals in terms of both their political program 
and their party organization.2 The third wave of outside influences origi-
nated from British parliamentary and constitutional theories which, by the 
late l880s, had become fully espoused by the Radicals in Serbia. 
Yet, the ideas taken from European political experiences needed to be 
transformed, altered, and adapted to suit the specific Serbian political envi-
ronment. The original (or internal) sources of Serbian Radicalism derived 
from a particular socio-political situation in the country. Within a given 
historical framework, political decision-making was coming from the Ruler 
on one hand and from political parties on the other. This feature of late 
nineteenth century Serbian reality fundamentally influenced and modified 
the Radical ideology. 
Finally, it seems appropriate to draw some general conclusions re-
garding the multiple sources of Serbian Radical ideology. That is what we 
did in the concluding remarks at the end of this chapter.
1
The influence of European socialism reached the Serbian Radicals in their 
earliest phase of development, during the period when future Radical front 
men were still associated with the group led by Svetozar Marković.3 In the 
late l860s, the Swiss city of Zurich attracted many young, politically aware 
students from all over Europe. At that time and later on, Switzerland in 
general represented the epicenter of various, mainly leftist, political move-
ments and ideas. Undoubtedly one of the most significant personalities was 
1 For more details see: Milan St. Protić, Radikali u Srbiji – ideje i pokret, 1881–1903, 
Beograd, 1990.
2 See: D. T. Bataković, ”Francuski uticaji u Srbiji 1835–1914 – Četiri generacije 
Parizlija”, Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske 56, Novi Sad, 1997, 73–95; « L’influence 
française sur la formation de la démocratie parlementaire en Serbie », Revue d’Eu-
rope centrale VII/no. 1, Strasbourg 2000, 17–44. 
3 For more details see: Jovan Skerlić, Svetozar Marković, njegov život, rad i ideje, Bel-
grade 1922; Sofija Škorić, “The Populism of Nikola Pašić: The Zurich Period”, East 
European Quarterly XIV, no. 4, Winter 1980, 469–485.
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Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian émigré, politician, vagabond, and revolutionary 
– the leading figure of the anarchist movement and the First International.4 
He played a key role among the student youth in Zurich, and organized 
many clandestine and semi-clandestine political groups and gatherings 
propagating his theories of revolution and the state. His reputation as the 
leading figure of the most extremist wing of the Socialist International and 
Karl Marx’s chief rival, secured him a position in the center of attention 
among the student community in Switzerland. His eventful life, the inhu-
man tortures and long imprisonments he had endured, his spectacular es-
capes and dangerous revolutionary adventures all over the world, from his 
native Russia to the United States, Japan and Western Europe, made him a 
living legend.5 
Bakunin’s teachings included the concept of a social revolution car-
ried out by violent means, the destruction of state authority and organiza-
tion, and the establishment of free associations of individuals based on their 
free will.6
In the late 1860s, a small group of Serbian students was sent to Zurich 
on government scholarships to obtain higher education. In 1868, Svetozar 
Marković came to Zurich from St. Petersburg, where he had already begun 
his political career as a follower of Russian socialists such as Chernyshevsky,7 
Dobrolyubov and Lavrov.8 Together with other Serbian students, he orga-
nized an informal, distinctly socialist-anarchist political circle known as 
the “Zurich group”. All of its members would eventually become Radicals: 
Nikola Pašić, Pera Velimirović, Raša Milošević, Pera Todorović and Jovan 
Žujović.9 By the early 1869, they had decided to organize a political party, 
4 Velizar Ninčić, Pera Todorović, Beograd 1956, 31–32.
5 Further reading: Paul McLaughlin, Mikhail Bakunin: the Philosophical Basis of His 
Anarchism. New York, Algora Publishing, 2002; Mark Leier, Bakunin: The Creative 
Passion: A Biography. New York, Thomas Dunne Books, 2006; Tom Stoppard, The 
Coast of Utopia. New York, Grove Press, 2002; Daniel Guerin, Anarchism: From 
Theory to Practice, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1970. 
6 ASANU, Drag. Cilic, “Pera Todorović”, no. 10634, 3.
See also Ninčić, 32–35.
7 Further reading: N.G.O. Pereira, The Thought and Teachings of N.G. Černyševskij. 
The Hague, Mouton, 1975; Irina Paperno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A 
Study in the Semiotics of Behavior. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988.
8 See Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, 8–12; also, Woodford McClellan, Svetozar 
Marković and the Origins of Balkan Socialism, 241–242.
9 Sv. Marković to Belimarković, 11 May 1869, in Odabrani spisi, Beograd–Novi Sad, 
1969.
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and to name it the “Radical Party”.10 In February of the same year, Svetozar 
Marković, Nikola Pašić, and Pera Velimirović agreed to elaborate the politi-
cal program of their organization in the making, but the attempt failed be-
cause Marković had to return to Serbia. He had been denied a government 
grant on account of his dissident activities.11
Although their first attempt to create a political party failed, the 
young students returned to Serbia with enthusiastic ideas about socialism, 
anarchism and radicalism. The works of Russian populists and Western so-
cialists they brought back to their native country became the main sources 
of their political beliefs.
Upon their return to Serbia (1870–71), the members of Svetozar 
Marković’s group started a series of socialist and radical-socialist newspa-
pers12 and continued political activities along socialist and radical-socialist 
lines. Until the death of its leader Svetozar Marković (1875), the movement 
gradually moved from pure socialism to radicalism13 due to the peculiarities 
of the Serbian rural society, but did not give up its revolutionary dreams. 
Since the majority of the Serbian population was comprised of peasants and 
since there was virtually no working class, the ideas of socialism14 could not 
be applied in their original form. Thus, faced with Serbian socio- political re-
alities, the socialist group of Svetozar Marković focused on political reforms 
(anti-bureaucratism) instead of social change.
Even so, some purely socialist elements could be found within the 
Radical movement in its later years.
For example, in a personal letter to a friend, a member of the Radical 
Party wrote in 1883: 
“I’d break the neck of anyone who says I’m not a socialist. I am as 
proud of that name as I am proud of the name of an active Radical.”15
10 Ibid.
11 Svetozar Marković, “Srpske obmane”, Zastava, Novi Sad, 1869.
12 1871–1875: Radenik (Worker), Javnost (The Public), Rad (The Labor), Oslobod-
jenje (Liberation).
13 ASANU, Drag. Cilic, “Pera Todorović”, 3–4; see also Slobodan Jovanović, Političke 
i pravne rasprave, I, Belgrade, 1932, 223; Skerlić, 95.
14 Especially those of Karl Marx (nationalization of the means of production, dicta-
torship of the proleteriat, abolition of workers’ exploitation, etc).
15 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, B6, no. 750.
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A report from Smederevo dated the same year mentioned a group of 
workers among local Radicals “which has socialist colors and numbers some 
70 members”.16 
A secret report to King Milan Obrenović, also dating from 1883, men-
tioned a certain T. Milošević, a Radical member from eastern Serbia who 
pursued his studies in Zurich and now overtly “declares himself a nihilist”.17
From July 1883, Pera Todorović, a founding member of the Radi-
cal Party and its ideologue during its formative period, was subscribed to 
French revolutionary newspapers of a radical-socialist orientation: La Ba-
taille, Le Proletaire and L’Intrensigeant.18
In defining the position of the Radical Party in relation to socialism,19 
Lazar Paču published in 1881 in Samouprava a series of articles under the 
title “The Middle Class Society and Its Political Parties”,20 in which he made 
a tripartite classification of political organization:
“The Group of parties that want to take society back to feudalism 
(reactionary or aristocratic parties); the group of parties called 
“money aristocracy” that teach that the human society reached its 
peak at a certain moment in the past and cannot develop any further 
without destroying its own fruits of culture and civilization; the third 
group of parties argues for a new economic program: the program of 
social and economic reform”.21
Continuing this line of reasoning, Paču suggested that socialism 
might take two possible directions: towards theoretical socialism or towards 
applied socialism. By applied socialism Paču meant the practical political 
organization of the working classes. He simply concluded that the Radi-
cal Party had adopted the concept of applied socialism.22 The Radicals had 
16 AS, no. 667, 30 August 1883, Smederevo.
17 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183, 6 June 1883, Požarevac.
18 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO/183, 8 July 1883.
19 Following the founding of the Radical Party in 1881 and the publishing of its 
political program, a group of Svetozar Marković’s orthodox followers who main-
tained a strict socialist position formed a small political group led by Mita Cenić. 
They confronted the Radicals, accusing them of having betrayed Marković’s origi-
nal ideas and abandoning the socialist cause in general.
 For more details see: Latinka Perović, Srpski socijalisti XIX veka, Belgrade, 1985.
20 Lazar Paču, “Gradjansko društvo i njegove političke stranke”, Samouprava, 5 May 
to 16 June 1881.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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obviously moved away from the original socialist ideology, but remained 
sympathetic to the ideas which had inspired them in their early days.
Elements of socialist influences on the Serbian Radical Party were 
noticeable throughout the period until the Timok Rebellion. Articles about 
contemporary developments in European socialist circles regularly ap-
peared in Radical publications. In 1881, Samouprava published a series of 
articles on Chernyshevsky.23 In 1882, this Radical paper devoted a lengthy 
column to Louis Blanc, stating that Blanc was among the most prominent 
leaders of the 1848 Revolution in France, praising his intention to establish 
a “ministry of progress” as the highlight of his political career. Samouprava 
concluded that “he shall be remembered by generations to come”.24 In 1883, 
the newspaper noted the death of Karl Marx, dedicating a long tribute to the 
father of scientific socialism:
“The importance of his work is as relevant today as it has ever been. 
But future alone will show the enormous impact of this talented and 
energetic man… Let the memory of this diligent man, who for more 
than forty years worked tirelessly for the development of social du-
ties and the liberation of the entire mankind, remain deep in every 
human heart”.25
Perhaps the most illustrative example of socialist influences on the 
Radical movement is the fact that, while searching the homes of local 
Radicals (leaders of the Timok Rebellion), the police found the following 
books: Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto (1848) and Program of German 
Social Democracy (1869), writings of F. N. Babeuf (1789), and brochures 
by a local utopian socialist Vasa Pelagić.26 Traces of socialist ideologies 
in the Radical movement were, however, more theoretical than practical, 
except in its revolutionary aspect. From the very beginning, the Radicals 
abandoned the economic teachings of Svetozar Marković, basically the 
most socialist part of his theories. They entered full-heartedly into the 
political battle, concentrating all their forces on political reforms along 
the lines of constitutionalism and democracy. Hints of socialism shown 
here suggest that the attitude of Serbian Radicalism towards socialism was 
merely academic. The sole element of socialism which the Radicals re-
tained was its militancy.
23 Samouprava, 12 February 1881.
24 Samouprava, 1 December 1882.
25 Samouprava, 15 and 22 March 1883.
26 Timočka buna, ed. Milen Nikolić, Belgrade, 1954–55, 372–385.
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Between Democracy and Populism 67
The Radicals often insisted on their loyalty to their socialist roots. 
They liked to be regarded as an offspring of the great European socialist fam-
ily. They expressed strong sentiments towards each and every movement or 
concept coming from the left. Yet, the realities of the Serbian rudimentary, 
mostly peasant, society, with other social classes just emerging, forced them 
to re-direct their actions and their policies towards pragmatic problems and 
prepare to tackle real obstacles on Serbia’s bumpy road to modernity.
* * *
The influence of French Radicalism was much more significant than the 
impact of European socialism. Two different views have developed in recent 
Yugoslav historiography regarding the issue of the main foreign influence 
on the Serbian Radical movement. The first argues that the major impact 
came from the Russian populist tradition.27 This argument is based on two 
assumptions. First, the Russian society as it was in the second half of the 
nineteenth century resembled the Serbian society of the same period to a 
large extent. The vast majority of the population was comprised of unedu-
cated peasantry. Consequently, the idea of “going to the people”, the ultimate 
slogan of the Russian populist movement, held much appeal to the Serbian 
Radicals. Second, the political methods used by the Radicals were very simi-
lar to those used by Russian populists: the educational mission among the 
peasantry, accompanied by simplification and demagoguery.28
The view that the French Radical tradition had the most crucial impact on 
the formation of Radicalism in Serbia deserves more attention.29 It is virtu-
ally impossible to establish the exact ways in which French ideas found their 
way to Serbia. The only fact that seems unquestionable is that most Radical 
leaders could read and speak French, and that most of them had visited 
France in the 1870s.30 Some, but not many, had studied in Paris and later 
came to be known as “Parisian doctors”.31 According to Radical newspapers, 
it appears that by the 1880s they had received the French political press on 
a regular basis, including Clemenceau’s “La Justice”.32
If the notion of a predominant Russian populist influence has some 
merit as an instrument of social development and general political inspira-
27 See: Latinka Perović, Pera Todorović, Belgrade, 1983.
28 Perović, Pera Todorović, 162–167.
29 Slobodan Jovanović, Jovan Skerlić, Živan Živanović.
30 See Ninčić, Pera Todorović, 58–62.
31 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 282–283.
32 Cf. Samouprava, June and July 1883.
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tion, the hypothesis about French Radicalism as the main source of Serbian 
Radical ideology is even more convincing. In other words, while Radical 
beginnings owed much to the “Narodniki” movement, during their prime 
the Serbian Radicals looked to their French counterparts for guidance and 
drive. 
It is almost an understatement to claim that the relationship between 
Serbian and French Radicalisms was crucial for the expertise of our topic. 
The first written program of the Radical Party in Serbia dates from 
January 1881. This program was originally published in the opening issue of 
Samouprava, immediately following the formation of the Radical Party.33 In 
the introduction, the Radicals stressed two key political objectives:
“…in domestic affairs – national prosperity and freedom; in foreign 
affairs – state independence, liberation and unification of all parts of 
Serbdom”.34
The program was divided into eight sections, each defining the Par-
ty’s position on a specific issue. Much like the French Radicals, they sug-
gested constitutional reform in the following directions: the National As-
sembly as the supreme legislative body was to be completely elective; the 
elections were to be directly accompanied by universal male suffrage. The 
Grand National Assembly was designed to convene periodically, and to be 
solely responsible for constitutional change, while the State Council was to 
be abolished. Serbian Radicals also proposed an administrative division of 
the country into regions and communes which were to be organized on 
the basis of local self-government. In the judicial system, the Radicals es-
tablished elective judges for all civil cases and juries for all criminal cases. 
Exactly the same terminology was used in discussing the question of State 
finances; “the establishment of a direct, progressive tax system based on 
property and income”. The Serbian Radicals also suggested a reorganiza-
tion of the National Bank along the lines of a central credit institution for 
agriculture, trade, and industry. Just like the French, the Radicals in Serbia 
insisted on free and compulsory primary education, and the replacement of 
the standing army with a popular one. They demanded absolute freedom of 
press, association and public assembly, the application of the principle of lo-
cal self-government, and the guarantee of personal and material security.35
33 “Naš program”, Samouprava, no 1, 8 January 1881.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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Ten years earlier, in 1871, the Radical group in Serbia had developed 
a political program with essentially identical political demands.36 This earli-
est Radical political platform contained eighteen important points: commu-
nal and regional autonomy and self-government, absolute freedom of press, 
association, public assembly and political action, judicial independence, 
reforms of state administration based on the principle of local self-govern-
ment, the establishment of regional banks for peasant and craftsmen loans 
and town banks for merchants and industrialists, the abolition of guilds, the 
cancellation of railroad construction, the founding of agricultural and craft 
schools, reform of the educational system, abolition of the gendarmerie as 
unnecessary due to the introduction of self-government, the abolition of 
depository funds, complete control of the budget by the National Assembly, 
and the demand for constitutional change.37
The similarities between the Serbian Radical program of 1881 and 
the electoral programs of Georges Clemenceau and Camille Pelletan of the 
same year were striking indeed. The fundamental issues pointed out in all 
three documents were identical, not only in the ideas they expressed, but in 
their wording as well. Serbian Radicalism, just like its French counterpart, 
insisted on a constitutional reform which in both cases included a unicam-
eral National Assembly elected by all adult male citizens (universal male 
suffrage). Following their French comrades, the Serbian Radicals singled 
out the principle of self-government as the basic form of decentralization 
and the essential tool of democratic decision-making. They both insisted on 
tax reform and on the introduction of a direct and progressive tax system 
on capital and income. The idea of the formation of a popular militia instead 
of professional military corps characterized both ideologies. Finally, Serbian 
Radicals, like the French, persistently repeated their demand for civil liber-
ties. Their ideas in the field of education were also similar: both argued in 
favor of free and compulsory primary education.
The differences between the ideologies of the two Radical movements 
came mainly from their different political and socio-economic contexts. 
French Radicals were strongly anticlerical due to the dominant role of Ro-
man Catholicism in French politics, social life, culture and education. By 
contrast, the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church was neither powerful 
nor enjoyed a particularly privileged position in the social hierarchy. This 
was particularly true of the lower clergy, who had largely shared the social 
status of the peasantry, but also acted as parish intelligentsia and became af-
36 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, V1, PO-27/209, “Program of the Radical group”, August 
2, 1871.
37 Ibid.
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filiated with the Radical Party.38 However, Orthodox bishops and archbish-
ops seated in the capital and a few larger Serbian cities, never really accepted 
Radicalism. As a part of the state establishment, the top of the Serbian Or-
thodox Church opted for the Liberal Party.39
It is worth repeating at this point that the French Radical movement 
grew out of the Republican bloc, and always remained devoutly loyal to the 
republican cause. This came as a result of specific historical circumstances in 
France, where the conflict between the Monarchy and the Republic marked 
the entire nineteenth century. In Serbia, the Republican issue was never 
seriously considered. Although the group around Svetozar Marković had 
developed a theoretical concept of republicanism, the idea was soon aban-
doned by the Radicals, although there remained several staunch republicans 
in their ranks.40 Serbia’s socio-political realities, with the Crown assuming 
the pivotal role not only in politics but, more importantly, in the minds of 
the population, the republic could never be a viable option. Both Serbian 
royal families were of domestic and common origin, and were hence easily 
identified with the wars for independence against the Turks. The nation was 
divided between the supporters of the Karadjordjevićs and the supporters of 
the Obrenovićs and that controversy lasted exactly a hundred years (1804–
1902). From a historical perspective, there was no room for republicanism.
In Serbia, the Monarchy was identified with the nation-state. In 
France, that was the case with the Republic.
Instead of embracing overt republicanism, the Serbian Radicals be-
came strongly anti-dynastic,41 tirelessly fighting to limit the Ruler’s power. 
This meant that the Radical anti-dynastic orientation had become a kind of 
a substitution for open republicanism. 
The French representative in Belgrade noted their anti-dynastic at-
titude and underlined it in several reports: 
« L’opposition radicale en Serbie est loin d’être une opposition 
dynastique »42 
And again in 1888:
38 AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, B18, no. 10.
39 ASANU Jovan Avakumović, Memoirs, unpublished manuscript, no. 9287/II.
40 For example Jovan Žujović and Dragiša Stanojević, later Jaša Prodanović and 
Ljubomir Stojanović.
41 Opposed to the Obrenović dynasty.
42 AMAE, Correspondance politique – Serbie (CP-Serbie), 1882–83, 8 May 1883.
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« Sans doute, parmi les cinq cents radicaux, que les électeurs ont 
envoyé sièges à la Grande Skoupchtina, plus d’un est parti de son vil-
lage avec des dispositions franchement antidynastiques ».43
The French Radical movement favored an anti-colonial and pacifist 
foreign policy. Following the country’s devastating defeat in the Franco-
Prussian war (1870–71), in view of the unstable political situation in their 
country, the French Radicals argued for internal political reforms and op-
posed any audacious colonial conquests. The Serbian Radical Party, in con-
trast, was driven by a purely national (nationalist) impetus, advocating the 
liberation and unification of all Serbs and Serbian lands. This was the ef-
fect of historical processes of national emancipation and state-building (the 
“nation-state”) inspired by massive national unification movements across 
Europe of the nineteenth century.44 As a centrifugal force, Serbia attracted 
all unliberated parts of the nation. The Radicals were compelled to join in 
the great national endeavor. Their nationalism grew in time, but reached its 
peak only after 1903.
Serbian Radicals were primarily influenced by the political aspect of 
French Radicalism. They found Serbia a most fertile soil for the implemen-
tation of French Radical ideas. The socio-economic aspect of the French 
Radical programs, however, was incompatible with the social and economic 
particularities in Serbian and, hence, unacceptable and inapplicable. In a de-
veloped industrial environment such as France, with a large working class, 
demands for a limit on working hours, workers’ insurance, and the prohibi-
tion of child labor were logical steps in the process of improving working 
conditions. France was no exception in Europe in that respect. Almost all 
European industrial countries introduced social legislation in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century. In the predominantly rural Serbian soci-
ety, with little industry and no organized working class, the socio-economic 
segment of the French Radical programs was inapplicable. Thus, it is quite 
clear that the ideological aspect of the French Radical movement on Ser-
bian Radicalism acquired the central place among the external (or foreign) 
sources of the Serbian Radical doctrine.
To make a long story short: socialism does not apply to agrarian 
societies.
43 AMAE, Correspondance politique – Serbie, 1887–88, 25 December 1888.
44 Primarily Italian and German, but also Greek, Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian, etc.
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* * *
Influences of British constitutional and parliamentary theories and practices 
were the third major external source of Serbian Radicalism. This particular 
item was the last to reach the Radical Party in Serbia in the period after 1883. 
The Radical constitutional proposal of 1883 was still heavily influenced by 
“Markovićism”. It espoused the “Convention system”, which meant the su-
preme authority of the omnipotent National Assembly (equipped with all 
three branches of power), and essentially established a quasi-republic with 
a monarch as its head.45
The British constitutional blueprints were finding their way into the 
ideas of the Radical Party throughout the 1880s. It was not until after the 
final text of the 1888 Constitution had been completed that the Radicals 
definitely espoused the concept of democratic parliamentary monarchy (in-
cluding a strict division of powers).46
A general notion of the British understanding of governmental or-
ganization reached Serbia already in the late 1850s. Young members of the 
Liberal movement, who had for the most part received higher education 
abroad, were the first to point out the importance of the English constitu-
tional tradition: 
“We need to learn from England – mother of freedom and of the 
world’s constitutional tradition”, one of them wrote in 1870.47
In 1876, John Stuart Mill’s classic book Considerations on Represen-
tative Government48 was translated by Vladimir Jovanović, a leading Lib-
eral intellectual of the first generation. The Radical intellectuals, however, 
came into contact with the British concept in a roundabout way. The works 
which had been published on the Continent but followed in the footsteps 
of the British political doctrine became their earliest literature on the sub-
ject. In 1880, Kosta Taušanović translated Hover’s book Switzerland, Her 
Constitution, Government and Self-Government.49 At about the same time, 
Djordje Simić translated Benjamin Constant’s The Political Principles and 
On Ministerial Responsibility.50 In 1884, Stojan Protić translated the most 
45 Slobodan Jovanović, Rasprave, I, 43.
46 Milivoje Popović, Poreklo i postanak ustava od 1888, Beograd, 1939, 109.
47 Stojan Bošković, Serbia, 1870.
48 Published in 1861.
49 Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 332–340; see also Milošević, 
Timočka buna, 252–256.
50 Ibid.
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liberal constitutions of the period: American (1787), Belgian (1831) and 
Swiss (1848)51. They were all published in Odjek. In his personal papers 
dealing with questions of parliamentary theory, Andra Nikolić, a long-time 
member of the Radical Main Committee, frequently referred to the British 
political example.52
A more coherent political concept was developed by a younger Radi-
cal intellectual, Milovan Dj. Milovanović53. He was educated at the Univer-
sity of Paris, where he earned a doctorate in law. By the age of twenty-six he 
had already become a professor at the Belgrade Law School (1888).54
His inaugural lecture at the University entitled On Parliamentary 
Government55 was the most advanced treatment of the British parliamen-
tary concept in Serbia at the time. Milovanović also worked as a preparatory 
secretary to the Constitutional Committee in 1888.56 The final version of the 
1888 act chiefly reflected his constitutional ideas.
British theoretical influences came through the writings of political 
thinkers as well: Maine, Freeman, Boutmy, Guiest, and especially Bagehot.57 
From their English teachers, the Serbian Radicals adopted the philosophical 
supposition that the ideal political system would be the one in which the 
entire nation ruled by itself (direct democracy). In other words, in a perfect 
world, political decision-making would lie in the hands of the people itself, 
no political institutions needed. The complexities of modern state conglom-
erates, regrettably, made such a plain and just order of things impossible 
and dysfunctional. Consequently, they suggested that the people should 
rule through a collective representative body by transferring their sovereign 
governing rights to their elected delegates (Parliament or National Assem-
bly). They declared that, as a result of the fact that the people’s interests were 
varied and often in contradiction, the Parliament (National Assembly) must 
consist of diverse political groups. The group that held the majority of rep-
resentation (legislature), thus representing the majority of the people, must 
be entitled to decision-making (executive power).
51 Ibid.
52 AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.
53 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
54 Fore more detail see: Dimitrije Djordjević, Milovan Dj. Milovanović, Beograd, 
1962.
55 Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, 381.
56 Ibid.
57 Milovan Dj. Milovanović, “O parlamentarnoj vladi”, Otadžbina, XIX, May-June, 
1888, 166.
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This is the most famous axiom of English parliamentarism:
“The government is born, lives and dies together with the Assembly 
Majority”.58 In line with the British concept, the Radicals in Serbia accepted 
the system of political parties and so-called “party government”: the party 
which wins the majority in the Parliament forms the cabinet:59
“The essence of a parliamentary system lies in the cabinet’s depen-
dence on and responsibility to the Assembly”.60
The foreign sources of the Radical political ideology were indeed 
threefold. They originated from three different European political doc-
trines, but each left its mark on the formation of the Serbian Radical ide-
ology. Their impacts differ both in intensity and in scope, thus essentially 
making the Radical ideology an eclectic political doctrine.
2
From an internal perspective, the ideology of the Serbian Radical Party was 
shaped by the specifics of the Serbian political and cultural situation. It is 
worth repeating here that by the early 1880s the Serbian political scene had 
witnessed a drastic divergence. On one side was the Prince (King from 1882 
onwards), and on the other – the three major political parties. Their com-
petition for dominance influenced their ideologies, and vice versa: their un-
derstanding of politics influenced their political positions.
The role of Serbian rulers was dominant from the very beginning. It 
was already Karageorge (Karadjordje Petrović), the leader of the First Ser-
bian Insurrection against the Ottomans in 1804, who acted as the supreme 
and unquestionable authority (taking the title of “Supreme Leader”). His 
successor Miloš Obrenović led the Second Serbian Insurrection (1815) and 
became the Prince of Serbia (1830). Prince Milan Obrenović proclaimed 
himself king in 1882.61 Despite his youth when he came to power (b. 1854), 
he was a strong-minded and highly authoritarian ruler, who opposed any 
attempt of democratic change in Serbia. On the occasion of the promulga-
tion of the 1888 Constitution, he said to an intimate friend, expressing his 
honest opinion:
58 Ibid.
59 Stojan Protić, “Ustavna vlada i njena odgovornost”, Samouprava, January 1888.
60 AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.
61 See Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, I; see also Živanović, I-III.
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“Everybody screamed and shouted demanding a new constitution. 
So I agreed to it. But, frankly, I wanted to demonstrate the absurdity 
of the issue and thus prove that this constitution is not for Serbia”.62
Before his arrival in Serbia in 1868 at the age of 14, Prince Milan 
Obrenović had lived abroad, where he received a sophisticated education in 
the most prominent centers of Europe,63 learning French and German bet-
ter than his mother tongue.64 Handsome and restless, with the virtues and 
vices of any spoilt young royal, he led a lifestyle according to European bon 
vivant standards and customs of the richest aristocracy. He was as foreign 
to the Serbs as the Serbs were foreign to him. They never liked one another, 
nor were able to achieve mutual understanding. 
Milan Obrenović’s policies were marked by two major features: he 
ran domestic affairs by himself, using political parties and politicians as 
his pawns, demanding blind obedience, loyalty and admiration. He was no 
democrat. Internationally, he saw Serbia as the central power in the region 
and insisted on the establishment of a standing army. By proclaiming the 
country a kingdom (in 1882), he elevated his own standing, but Serbia’s in-
ternational prestige was also lifted up. Milan’s foreign policy was hostile to 
Russia (due to her betrayal of the Serbian national cause in 1878).65 Hence, 
he turned to the Habsburgs for protection and assistance, signing the so-
called “Secret Convention” of reciprocal friendship in 1881.66 His states-
manship was too often dictated by his personal preferences; his political 
moves were inspired by his emotional states even more often. 
A police report from the Čačak area, central Serbia, dated December 
1888, illustrated to what extent Milan had been alien to the Serbian popula-
tion. A certain Toma Vilotijević claimed publicly that “the King is German, 
he is going to Germanize all of us and we’ll have to eat cats, because we 
know that Germans eat cats!”67 By the same token, King Milan had a quite 
harsh opinion about Serbs in general. Shortly before his abdication in 1889, 
he confided to a close associate:
62 Stojan Novaković, Dvadeset godina ustavne borbe u Srbiji 1883–1903, Belgrade, 
1912, 30.
63 Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, I, 24–27.
64 Ibid.
65 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, II, 67.
66 Jovanović, Vlada Milana ObrenovićaIII, 79.
67 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1214, Belgrade, 6 December 1888.
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“After twenty years of my rule in Serbia I have come to believe that 
our people are unable to grasp the meaning of the national idea and 
prefer partisan interests over the interests of the country.”68
The two mainstays of the ruler’s power in Serbia were the army and 
the capital.69 The greatest achievement of King Milan Obrenović was the 
creation of a standing army and a professional officer corps.70 Insomuch 
as this innovation fostered the state-building process and the international 
status of Serbia, the entire military structure was subjugated to the Crown 
and used as the King’s “Praetorian” guard. Later on, however, the Serbian 
army acquired a double role: it acted as a decisive political factor, but also 
represented the source of Serbian national strength. 
The other stronghold of the King’s authority was the nation’s capi-
tal city of Belgrade. In those days, Belgrade was virtually the only urban 
settlement in Serbia that bore some resemblance to European cities.71 State 
administration, military headquarters, major businesses, banks, trade, uni-
versity, hotels, restaurants and the Court itself, of course, were located in 
the Capital, which also housed the bulk of Serbian intelligentsia and the 
fledgling middle class. The King threw parties, organized receptions and 
balls, and, on the whole, played a central role in the city’s social life.72 It was 
the only environment in Serbia where King Milan felt both comfortable and 
powerful.
From the very beginning of the Radical Party, an especially strong 
animosity had developed between the Radicals and the Crown. The reasons 
for this almost unbearable conflict were logical: the King was an authoritar-
ian ruler who understood his royal powers as unlimited; he would accept 
no restrictions whatsoever. The Radicals, eager to come to power, preached 
constitutionalism, democracy, and self-government – demands aimed di-
rectly against the King’s personal power. Andra Nikolić wrote on the subject:
“The supreme power of the Ruler always ends in disaster; Nicholas I, 
Austria 1859 and 1866, France 1870–71, King Milan in Serbia. It is 
not good for the affairs of the State when the ruler is too influential. 
68 AS, Vladan Djordjević Fund, no. 40; Vladan Djordjević, “Uspomene Vladana 
Djordjevića”, Vreme, 5 December 1925.
69 Dragutin Ilić, Zaječarska buna, Belgrade, 1909, 25.
70 See Živanović, III, 171–173.
71 See Dimitrije Djordjević, “Srbija i srpsko društvo 1880–ih godina”, Istorijski 
časopis XXIX-XXX,1982–83, 413–426.
72 See Živanović, III, 201–205.
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Even if he is not irresponsible, he is unable to control everything by 
himself and therefore the outcome is always unfavorable…”73
Having escalated between 1881 and 1883, this conflict culminated in 
the 1883 Timok Rebellion. Although the rebels never openly admitted that 
the revolt had been directed against the Ruler personally, the rebellion was 
indeed an aborted anti-dynastic mutiny. The driving force behind the revolt, 
a prominent Radical leader from Knjaževac, Aca Stanojević,74 was dubbed 
the Commander of the Knjaževac Army in Action against the Abuser of the 
Constitution and the People’s Rights,75 in a clear reference to the King. In 
September 1883, on the eve of the revolt, one of the Radical representatives 
in the National Assembly76 supposedly said: 
“It is easier for me to overthrow the King than to remove a village 
kmet (local official)”.77 
Another report from the same year stated that the Radical Party 
had organized a coup against King Milan.78 Pera Todorović, one of the co-
founders of the Radical Party, who had abandoned the movement in 1886 
and became the King’s spokesperson, addressed this letter to the Serbian 
monarch:
“In the hands of Djaja, Kosta (Taušanović) and Stojan (Protić), the 
Radical Party is a permanent threat to the country, and if there is 
no other way, his patriotic duty would dictate to the ruler and the 
government to fight that Party to the bitter end, to the final annihila-
tion of one side. At this point there can be no truce, there can be no 
excuse – it is a life-or-death fight”.79
The King himself never fully trusted the Radicals, nor did he ever see 
them as a genuine ideological movement. In his view, they were a mob of 
anti-dynastic elements plotting to overthrow him. He defeated them once in 
1883, but his struggle with them continued until his death in 1901:
“The Radicals in Serbia are not a political party willing to fight for 
certain principles applicable in state institutions, but rather an anti-
73 AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.
74 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
75 Ilić, Zaječarska buna, 39.
76 His name was Ljubinko Milinković.
77 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183, September 10, 1883.
78 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, August 27, 1883.
79 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1064.
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dynastic party, which has, since its very inception, been systemati-
cally working on overthrowing our dynasty”.80
There were two attempts on King Milan’s life during his thirty-year 
presence in Serbian politics. The first occurred in 1882 and the second in 
1889. He utilized both attempts as a pretext to crush down the leadership of 
the Radical Party. The first attempted assassination was perpetrated by Jele-
na-Ilka Marković,81 the sister-in-law of Svetozar Marković, whose husband, 
a Radical sympathizer, had been executed for alleged high treason.82 She died 
in prison under unclarified circumstances. She was very close to most of the 
Radical leaders in Belgrade, especially to Raša Milošević,83 and it seems likely 
that at least a few of them had been aware of her intention. The King, how-
ever, was convinced that the assassination had been entirely organized by the 
Radicals.84 The second attempt on King Milan’s life was made in 1899. This 
event had a twofold importance in regard to the relations between the Radi-
cals and the King: first, it confirmed the profound animosity between the two; 
second, it indicated the intention of the former king to destroy the leadership 
of the Radical Party, even after almost twenty years of their presence in Ser-
bian politics. This assertion is supported by the former king’s letter to his son 
Alexandar dated 1898, in which he informed his successor that the Radicals 
had been the chief enemies of the Obrenović dynasty and that they should be 
“destroyed and annihilated”.85 According to the same source, the former king 
ordered that a secret agency be formed, headed by Court Marshal Mihailo 
Rašić, in order to follow closely the actions and moves of prominent Radi-
cals.86 The open clash between the King and the Radicals left a deep mark on 
the Radicals’ policy. Their opposition to the King inspired their demands for 
constitutional and democratic reforms – their understanding of democracy 
compelled them to oppose the King.
* * *
Relations among the three political parties constitute the second internal 
factor in the formation of Radical political ideology. 
80 AS, Vladan Djordjević Fund, no. 27, 1899.
81 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
82 See Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, I, 210–215.
83 Milošević, Timočka buna, 51–58.
84 AS, Vladan Djordjević Fund, no. 27.
85 ASANU, no. 11657/1.
86 Ibid.
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At this point, it should be noted that neither the Progressive nor the 
Liberal Party had directed their political actions towards the masses. The 
Progressive Party, which came up with a program of a moderate reform in 
the 1870s, sought to effect the change through collaboration with the King. 
Their understanding of statehood was based on the premise that it was the 
intellectuals headed by the Crown that should lead the State and shape its 
policies. This aspect of the Progressivist ideology was noticed by the French 
representative in Belgrade and described in several reports:
« A Belgrade, les progressistes sont détestés par la population qui est 
libérale ou radicale. On ne leurs pardonne pas de s’être faits les ins-
truments de la politique Autrichienne du Roi Milan. »87
In another of his reports to Paris, the French representative was even more 
outspoken:
« Le parti progressiste qui n’a jamais eu de racines profondes dans le 
pays, que le Roi a créé en quelques fortes pour appliquer sa politique 
personnelle, est en pleine décomposition ».88
In his report dated March 1888, the Frenchman gave his final assess-
ment of the Progressive Party in Serbia:
« C’est toute une génération politique qui disparait de la scène: géné-
ration de petits bourgeois honnêtes, mais étroits et entêtés, qu’on 
pourrait appeler les doctrinaires de la Serbie. Ayant emprunté à l’Eu-
rope quelques idées constitutionnelles, conservant de l’Orient l’esprit 
stationnaire… »89
The Liberal Party, which grew out of the romantic national senti-
ment of the 1850s and saw internal progress in terms of national liberation, 
was also essentially an elitist organization. The leaders of this group were 
in power throughout the 1870s and already had significant political experi-
ence, tradition and self-confidence. The Liberals did not deem it necessary 
to gain massive support in the population. In their view, largely shared by 
the Progressivists, the Serbian peasant was uneducated and primitive, and 
was not to be allowed to act as a politically relevant factor.
Both political organizations, therefore, resembled political clubs rath-
er than true political movements with mass followings. Their strength de-
rived either from the King’s authority or from their intellectual prominence 
87 AMAE, CP-Serbie, 1889, May 28, 1889.
88 AMAE, CP-Serbie, 2 Jan. 7, 1889.
89 AMAE, CP-Serbie, 1887–88, March 10, 1888.
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and political experience. Both were small in numbers and incapable of ever 
winning the majority of the electorate, partly because they never took elec-
tions as a decisive criterion in the competition for power, and partly because 
they were not rooted deeply enough in the Serbian population.
In contrast, the Radicals concentrated all their power and ability on 
winning over the peasantry. Their political strategy was entirely based on 
introducing the people to politics and making them a significant political 
factor. From the very beginning, the Radicals sought to ensure the broad-
est possible support from the countryside. The power of their movement 
came from two sources: the village and the numbers. Some figures may il-
lustrate this assertion. In November 1887, the Radicals won 81 seats in the 
Assembly, the Liberals 61, and the Progressivists none.90 In March 1888, 
133 out of 156 members of the National Assembly were Radicals.91 At the 
elections held in 1889, the Radicals received 158,856 votes and the Liberals 
only 21,829.92 In the 1890 elections, the Radicals won 152,935 votes, the 
Liberals 23,548, and the Progressivists only 8,895,93 which meant that the 
Radicals had attracted over 80 percent of the electorate. The Radical official 
newspapers were distributed all over the country. A number of reports from 
the interior of the country stated that no other political journals were avail-
able there.94 The Progressivist official publication ironically commented on 
the Radical vast membership:
“The Radical Party is still powerful; its power does not necessarily lie 
in intelligence, but at least it is the power in numbers…95
This “power in numbers” was obviously not enough in the Serbian 
political circumstances for the Radicals to come to power. As a result, they 
resorted to making agreements with rival political camps. Their competi-
tion with Progressivists and Liberals worked in both directions: it pushed 
the Radical movement towards the electorate, towards the peasantry, and 
towards the countryside; the drive to come to power motivated their col-
laboration and coalition tactics. Both processes marked the Radical ideol-
ogy. One endowed it with its simplicity and demagoguery, but also with a 
90 AMAE, CP-Serbie, November 11, 1887.
91 AMAE, CP-Serbie, March 10, 1888.
92 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 191.
93 Ibid.
94 No. 199, Vranje, November 3, 1881. 
95 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1058.
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straightforwardness and clarity of ideas. The other led to its flexibility and 
pragmatism.
To sum up, the ideology of Serbian Radicalism was essentially a com-
bination of various influences. Its sources were multiple and came both from 
outside and inside the country. In a purely political sense, French Radical-
ism was the most significant single impact. A comparison of the French and 
Serbian political programs convincingly supports this assessment. The in-
spiration for the movement came from socialists. The British constitutional 
concept also played a significant role. From the viewpoint of internal politi-
cal relations, the Radical doctrine was shaped under the impact of confron-
tation and collaboration with other actors on the Serbian political scene.
 
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Chapter Four
THE CHARACTERISTICS
From the most general viewpoint, there were two major aspects of Ser-bian Radicalism: its political thought and its political practice. The two were not always and necessarily in full accord. 
The main elements of Serbian Radical ideology in its prime were the 
following: constitutional reform, parliamentarianism, self-government, 
democratic freedoms (freedom of press, association and public assembly), 
and a Serbian national program. 
The main features of Serbian Radicalism as a politically relevant 
movement could be summed up as: militancy, pragmatism, cohesion, and 
populism. 
Its ideological elements can be singled out from Radical programs, 
constitutional proposals, and numerous writings and articles. The features 
of the movement were shaped by the political realities in which it had ex-
isted and struggled for power or, at times, for its very survival. Its first facet 
– the ideological aspect – provided the movement its firmness, consis tency 
and rationale; the other, the practical aspect, ensured its popularity, success 
and might. Together they formed the essence of Serbian Radicalism.1
1 A. Radenić, Radikalna stranka i Timočka buna. Istorija radikalne stranke. Doba 
narodnjastva, Zaječar, 1988; see also Milan St. Protić, Radikali u Srbiji: Ideje i pokret 
1881–1903, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade, 1990; G. Stokes, Politics as De-
velopment. The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia, Duke 
University Press, Durham–London 1990; D. Janković, Radjanje parlamentarne 
demokratije. Političke stranke u Srbiji XIX veka, Belgrade, 1997.
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Milan St. Protić 84
1
Each and every political ideology, as much as each and every individual 
belief, is subject to revision and change. Still, it is possible to look for some 
relatively permanent ideas or concepts which can be described as the funda-
mental principles of a given political party. Following this line of reasoning, 
and bearing in mind the historical development of the Radical Party’s mani-
fests, four basic items of the Radical understanding of politics and govern-
ment ought to be highlighted: constitutionalism as the supreme principle of 
state organi zation, parliamentary democracy as its method, civil liberties as 
its safeguard, and local self-government as its manifestation. Each of these 
elements was defined gradually, over a long period of ideological fermenta-
tion. Once they became fully clarified and accepted, the Radical Party ac-
quired its firm theoretical ground. From that point on, it could be classi-
fied as an organization of a radical-democratic orientation. By then, the last 
socialist and revolutionary traces had faded away. The national program, 
another fundamental facet of their political ideology, belonged to its exter-
nal ingredients. Namely, the Radicals viewed Serbian national emancipa-
tion, libera tion and unification (“nation-state”) as originating from internal 
freedom. In other words, the national program was the result of democratic 
changes, and not vice versa. Yet, in the subsequent years (1903 onwards), 
their nationalism was less pronounced than that of the other political par-
ties in Serbia or Europe. Perhaps it was simply a little more pragmatic. 
* * *
A liberal constitution had been the Radicals’ main objective from their 
early days.2 Svetozar Marković had sharply criticized the Constitution of 
1869 and raised the question of a constitutional reform.3 In the first written 
Radical program (1871), the constitutional change was placed at the top of 
their agenda.4 In a number of public statements and parliamentary motions, 
Adam Bogosavljević’s group insisted on a constitu tional reform “according 
to the principles of modern democracy”.5 A good part of the Radical Party’s 
first program (1881) was dedicated to the prospects of a new constitution 
and its substance.6 In 1883, the Radicals prepared their own constitutional 
2 The Radicals had pressed for constitutional reform since 1871.
3 See Marković, “Srpske obmane”.
4 ASANU no. 9783/44.
5 R. Petrović, Adam Bogosavljević, 77.
6 ASANU, no. 10634.
See also “Naš program”, Samouprava, no 1, January 8, 1881.
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proposal.7 The 1888 Constitution was mostly an expression of their consti-
tutional ideas.8 They also con tributed to the work on the 1901 Constitution, 
but the spirit of this document did not fully reflect their notions of constitu-
tionalism. Rather, it was a reflection of the compromise between the Radi-
cals and the Progressive Party, i.e. the Crown.9 The 1901 Act was the spark 
that triggered the split within the Radical Party. The Radicals reinstated the 
1888 Constitution in June 1903, immediately after the dynastic change and 
before the new King (Petar I Karadjordjević) had even arrived to Serbia.10 
The 1903 Constitution was unique in that it established a parliamentary 
monarchy, but bore no royal signature. 
In a nutshell, the principle of constitutionalism represented the focal 
point of Radical political ideology.
The Radical understand ing of the constitutional issue is best illus-
trated by the following two documents: the 1883 constitutional proposal, 
and the 1888 Constitution. 
The guiding principle of the proposal drawn up in July 1883 was 
the sovereignty of the people.11 It stated that the people should be the sole 
source of power, executing their sovereign will through national representa-
tion – the National Assembly.12 The Assembly should be fully elective by di-
rect and secret ballot. Universal male suffrage was guaranteed. The National 
Assembly as the supreme legislative authority was at the top of the state pyr-
amid. According to the proposal, the Assembly could be bipartite: Regular 
and Grand. The jurisdiction of the Grand National Assembly was defined 
by the Constitution itself, making a constitutional change its sole respon-
sibility. All legislative prerogatives were assigned to the Assembly. The Ruler 
was entitled to approve proposed legislation, but the Assembly was empow-
ered to pass legislation even in case of royal dis approval. The proposal es-
tablished the Council of Ministers at the top of administration acting as 
a mere instrument of the Assembly. Thus, the Radical project envisaged a 
system that subordinated the executive and judicial branches to the legisla-
ture. The state territory was to be divided into districts and municipalities, 
7 ASANU, no. 9729.
8 ASANU, no. 10593.
9 See Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra, III, 112–114.
10 J. Prodanović, Ustavni razvitak i ustavne borbe u Srbiji, Belgrade, 1938, 203–205; 
see also K. St. Pavlowitch, “The Constitutional Development of Serbia in the 19th 
Century”, East European Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, 456–467.
11 Djordjević, ed., Ustavni razvitak; see also R. Milošević, Timočka buna, 108–128; 
M. Popović, Borbe za parlamentarni režim u Srbiji, Beograd, 1939, 54.
12 Djordjević, ed., Ustavni razvitak, 84.
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and these subdivisions were to be organized according to the principle of 
local self-government (highest level of autonomy).13 This was basically the 
materialization of the so called “Convent system”, with a supremely power-
ful National Assembly.14 The role of the King was entirely marginalized. It 
essentially created a republic disguised in monarchical form. 
In terms of their ideological evolution, the 1883 Radical constitutional 
draft was placed halfway between their radical-socialist past and their par-
liamentary democratic future. On one hand, it was expressive of their covert 
republicanism, a concept inherited from Svetozar Marković. On the other, 
it insisted on fundamental democratic principles, which included universal 
suffrage, civil liberties, ministerial responsibility, free, direct and secret elec-
tions, and judicial independence.15 This was a sign of their coming closer 
to the ideology of Radical democracy rather than socialist revolution. At 
that point, the process of political maturation was already underway. Only 
two months later, the Radicals opted for violence, trying to overthrow the 
government by violent means (the Timok Rebellion). The Radicals were 
still torn by a dilemma: is democracy attainable through legitimate political 
struggle or it does it need to be achieved by the use of force? As we saw, the 
outcome of the Timok Rebellion provided the most convincing answer.
As far as we know today, the proposal was the result of the activities of 
the entire Radical membership. The text was distributed, analyzed and com-
mented upon by local party boards throughout Serbia. The final version was 
adopted through a procedure that could be described as democratic and by 
general consent, even though it was never actually subjected to a vote.16
The 1883 proposal is most illustrative of the multiplicity and diversity 
of Serbian Radicalism’s sources. The point to be made here is that – both in 
their socialist-revolutionary and radical-democratic theories and practices 
– the Radicals were the disciples of the Western political tradition. 
The 1888 Constitution, a cornerstone of Serbian democracy, was un-
doubtedly a great triumph of the Radical Party.17 The legal preparations had 
been done by Radical experts; it mainly expressed Radical concepts.18 For-
13 Djordjević, ed., Ustavni razvitak, 85–90.
14 Slobodan Jovanović, Političke i pravne rasprave, I, 43; this particular “Convent 
system” was also applied in the French Constitution of 1793.
15 Djordjević ed., Ustavni razvitak, 91.
16 ASANU, no. 9783/1–22.
17 D. Janković, Političke stranke, 257; M. Popović, Poreklo i postanak, 65.
18 Zaključci i rezolucija radikalnih zemaljskih konferencija u 1920 i 1921, Beograd, 
1923, 2–4.
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mally, though, it was agreed upon by all three political parties as well as the 
Crown, and was passed by a great majority, with only  a few votes against.19 
Its most significant feature was the fact that it had introduced a sys-
tem of parliamentary democracy based on a strict division of powers.20 Its 
major characteristics may be classified as follows:
1. Guarantees of political and civil rights: a multiparty political 
system.
2. Free and fair elections; universal male suffrage; fully elective uni-
cameral Parliament (National Assembly).
3. Dual legislative initiative shared between the Assembly and the 
King.
4.  Power of the National Assembly to appoint and control the execu-
tive branch (Council of Ministers). 
5.  Ministerial responsibility, both political and criminal.
6.  Sovereign right of the National Assembly to pass the budget.
7.  Administrative organization of the country according to the prin-
ciple of local self-government.
The 1888 Act also guaranteed freedom of press, association and pub-
lic assembly,21 introduced compulsory primary education,22 and abolished 
capital punishment for political crimes.23 
The 1888 Constitution showed that the Radical ideology had ma-
tured: democracy overpowered revolution. At the same time, it represented 
the peak of radical constitutionalism. Thereafter, rather than further devel-
oping their constitutional concept, they only insisted on its full implementa-
tion. This particular item became their chief political demand in the years 
to come.
* * *
The other three elements of the Radical ideology were derived from the first. 
Parliamentarianism, self-government and civil liberties were, in fact, the 
specific points of the Radical perception of constitutionalism. 
19 ASANU, no. 10593.
20 Popović, Poreklo i postanak, 170.
21 Ustav Kraljevine Srbije, Beograd 1888.
22 Ibid., art. 125–132.
23 Ibid., art. 54.
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The idea of parliamentary democracy found its way into the ideol-
ogy of Serbian Radicalism gradually, and for two main reasons: first, multi-
partism required a well-developed political environment supported by or-
ganized public opinion, and this would not occur in Serbia until the 1870s; 
second, parliamentarianism had originated from European, more precisely 
British, political practice. The Radical thought had to evolve through several 
stages before that particular system could be applied. Here is what Andra 
Nikolić wrote about parliamentarism in the 1880s: 
“Parties and politics – those are realities, necessities... because not all 
people think the same, and people want freedom.... hence, different 
opinions ought to be publically and equally represented”.24
According to the Radicals, who followed the British model, the multi-
party system was simply an organized way to demonstrate various interests 
of various groups of people. They argued for a system in which the party 
which wins the majority forms the government. Here is a famous sentence 
of the leading Radical expert on the subject: 
“The government is born, lives and dies with the Assembly 
majority.”25 
Another radical theorist noted:
 “The essence of parliamentarianism resides in the cabinet’s depen-
dence on and responsibility to the Assembly”.26
The principle of local self-government was the oldest element of Radi-
cal ideology. It arose from the teachings of Svetozar Marković, and demands 
made by Adam Bogosavljević in early and mid-1870s. Present in all Radical 
programs and manifestos, it was the most enduring item of their political 
ideology. As such, it requires a closer examination. 
As an alternative to royal and governmental centralism, the Radicals 
proposed a system of direct election of local officials by the local population 
with broad competences. They believed that this would ensure the principle 
of national sovereignty and relieve the paternalistic pressure of the central 
authorities. The Radicals did not restrict self-government to the sphere of 
administration; rather, they argued that the municipal physician, teacher, 
24 AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.
25 M. Dj. Milovanović, “O parlamentarnoj vladi”, Otadžbina, XIX, May–June 1888, 
166.
26 St. Protić, “Ustavna vlada i njena odgovornost”, Samouprava, January 1882.
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priest, and even the local military commander, should be chosen by popular 
vote.27
The system of local self-government as conceived by the Radicals 
was based on a division of the country into districts and municipalities.28 
The municipality was seen as the fundamental political and economic en-
tity.29 Each municipality was entitled to two elected representatives in the 
District Assembly.30 These districts were designed to be quite large, with 
about 10,000 taxpayers (families) each, and governed by three bodies: the 
District Assembly (fully elective supreme decision-making body), District 
Control Committee (the executive organ of the Assembly), and District Ad-
ministrative Council (with administrative and judicial responsibilities).31 
All executive and administrative offices were fully elective and their officials 
accountable to the District Assembly. The competences of the District As-
sembly included all educational, judicial, administrative, financial, statis-
tical, technical, economic, and reli gious matters in the district.32 In 1883, 
Raša Milošević,33 a distinguished leader of the Radical Party and a member 
of its Main Board, wrote a booklet – District Organization according to the 
Principle of Self-Government and Electoral Rights – thoroughly exploring the 
concept and the system of local autonomy. The booklet was also published 
in Samouprava and distributed to all local party committees.34
The demand for civil rights liberties was among those upon which 
the Radicals had insisted from the very beginnings of the movement. As 
early as 1875, Adam Bogosavljević repeatedly underscored the importance 
of freedom of press and public speech:
“Try telling a simple peasant that he is forbidden to write and speak 
the only way he knows, and he wouldn’t believe something like that 
27 R. Milošević, Organizacija sreza na načelu samouprave i izbornog prava, Beograd, 
1883, 14.
28 Milošević, Organizacija sreza, 23; see also Jaša Prodanović, Istorija političkih stra-
naka i struja u Srbiji, Beograd, 1947.
29 Milošević, Organizacija sreza, 22–24.
30 Ibid.
31 Milošević, Organizacija sreza, 26; see also F. Nikić, Lokalna uprava Srbije u XIX i 
XX veku, Beograd, 1927, 242.
32 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 26–27; see also Prodanović, Istorija..., 
473.
33 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
34 Milošević, Organizacija sreza 28–30.
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was possible... I claim that today Serbia needs freedom of expression 
more than ever...”35
And again there were two aspects to a tenet of the Radical politi-
cal program: the theoretical and practical. Civil liberties were inherent to 
their concept of democracy. Yet, it was often used as an instrument of popu-
lism and demagoguery. The radical leaders mastered the craft of sweet-talk, 
learning to reach out and touch the most sensitive emotions of the Serbian 
peasantry. Speaking in plain language, using every opportunity to attack 
Belgrade bureaucrats and bourgeoisie, simplifying the complexities of any 
modern government and its considerations, and arguing for a drastic de-
crease in taxes, the radicals built an image of popular tribunes and spokes-
men of the masses. 
The 1888 Constitution marked a turning point in this respect too. 
Abolishing any kind of censorship, it enabled the total proliferation of po-
litical press.36
* * *
The Radical Party’s national program was an external component of its ide-
ology. In the formative period of the movement, major national issues and 
foreign policy in general were of secondary importance: domestic problems 
prevailed over the question of Serbia’s international position. It was only 
after the Radicals had entered the cabinet (1887) and King Milan had ab-
dicated (1889) that they began to be more concerned about foreign policy, 
fully developing a national program during the 1890s.37 This segment of 
the Radical ideology revolved around four major points: the Serbian na-
tional idea; Russia as Serbia’s key ally; the prospect of a Balkan alliance; and 
a South-Slavic union. From the outset the Radical Party thought of itself 
as a nationalist movement.38 The original Party program (1881) stipulated 
“an independent Serbian state and the liberation and unification of all parts 
of Serbdom” as its foremost goal.39 In a proclamation to the Radical mem-
bership dated 1886, the leadership reaffirmed its view of Serbia as “Serbian 
Piedmont.40
35 ASANU, no. 10438/22.
36 AMAE, January 7, 1889.
37 Zaključci i rezolucija , 1; AMAE, January 6, 1888.
38 ASANU, no. 13681/1.
39 Zaključci i rezolucija, 1.
40 ASANU, no. 13681/1.
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In 1894, the national program was articulated along these lines:
“Serbia simply cannot abandon the interests of Serbdom. From the 
Serbian standpoint, there is no difference between the interests of 
the Serbian state and the interests of other Serbs. The ques tion of 
Serbdom is the “to-be-or-not-to-be” question of the Serbian state… 
Cut off from other Serbian lands, Serbia alone is nothing and has no 
raison d’être.”41
This statement mirrored the nationalist orientation of the Radical 
Party, following in the footsteps of earlier European and Serbian national 
programs. There are obvious similarities between the first Serbian national 
program of 184442 and the Radical concept of 1894.
The national policy of the Radical Party was the result of its views 
on domestic policy. The Radicals espoused the concept of modern democ-
racy and, consequently, the principle of popular sovereignty, which in turn 
required an independent state and a high level of national consciousness 
(nation-state). It was at an early point in their evolution that they aban-
doned the concept of a social revolution leading to national emancipa-
tion, liberation and unification,43 but they retained something of their so-
cialist past nevertheless: the precedence of internal reform over national 
aspirations.
The Radical movement followed the tide of history, carrying Serbia 
towards the nineteenth-century European ideal: one nation – one state. Eu-
ropean nationalism went hand-in-hand with European democracy. It was 
this collectivism that contradicted the notion of individual freedom. In the 
latter stages, during the twentieth century, it became increasingly difficult to 
combine nationalism and liberalism.
In the Serbian case, this ideological blend meant striving for the lib-
eration and unification of the Serbs living in neighboring undemocratic em-
pires, the Habsburg and the Ottoman. Although they were internationalists 
in their early days, the Radicals soon turned into ardent nationalists
Most historians who have studied nineteenth-century Serbia have 
claimed that Russophilia was the main feature of the Radical foreign policy. 
Yet, as much as this claim is generally correct, it requires a more detailed 
41 M. Dj. Milovanović, “Naša spoljna politika”, Delo, IV, 1894, 246.
42 Načertanije (“The Draft”) was a secret document created by the Serbian states-
man Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874). A good part of the work was done by Frantisek 
Zach (1807–1892), a Czech national revolutionary and agent of the Polish emigre 
leader Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861). 
43 V. Čubrilović, Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka, Beograd, 1958, 368.
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analysis. The question may be formulated as follows: What were the Radi-
cals’ motives for their inclinations towards Russia? Or vice versa: What rea-
sons did Russia have to sup port the Radicals? On one hand, Tsarist Russia 
was a conservative, autocratic and unconstitutional state. The Radical Party, 
on the other hand, championed constitutionalism, parliamentarism, and 
democracy. How come, then, that an undemocratic empire (Russia) would 
agree to assist a democratic political organization (Radical Party)?
The answer lies in the realm of interests and not of ideology. 
The answer may partly be found in the fact that the Radical leaders 
had been inspired by Russian populism and anarchism in their youth, and 
had identified with Russian liberal intelligentsia.44 It could easily be, there-
fore, that some of them had kept close and personal friends in St. Petersburg 
or Moscow. Moreover, and more importantly, imperial Russia was viewed 
as the guardian of the Orthodox and Slavic world. For her part, Russia sup-
ported all national movements in the Balkans, her fundamental interest be-
ing to gain access to the Mediterranean (the Straits).45 46 Thus, the national 
interests of Balkan nations47 coincided with Russian foreign policy priori-
ties. Hence, the Radicals believed that Russia was best suited to be Serbia’s 
closest ally and the best supporter of her national objectives of all the Great 
Powers:
“As far as our attitude towards Russians is concerned, I think that we 
should really lean in her direction; but, personally, I would prefer to 
see Russian influ ence on our affairs limited to the extent needed to 
act as a counterweight to that of Austria-Hungary”.48
The Radical front man Nikola Pašić has been quoted as saying: “If it is 
difficult with Russia, it is even more difficult without Russia”.49
Another Radical from Belgrade wrote to Pašić in Bulgaria (1884): 
“I think that so far our attitude towards Russia has been good. But, 
maybe we should now come out as open Russian expon ents”.50
44 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1885, July 10, 1885.
45 The Straits of Constantinople: Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
46 For more details see Ch. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, Califor-
nia University Press, Berkeley 1958.
47 Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, Montenegrins.
48 Letter to Nikola Pašić, Belgrade, 1884, private collection.
49 M. Gavrilović, Nikola P. Pašić, Windsor, Canada, 1963, 8. This sentence has also 
been attributed to Jovan Ristić, a Liberal.
50 Letter to Nikola Pašić, Beograd, 1884, private collection.
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From 1881, the Radical leadership established a close relationship 
with Russian representatives in Belgrade.51 Lamansky and especially Per-
siani52 were seen as their “intimate friends”.53
Archival sources suggest that these two Russians extended more than 
just moral support: Russian financial aid was substantial, but highly secret.54 
A number of documents indicated that Russia was the major financial spon-
sor of the Radical emigrants in Bulgaria. In a series of reports the Serbian 
representative in Sofia accused Pašić and other Radicals of having contacts 
with and receiving money from Russian emissaries.55 Both were opposed to 
the Serbian King Milan Obrenović: Russia because of his Austrophile for-
eign policy and the Radicals because of his foreign as well as his domes tic 
policies.
But relations between the Radicals and Russia had not always been 
so cordial. The Radicals viewed Russia’s involvement in Balkan affairs with 
a certain cautiousness. In Serbia, Russia had backed the Liberal Party before 
and simultaneously with the Radicals. Due to their pan-Slavism and strong 
Orthodox influences, the Liberals were warmly received in St. Petersburg. 
What the Radicals thought on the subject may be seen from a letter dated 
1884:
“Giga (Geršić)56 talked to Lamansky. He complained about the Lib-
erals’ disregard and insult of our party comrades. Lamansky told him 
that he had acknowledged some serious mistakes of the Liberal gov-
ernment and would give it more attention. But, he also said that we 
need to keep collaborating with (Jovan) Ristić”.57
Even more skeptical was the Radicals’ reaction to Lamansky’s propo-
sition that Belgrade Radicals give their full support to their exiled comrades 
in Bulgaria regarding their relations with Russia:
“Be careful not to become a mere tool of others who will let you 
down as soon as your role is finished.”58
51 J. Avakumović, “Memoirs”, ASANU, no. 9287/III, 131–133.
52 Russian diplomats in Belgrade.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183, September 19, 1883; ASANU, no. 11548.
56 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
57 Stojan Protić to Nikola Pašić, August 31, 1884, private collection.
58 Ibid.
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Russia’s Balkan policy followed two different courses: pro-Serbian 
and pro-Bulgarian. The Radi cals considered pro-Bulgarian Russia as a seri-
ous threat in case of a Serbo-Bulgarian conflict, but believed that Serbia, in 
the absence of a better ally, needed to accept Russia as “the foremost defend-
er of its national interests”.59 By the same token, the Radical foreign policy 
was very much concerned with ameliorating relations with Sofia. 
The claim that the Radical Party was essen tially Russophile does seem 
accurate, but requires additional elaborating. 
Namely, the Radicals’ pro-Russian position passed through several 
phases. As we saw, in the early years of the Radical movement, it stemmed 
from the influence of Russian socialist thinkers and their ideas. With time, 
this idealistic sentiment gave way to a more rational justification. Russia 
came to be seen as the best possible supporter of the Serbian national cause, 
galvanized by the feeling of common ethnic and religious origins. This ori-
entation toward the East was confirmed by Nikola Pašić himself on his visit 
to St. Petersburg, sometime in the 1890s: 
“Serbia will always and in any circumstances be on the side of 
Russia”.60 (How sincere was the Radical Chairman’s statement is 
quite another matter. His pro-Russian inclinations, however, never 
wavered.)
The vision of a Balkan alliance was also one of the Radicals’ oldest 
ideas. As most their views, it could be traced back to the teachings of Sve-
tozar Marković, who had advocated “social revo lution leading to a Balkan 
federation of freely associated nations”. The Radicals modified Marković’s 
doctrine, transforming it into a concept of a Balkan alliance of sovereign 
states based on mutual interests.61 
Of all Balkan peoples, the Radicals were most attracted by Bulgarians, 
since it was the territory of Macedonia62 that was the target of both nation-
alisms. They considered Serbs and Bulgarians as two different peoples with 
their own separate states and histories, but with similar ethnic and historical 
backgrounds and languages.63 As two “sibling” nations sharing a common 
interest to fend off the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia, Serbs and Bulgar-
59 M. Dj. Milovanović, “Srbi i Bugari”, Delo, XVII, 1898, 291.
60 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1904.
61 D. Ilić, Zaječarska buna, 122.
62 At the time, Macedonia was under Ottoman rule, but was populated almost en-
tirely by Slavic population with a very low ethnic consciousness.
63 Milovanović, “Srbi i Bugari”, 290–292.
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ians would be much stronger if united.64 It is true that the Radical views on 
Macedonia were less nationalistic than those of other political parties in 
Serbia. The Radicals saw Macedonia as neither Serbian nor Bulgarian, but 
rather as a mixture of both. In order to resolve the problem of conflicting 
claims, they proposed a deal between Serbia and Bulgaria to partition Ot-
toman territories in the Central Balkans. This pragmatic approach was real-
ized in 1897, when an agreement was reached: it was a triumph of their pol-
icy of compromise in the Balkans, a concept they persistently advocated.65
Besides the official aspect of the Radical policy towards Bulgaria, 
there was a much more personal and an equally significant one. First, the 
Radical Party was particularly popular in Eastern Serbia, a region border-
ing Bulgaria, with the population on both sides of the border ethnically 
and culturally quite similar. Second, some of the most prominent Radical 
leaders were originally from eastern Serbia.66 Third, the Radical leadership 
maintained close contacts with the leaders of the Bulgarian Liberal Party: 
the two movements showed significant ideological kinship. Exiled after the 
Timok Rebellion, the Radicals were welcomed and assisted by the Bulgarian 
Liberals.67 The Radical friendship with Suknarov, Slaveykov and Karavelov 
was deeper than just political collaboration; they shared common feelings of 
ideological and national closeness.68
If their Balkan alliance project reflected the Radical’s national aspira-
tions towards the Ottoman Empire, the South-Slavic union project revealed 
their intentions towards the Habsburg Monarchy. National romanticism of 
nineteenth-century Europe had given rise to the idea of South-Slavic unity. 
Yugoslavism was a complex and somewhat controversial concept. Different 
parts of the Balkan Peninsula, diff erent ethnicities with different percep-
tions, different motives, and different histories, at one point or the other, 
developed their specific concept of the idea.
According to Serbian Radicals, the two key Yugoslav ethnic groups 
were Serbs and Croats. 
Disillusioned by the defeat of federalism, the acceptance of a dualist 
solution and the formation of Austria-Hungary (1867), Croatian national-
ists looked for a viable alternative in a potential South-Slavic unification.69 
64 Ibid.
65 See Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, II, 381–398.
66 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
67 ASANU, no. 11548 and 11551; AMAE, CP Serbie, 1884, July 11, 1884.
68 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1889, October 20, 1889.
69 M. Dj. Milovanović, Srbi i Hrvati, 21.
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Similar projects were hatched among the Serbs in Southern Hungary (Vo-
jvodina). It was only later (after 1903) that the Serbs in Serbia proper started 
to consider the idea seriously.70 A common ethnic background and the same 
language offered justification for their dreams about a Yugoslavian state. The 
Yugoslav idea was basically a matter of Serbo-Croatian relations.
The Radical approach to the Yugoslav question was realistic and ra-
tional. The Radicals were aware of the dissimilarities between the two na-
tions: different religions (the Croats being Roman Catholic and the Serbs 
Eastern Orthodox), different historical experiences (the Croats living under 
the Habsburgs, the Serbs under the Ottomans). This is what they had to say 
on the issue in 1882:
“The gap that exists today between the Serbs and the Croats is much 
deeper than we tend to think. The questions of religion, history and 
politics are so intermingled that one can rightfully ask whether we 
are one people or not…”71
The Radicals reflected on the future development of Serbs and Croats and 
prospects for their unification, offering two possibilities:
“To become members of the same state, to further our linguistic kin-
ship and to pursue the same goals. In that case, we shall be separated 
only by religion. On the other hand, a completely different thing 
might happen. Our hostile divisions may remain. The language may 
take divergent paths, and then the Serbs and Croats would be left 
with nothing in common.”72
What did the Radicals see as the major point of Serbo-Croat disagreement? 
In the words of the same Radical: 
“We seek happiness for our people outside Turkey but, God, outside 
Austria-Hungary as well. This ‘outside Austria-Hungary’ leads to 
conflict with our Croatian brothers”.73
In essence, the Radical idea of Yugoslav unification was a logical con-
tinuation of their idea of Serbian unification. Serbian unity was an essential 
item on their agenda (the concept of a nation-state). The Yugoslav solution 
was a broader framework for pursuing the same objective. The Radical Par-
ty grew into a nationalist movement expressing and defending the Serbian 
70 Ibid., 15.
71 St. Protić, “Srpsko-hrvatsko pitanje”, Samouprava, December 2–31, 1882.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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national cause. The Yugoslav alternative could only be the next stage of the 
Serbian idea, but by no means its substitute.
2
If the basics of the Radical ideology belonged to the ideal world of phi-
losophy, the characteristics of the Party belonged to the imperfect world 
of reali ty. In fact, these two sides have defined Serbian Radicalism in its 
historical context. On one hand, the adaptability of the Radical Party – its 
ability to respond to existing situations and to adapt to the changing real-
ity – seem of utmost importance. On the other hand, it was its adaptable 
nature that allowed the Radical Party to have an impact on the political real-
ity. This phenomenon had two major aspects: ideological and strategic. The 
first was characterized by its successive transformations, which have already 
been discussed.74 The second, however, requires a more in-depth analysis. 
In their early days, the Radicals were focused on influencing political events 
directly, using instruments such as propaganda, public criticism and the 
press. Milutin Garašanin, the Chairman of the rival Progressive Party, ob-
served mordantly but accurately: 
“In its childhood, the Radical movement was annoying, obnox-
ious and insolent…”75 Here is another of Garašanin’s mordant 
observations: 
“In its adolescence, the Radical move ment was a delinquent; as a 
young man – a rebel; as an adult it has become a criminal.”76 
Garašanin concluded:
“It (the Radical Party) still has a chance to save itself, not to indulge 
in sin, not to deny itself, not to spit in its own face… The Radical 
Party is in power today on the basis of concluded agreements and 
faits accomplis, fully at the ser vice of the abdicated King Milan and 
the retired Jovan Ristić…”77
74 M. St. Protić, “The Serbian Radical Movement 1881–1903: A Historical Aspect”, 
Balcanica XXXVI/2005 (2006), 129–149; M. St. Protić, “Sources of the Ideology 
of the Serbian Radical Movement 1881–1903”, Balcanica, XXXVII/2006 (2007), 
125–142 .
75 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1925.
76 Ibid.
77 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1922.
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Milutin Garašanin’s sarcastic tone (quite understandable for a bitter 
opponent of the Radicals) aside, it becomes crystal-clear what the flexibility 
of the Radical ideology had meant.
The second distinctive feature of the Radical Party was its pragma-
tism. The Radicals were very resourceful in finding practical ways and 
means to put their ideological tenets into practice. In other words, they were 
able to adjust their theoretical model so as to serve their purpose. Every 
concept which proved inapplicable or inconvenient was remodeled or al-
tered. What ever seemed too complicated was simplified and modified. Its 
ideology served the Party, not the other way round. If the years of Svetozar 
Marković were marked by an ideological consistency verging on rigidity, by 
the 1880s the Radical Party had become extremely rational. In the introduc-
tion to the 1881 program, they insisted on political realism and demanded 
urgent and practical reforms.78
The Radicals were often accused of using demagoguery as an instru-
ment of political propaganda,79 even of deliberately oversimplifying and dis-
torting matters in order to gain popular support. Local Radicals in various 
parts of Serbia were reported to the authorities for “holding secret meetings 
every evening, stirring up discontent among the population and promising 
them sweet dreams if they vote for them in the coming elections”.80 
In 1881, Nikola Pašić’s brother was accused of depicting “the work 
and attitude of Nikola Pašić as remarkably beneficial to the people; but his 
depictions do not have much effect because he likes to deceive people and 
that is why many do not believe him. Lazar Pašić will not be happy until he 
sees his brother in the ministerial chair. His current story is that things as 
they are now are all wrong”.81 
Similar reports about Radical activities were sent from Carina,82 
Pirot83 and Kruševac.84 
A proclamation to the member ship dated 1886 is a good illustration 
of Radical populism:
78 See “Naš program”.
79 See Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 261; Janković, Političke stranke, 132.
80 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 470, Požarevac, July 21, 1882.
81 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 62, Zaječar, November 16, 1881.
82 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 472.
83 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 442.
84 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund no. 525.
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“What makes the Radical Party different from other parties is the 
fact that it is not led by authorities or famous names… but by the de-
sires and interests of its entire membership.85
Moreover, according to a proclamation by the local Radicals of Jago-
dina86 dated 1883:
“The Radical Party is numerically stronger than any other party in 
Serbia: it is the deepest-rooted in the people – it is only the Radical 
Party, then, that is hundred percent pure people.”87
Reflecting on political honesty and integrity, Andra Nikolić insisted 
on moral standards for any public statement or action of the Radical mem-
bership. Aware that delib erate and frequent use of demagoguery may be 
harmful to the Radicals’ reputation, he wrote:
“A politician assumes duty, publicly promises to act according to cer-
tain principles and to work on the implementation of the proclaimed 
program. If he acts out of his own self-interest instead, he commits 
deceit.”88
In all fairness, two remarks ought to be made here. First, the majority 
of accusations against them came from their political adversaries. Second, 
the line between democracy and populism has always been thin here.
The last distinctive characteristic of the Radical movement was its 
cohesive durability. The Party succeeded in maintaining its ideological and 
structural unity throughout their time in opposition, from 1881 to 1901. 
It kept growing in numbers, mostly unshaken by internal strife and dis-
sension. Attempts to undermine the harmony of the organization ended in 
failure. Over the years, some individuals did leave the Party, but its member-
ship remained compact. 
Two factors kept the Party together. One was its internal mechanism 
of decision-making and vertical and horizontal lines of communication. 
The other was unconditional commitment to Radicalism shown not only 
by the leaders but also by the entire rank and file of the Radical Party. The 
movement relied on the staunch partisanship and enthusiasm of its mem-
bers. In the words of their political foes:
85 ASANU, no. 13781/2.
86 Town in central Serbia, 85 miles south of Belgrade.
87 ASANU, no. 9783/27.
88 AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.
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“Radicals are plain partisans and nothing more. Their only concern 
is their Party’s success, with no consideration whatsoever for justice 
or the needs of the state.”89
Or:
“Radicals are still at full strength… happy with their partisanship.90
Jovan Avakumović, a prominent Liberal leader, was even more direct:
“Radicals demonstrated their separatist aspirations from the very 
beginning of the coalition government [1887]. They never missed an 
opportunity to pursue their partisan interests.”91
Their partisanship became particularly visible after they entered 
the government. Once in power, they did their best to install their party 
members in as many public offices as possible. According to Avakumović, 
“courts, administration and the State Council were flooded with Radicals”. 
The Radical leadership promoted partisanship for obvious reasons. To be 
a Radical meant to be a member of a strong political organization. Com-
mitment to Radicalism was a matter of political conviction, yet it enhanced 
the individual sense of self-importance and offered possibilities for climbing 
up the social ladder. Frankly, belonging to the Radicals was becoming ever 
more useful.
These features were the cause of both the strengths and the weak-
nesses of the Radical Party. They ensured its survival, prosperity, and suc-
cess. But they were, in addition, responsible for its failures, inconsistencies 
and self-interestedness. And again, that brings to mind another analogy be-
tween politics and life.
* * *
In conclusion, we could sum up our main points as follows:
•	The	formative	period	of	the	Serbian	Radical	movement	(1881–	1903),	
was a period of its ideological fermentation resulting in the shift from 
vaguely defined socialism to the concept of parliamentary democra-
cy. The emergence and evolution of Radicalism was intertwined with 
the shift taking place in Serbia from an agrarian society to a modern 
European one. The Radical movement was both the cause and the ef-
89 ASANU, Avakumović, « Memoirs », 45.
90 ASANU, Avakumović, « Memoirs », 51.
91 ASANU, Avakumović, « Memoirs », 11.
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fect of this process: it arose from the underlying social and political 
trend but it also encouraged the process of modernization. Thus, the 
Radical Party was a force of progress in Serbian politics.
•	The	 formative	period	was	also	marked	by	a	certain	parallelism	be-
tween theory and practice, between ideology and realpolitik – a pro-
cess in which realpolitik eventually prevailed over ideology, theory 
was overpowered by reality, and interests triumphed over beliefs. The 
Radicals were concerned with accomplishing the possible. In time, it 
evolved into a Party of action rather than a Party of doctrine.
•	The	Radical	movement	may	be	defined	as	a	kind	of	ideological	asso-
ciation. It included individuals and groups of various political colors, 
socialists, democrats, opportunists, demagogues. What made such a 
conglomeration functional and enduring was probably its flexibil-
ity of practice. In that sense, Serbian Radicalism had the capacity to 
represent an entire spectrum of social groups and individuals. It was 
more than a political party: it was a political movement.
•	The	 Radical	 achievements	 were	 twofold:	 firstly,	 it	 was	 instrumen-
tal in introducing the peasantry into politics and in promoting it to 
a relevant political factor; secondly, it was the driving force in the 
process of Serbia’s political democratization, Europeanization, and 
modernization.
 The flaws of the Radical Party included its conformism leading to in-
consistency, partisanship leading to exclusiveness, and demagoguery 
leading to populism.
•	 In	terms	of	its	ideology,	the	nature	of	the	Radical	Party	was	dual.	Its	
commitment to constitutionalism, the middle-class background of its 
leadership and the social solidarity affirmed in its program made it a 
party of the Center. Its emphasis on democracy, its struggle for social 
justice and its socialist roots made it a party of the Left.
•	 In	theory,	its	major	objective	was	a	political	system	based	on	univer-
sal justice for all. Its method was constant work aimed at achieving 
an effective state organization providing national stability. Its political 
doctrine was a democratic parliamentary monarchy. Its social doc-
trine was founded on accord among all social classes.
•	 Serbian	Radicalism	was	 an	 open	 ideology	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 was	
more influenced by the reality than by deduction. The process of its 
development was based on political practice rather than on ideologi-
cal assumptions. The Radicals had gone a long way: from socialist 
revolutionaries to pragmatic democrats.
•	The	Radical	 Party	 served	 as	 a	 bridge	 between	European	 ideas	 and	
Serbian actuality. In that sense, its ideology was eclectic: it was drawn 
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from foreign sources, but implemented in a specific environment. 
The Radicals were not original or creative thinkers, yet the concepts 
they espoused bore a distinctly Radical mark; they were modified so 
as to correspond to the Serbian social and political situation.
An observation of the French historian J. Kayser seems most appro-
priate to end this chapter:
« II n’y a pas de doute, les radicaux furent des opposants, les hommes 
qui criaient: Non! Ils étaient contre: leur force d’attraction vient de là, 
leur prestige aussi et leur vulnérabilité. »92
 
92 Jacques Kayser, Les Grandes Batailles du Radicalisme, Paris 1962, 7.
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Chapter Five
THE STRUCTURE
The story about the People’s Radical Party in Serbia would be incom-plete without an examination of its social structure and organizational 
network. 
This particular aspect of Serbian Radicalism mirrored its ideological 
essence, as well as its appearance on the grand stage of historical develop-
ments. The Radical social structure reflected the composition of the Serbian 
society during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Consequently, 
as Serbia evolved from a peasant egalitarian to a modern stratified society, 
such changes were reflected in the Radical social makeup.
Every social segment within the Serbian populace was represented in 
the Radical Party. Its leadership consisted of Belgrade intelligentsia, which 
had been educated in Serbia and abroad. The party’s most lively activists and 
promoters were provincial intellectuals: high school professors, doctors, 
teachers, lower civil servants, countryside clergy, etc. The largest constitu-
ency was made up of peasants, who almost unanimously joined the Radical 
Party.1 The growing merchant and businessmen community – which had 
not yet become a social class in its own right, but whose social expansion 
was already underway – was also represented in the Radical Party. Even a 
handful of industrial workers employed in several factories and manufac-
1 See Andrija Radenić, “O Radikalskim seljačkim bunama u Srbiji 1892–93 godine”, 
Istorijski časopis, vol. IX-X, Beograd, 1960, 451–465.
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tures joined the Radical Party.2 Each of these social groups had a specific 
understanding of Radicalism as a political organization and ideology de-
spite their different social status, level of education, and collective interests.
Thus, from a sociological point of view, the Radical Party represented 
a conglomerate of multiple social layers. The sense of solidarism among 
them enabled the growth and success of the Party. Their differences made 
Radicalism a complex socio-political phenomenon. Therefore, the Radical 
Party could be defined as a political movement, political alliance or a politi-
cal bloc,3 rather than strictly a monolithic political party.4 It proved to be 
ideologically and organizationally broad enough to meet the expectations 
of the vast majority of the Serbian population. In terms of numbers, the 
Radicals were unmatched.
The organizational mechanism of the Radical Party played a key role 
in bringing and keeping the membership together. The Radicals’ operational 
apparatus was the chemistry of the Party – the main vehicle of its coordinat-
ed activities. As the first massive political movement and the most popular 
political organization in Serbia, (which in 1882 included 80 percent of the 
population5), the Radical Party required an elaborate and effective system 
in order to synchronize its large following and electorate. In this respect, 
the Radicals were more successful than any other political group in Serbia.6 
Thus, despite the fragmentary archival sources, it is necessary to take 
a closer look at the socio-organizational groundwork of the Radical Party.
* * *
In a sociological examination of the Radical Party, one is bound to begin 
with the great majority of its rank and file – the peasantry. But, before tack-
ling the problem of peasant membership in the Party, let us cite a few sourc-
es dealing with the total size of the Radical Party in its early years. 
According to J. Prodanović, almost five-sixths of the nation7 had joined 
the Radicals by 1883. M. Dj. Milićević, a member of the Progressive Party, 
claimed that the opposition by the name of ’Radicals’ had spread all over the 
country8 and Sl. Jovanović admitted that the Serbian people “had become 
2 ASANU, no. 9783/77.
3 Georges Clemenceau was the first to define it as a political bloc.
4 Very similar to French Radicalism.
5 See Prodanović, Istorlja..., 5, 12–513.
6 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, Ill, 105–110.
7 Prodanović, Istorija..., 513.
8 ASANU, no. 9327/11.
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“completely Radical” prior to the Timok Rebellion.9 According to Radi-
cal sources, the Party numbered about 45,000 registered members in early 
1883,10 and on the eve of the Timok Rebellion it had reached the number of 
60,000, with at least the same number of non-registered sympathizers.11 In 
a report dated September 1885, the French envoy in Belgrade informed his 
superiors in Paris that “the Radicals had absolute majority in the regions of 
Užice, Valjevo and Požarevac”.12
A contemporary source from the early 1880s claimed that the Timok 
region had been “the stronghold of the Serbian Radical Party with virtually 
every man being a member”.13 The capital of Belgrade, however, was never 
among the Radical monopolies. Pera Todorović14 wrote that “Belgrade was 
never Radical. Our capital, unlike all other capitals of the World, has al-
ways had a conservative character.”15 Niš, as the second largest city in Serbia, 
had a Liberal majority, while the Progressivists and the Radicals were much 
weaker there.16 A report from the small town of Arandjelovac claimed in 
1883 that the position of the Radical Party was “weak and unimportant”.17 
From the very beginning of Radicalism in Serbia, small peasant pro-
prietors who represented the vast majority of the overall population18 joined 
the Radical Party. What were the real reasons for this mass attachment of 
the peasantry to the Radical movement? 
Two major factors inspired the Serbian peasant to identify with the 
Radicals. First, the Serbian peasant had been left out of Serbian politics for 
decades. It was the city and the city elites which had profited from the mod-
ernization process. Under the long Ottoman rule, democratic traditions 
were non-existent. The Serbian peasant was subject to exploitation and 
persecution. Having acquired his own state and independence, the average 
9 Slobodan Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, vol. Ill, pp. 58–59.
10 Raša Milošević, Timočka buna 1883. godine, p. 42.
11 Pera Todorović, Male novine, no. 190, August 15, 1890.
12 AMAE, CP Serbie 1885, Beograd, September 6, 1885.
13 Dragutin Ilić, Zaječarska buna, p. 55.
14 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
15 ASANU, no. 13512.
16 ASANU, no. 9783/148.
17 ASANU, no. 9783/6.
18 By 1889, 72.60% of the overall population owned less than 12 acres of land, 
20.31% had 12 to 24 acres, 6.03% owned 24 to 45 acres, 1% had 45 to 100 acres and 
only 0.06% owned estates of over 100 acres. 
See Nikola Vučo, Privredna Istorija Srbije, Beograd, 1955, 177.
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Serb expected fewer burdens and more freedom. Neither hope was real-
ized. Domestic bureaucrats proved to be as abusive and authoritarian as the 
Turks had been. The mistrust that the Serbian peasant developed towards 
the foreign rule remained intact under the Serbian government. The lack 
of political experience, heavy Ottoman heritage and ignorance about con-
temporary European trends resulted in a sort of oriental despotism alien 
to the Serbian peasant. His somewhat anarchic inclinations only contrib-
uted to the general instability and chaos, accompanied by frequent revolts 
and removal of rulers.19 Moreover, no political party before the Radicals 
had ever turned towards the peasantry as a viable political force, or tried to 
seek support among the agrarian social stratum. With the emergence of the 
Radical Party, the peasantry gradually achieved two major objectives: it be-
came politically organized and its interests were represented in the National 
Assembly. They became politically relevant. 
In several of his reports, the French ambassador in Belgrade referred 
to the Serbian National Assembly as “composée presque entièrement de 
paysans”,20 or “avec des deputés pour la plupart des paysans simples”.21 
It is worth mentioning here that in 1881 the annual session of the 
National Assembly had to be postponed for a full month due to agricultural 
spring works.22 
The Serbian village was attracted by the Radical program because its 
demands corresponded to its interests: universal suffrage, local self-gov-
ernment, tax reform, and abolition of the standing army. According to the 
aforementioned French source, these promises were “impossible à mettre à 
execution”, but still vigorously promoted by the Radicals.23 
It is interesting to note that the Radicals proved the Frenchman’s 
skepticism wrong. The 1888 Constitution did indeed introduce nearly uni-
versal suffrage and the principle of local self-government.24
During their brief period in power (1889–1892), the Radicals allevi-
ated the heavy tax burden on the peasantry. By the legal changes of Decem-
19 See Dimitrije Djordjević, “Srbija i srpsko društvo 1880-ih godina”. Istorijski 
časopis 29–30 (1982–83), 413–426.
20 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1887–88, Belgrade, September 25, 1887.
21 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1881, Belgrade, April 22, 1881.
22 Ibid.
23 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1882–83, Belgrade, November 12, 1883.
24 See M. Popović, Poreklo i postanak; Fedor Nikić, Lokalna uprava.
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ber 20, 1889, the Radical government relieved the agrarian population of 
about 1.5 million dinars in taxes.25
The numerical prevalence of the peasantry is well illustrated in Radi-
cal membership records (March/April of 1883): for example, 519 out of 547 
registered Radicals in Vratarnica were peasants;26 in the region of Pirot, 330 
out of 450 members were of peasant origin27; in Ivanjica there were 124 reg-
istered Radicals, among them 77 peasants.28
As it made up the bulk of its members, the Serbian peasantry devel-
oped a deep emotional attachment to the Radical Party. In their opinion, 
the Party was something like an extended family, a neighborhood, or a vil-
lage. The peasant could relate to the Party more easily than he could relate 
to the State. The State was distant, demanding and inconsiderate. It existed 
somewhere far away in Belgrade, occasionally sending its officials to collect 
taxes and draft for the army. The State was the peasant’s enemy, just like it 
had been for centuries under Ottoman rule. The Radical Party appeared as 
an organization of his self-defense against the State nomenclature and its 
demands. The Radical Party became a fact of his everyday rural life – his 
window into a brighter future. Through his membership in it, the Serbian 
peasant was becoming less and less suspicious towards the State, but the 
process was slow and turbulent. Still, in 1888, when Serbia was about to 
obtain its most liberal Constitution, two peasant deputies from the Radicals’ 
ranks voted against it just because they distrusted the King.29
Living up to peasant expectations, the Radical leaders were quite 
harsh in their criticism of the State’s bureaucratic apparatus. The Radicals 
exploited unfavorable conditions in Serbia, accusing the government of ar-
rogance, incompetence and fraud. 
This is a fragment of Pera Todorović’s speech at the First Congress of 
the People’s Radical Party in 1882 (a masterpiece of Radical demagoguery):
“Precisely because I am poor I have the right and I want more than 
anyone else to be involved in State affairs. Precisely because I am 
poor ... I feel more than anyone else the burdens and injustices of the 
State”.30
25 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 191.
26 ASANU, no. 9783/60.
27 ASANU, no. 9783/77.
28 ASANU, no. 9783/117.
29 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 206.
30 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 64.
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The general assertion that the peasant component of the Radical Party had 
an essentially negative approach to politics31 does not appear entirely cor-
rect and, frankly, sounds quite cynical. Even if we accept the claim that the 
peasantry could contribute no proposal besides the alleviation of taxes and 
the demand for the highest level of local autonomy, these issues were far 
from insignificant. Behind that, however, were the peasants’ common sense 
and their sentiments about collective interests. The peasantry was the first 
to reject the socialism of the early Radicals.32 It was enthusiastic about de-
mocracy, but hostile to any type of collectivization. The Serbian peasant was 
a landowner and, as such, very sensitive about his private property. In ad-
dition, he was traditionalistic, parochial and individualistic. His horizons 
reached out perhaps to his neighbor or his village, but hardly much fur-
ther. By joining the Radical movement, the Serbian peasants grew into a 
unified force, developing a consciousness beyond their previous limits. Al-
though they never completely dropped their localist approach and mental-
ity, the sense of belonging to a massive political movement widened their 
perspectives. 
The Serbian peasant was anti-dynastic, but not anti-royalist. He did 
not care much for the King, but he liked the monarchy. He was a traditional, 
church-going and family-oriented man. He liked to keep things right and in 
order. As much as the Radical Party served as a bridge between European 
ideas and Serbian peasantry, it was the peasant who brought rationalism to 
the Radical Party. Their relationship was a two-way street.
The process of national and political emancipation of the Serbian 
peasantry coupled with the rise and growth of the Radical Party.
* * *
If the peasantry represented the rank and file of the Radical movement, 
the provincial intelligentsia represented the local Radical leadership. In 
the Radical social framework, this stratum occupied a rather distinguished 
place. It was the most vibrant part of the Party – its driving force. 
Provincial intelligentsia formed a link between the Radical top lead-
ership and its constituency. Being among the few literate and educated peo-
ple, they led local Party boards, organized meetings and, most importantly, 
explained Radical ideas to the largely illiterate Serbian population.33 Their 
31 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 172; Michael Boro Petrovich, 447.
32 Živanović, II, 214.
33 In 1885, there were 1,270 teachers in Serbia. See Vladimir Karić, Srbija, opis zem-
lje, naroda i države, Beograd, 1887, 247.
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role in recruiting new members and spreading the organization was instru-
mental indeed. 
A number of archival sources emphasize the activities of the local 
leadership. A report from the Ub region dated 1882, pointed out the lo-
cal teacher and the public notary as “the greatest Radical agitators for the 
upcoming elections”.34 A report from Knjaževac, a small town in Eastern 
Serbia, dated 1883, described the work of the Mayor’s secretary “who, ac-
companied by the Mayor and other known Radicals, constantly campaigns 
in the neighboring villages, criticizing the government”.35 A report from 
1882 spoke of the Radical reunion in Veliko Gradište organized by a local 
priest and two teachers36.
A similar account was sent from Kruševac that same year: the Radi-
cal public meeting was organized “by three local teachers”.37 Teachers from 
Golubinje and Glogovac were described as “well known Radical organizers 
in the area”38. A report from Kragujevac expressed the general allegation 
that public servants in that region “all belong to the Radical Party and delib-
erately misinterpret the present political situation”.39 In his personal account 
of the Timok Rebellion, D. Ilić stated that “the uprising in Boljevac was pre-
pared by three local Radical leaders, all of them teachers”.40 The same author 
gave a vivid description of the local Party leadership:
“Really, these were... men whose lives merged with ordinary folk: 
they were truthful tribunes whose characters personified the pro-
gram of the Radical Party – the self-consciousness of the entire 
nation.41
When the Main Board lost initiative and direction following the out-
break of the Timok Rebellion, it was the second echelon that took the lead 
of the Radical Party.42
Differences did exist in understanding Radicalism among various 
groups of the provincial intelligentsia. Lower clergy represented its mod-
34 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 704, Ub, August 24, 1883.
35 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 664, Knjaževac, August 20, 1883 .
36 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 587, Veliko Gradiste, April 26, 1882.
37 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund,no. 461, Kruševac, July 4, 1882.
38 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund no. 431, Donji Milanovac, April 20, 1882.
39 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 429, Kragujevac, July 3, 1882.
40 Ilić, 22.
41 Ilić, 15–16.
42 Ilić, 94.
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erate component due to its dependence on church hierarchy and its reli-
gious affiliation. In 1881 Queen Natalija told one of her confidantes that 
she “cannot understand all these priests who join the Radical Party”.43 An 
identical comment could be made about local officials, who also belonged 
to the moderate faction, because of their professional association with the 
State authorities and their subordination to the Ministry of Interior. Fre-
quent governmental replacements, however, made their position rather vul-
nerable. Being in and out of work, they represented a kind of bureaucratic 
proletariat threatened by the unfavorable socio-economic conditions in the 
country. 
Provincial teachers represented the most radical segment of the Radi-
cal leadership. More independent than others groups and more educated, 
this group emerged as the most revolutionary element of the Radical Party. 
Certain socialist tendencies were also present among the countryside teach-
ers.44 Their attachment to the Radicals was colorfully illustrated by two 
teachers from the village of Sikola, who wrote to the Radical Main Board 
asking to be publically excused for being absent from the First Radical Con-
gress in Kragujevac in 1882.45 Samouprava published their letter on its front 
page and added that both were excused.46
Higher officials in the state administration started joining the Radi-
cal Party at a later date. Whereas the provincial intelligentsia was Radical 
from the very beginning, the higher bureaucracy signed up to the Radicals 
only after they had come to power, approximately from 1887.47 This social 
stratum, which included judges, public persecutors, cabinet staff, etc., repre-
sented the opportunistic wing of the Radical Party. Their loyalty to the Party 
was essentially self-serving. When it had become beneficial to be a Radical, 
they decided to join in.
* * *
The top leadership of the Radical Party, located in Belgrade, consisted of 
the Serbian educated elite. Most of them had received university education 
in European cities of Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France, and Russia.48 
43 ASANU, no. 9327/11.
44 Dragiša Stanojević, Gluho doba u radikalnoj stranci, Beograd, 1891, 39.
45 ASANU, no. 9777/IV.
46 Samouprava, August 24, 1882.
47 ASANU, no. 11651 and no. 11564.
48 See Milan Dj. Milićević, Pomenik znamenitih ljudi, Beograd, 1888.
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They belonged to the second and third generation of Serbian intelligentsia.49 
With regard to their social backgrounds, only a few of the Radical top lead-
ership had been born in the capital and only a handful had originated from 
distinguished and affluent families. On the contrary, the Radical leaders 
were either of peasant or provincial origin, and hence very eager to climb 
up the social ladder.50
Concerning their professional orientation, they consisted of diverse 
occupations: engineers, lawyers, physicians, professors, economists, etc. Af-
ter the creation of the Party, most of them became professional politicians. 
Exceptions were university professors, who continued to pursue their aca-
demic careers, occasionally being expelled from the university.51 
Several among the founding fathers of the Radical Party belonged 
to the socialist group of Svetozar Marković and were his closest associates: 
Nikola Pašić, Pera Todorović, Pera Velimirović, and Raša Milošević.52 Their 
approach to socialism, however, remained purely theoretical and academic. 
The Radical intellectuals flirted with revolutionary ideas, but never har-
bored any realistic revolutionary intentions. Although the classic works of 
socialist authors held a special place in their libraries,53 their socialism was 
idealistic and emotional. Despite their intellectual sympathies for socialist 
ideas, the Belgrade Radicals were members of the urban class in the process 
of gradual “embourgeoisement”. The manners which they had adopted in 
Europe largely influenced their style of life. 
The following is a brilliant description of Pera Todorović’s appearance 
while being arrested in 1883: 
“He wore a top hat, gloves and glasses, although his eye vision was 
perfectly normal. He resembled more a foreign journalist than a do-
mestic insurgent... No one would have ever guessed that this preppy 
gentleman was the first flag-bearer of the People’s Radical Party”.54
Following the outbreak of the 1883 Timok Rebellion, the Radical leaders 
were apprehended in a Belgrade coffee house, while they were “sipping cof-
fee”. Pera Todorović went to prison wearing a monocle; Jovan Djaja was 
brought in dressed in a formal suit; and Giga Geršić was found dining in his 
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, I, 175–76; see also Michael Boro Petro-
vich, 448.
52 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, I, 9; Michael Boro Petrovich, 449.
53 Andra Nikolić, Književni radovi, preface by Pavle Popović, Beograd, 1938, 14.
54 Jovanović, Političke i pravne rasprave, I, 320–321.
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favorite restaurant.55 Not exactly the sight of a revolutionary bunch plan-
ning to overthrow the monarchy, was it?
The top Radical leadership was never entirely unified. From the Par-
ty’s beginnings in 1881, one could not but notice various factions emerging 
among the Belgrade Radicals.
Prior to the Timok Rebellion, the Radical leadership had stuck to-
gether. Most of the members of the Main Board were close personal friends. 
Except for Svetomir Nikolajević, the vice chairman of the Radical Party,56 
who was expelled from the Party as early as 1882,57 the Radical leadership 
kept its unity. The older members from the 1860s and 1870s were joined by 
several youngsters in 1881, some of which were to become future promi-
nent Radical leaders.58 Their zeal for politics and individual dynamism, as 
well as their fresh ideas and intellectualism, facilitated the cohesion of Party 
leadership. 
The undisputed front men in these days (until 1883) were two dis-
tinguished personalities, Nikola Pašić and Pera Todorović. While Pašić was 
something of a manipulator, Todorović was a talented author and orator. 
Both had belonged to Svetozar Marković’s socialist and radical-socialist 
group. Both were among the founding members of the Radical Party. Dur-
ing these initial years, they walked shoulder to shoulder, but then they went 
their separate ways. Pašić fled Serbia, finding refuge in neighboring Bul-
garia. Todorović was arrested, trialed, sentenced to death and paroled. Their 
latter life paths were as different as they could be.59 
In 1892, the Radical leadership was torn between two camps: the 
camp of Nikola Pašić and the camp of Kosta Taušanović.60 The falling-out 
occurred after the death of a Royal Regency member, Gen. Kosta Protić, 
when both Radical leaders showed interest in replacing him.
According to the Liberal J. Avakumović:
“If the Radicals had remained in government, the split would have 
been unavoidable, public and final”.61 
55 Dimitrije Djordjević, “The 1883 Peasant Uprising In Serbia”, Balkan Studies, no. 
20, 253; see also Raša Milošević, Timočka buna, 158.
56 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders); for more details, see Božidar Nikolajević, Radikalna 
stranka i Svetomir Nikolajević, Beograd, 1938.
57 Ibid.
58 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 233–34.
59 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
60 ASANU, no. 9287/III, Avakumović, 99; see Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
61 Ibid.
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The quarrel was somehow settled for the time being. In 1897, Kosta 
Taušanović, accompanied by Jovan Djaja, finally left the Radical Party. For-
mally, the motive behind this decision was his personal disagreement with 
another Radical leader, Stojan Protić, but it was Pašić who stood behind the 
scenes, pulling strings.62 
In his resignation letter addressed to Nikola Pašić, Taušanović wrote:
“We do not find ourselves responsible for the split, since we believe 
that the unity of the Party required that Stojan Protić and Okica 
Gluščević do not enter the editorial board [of the newspaper Narod 
(“The People”); their conduct makes them absolutely inapt for col-
lective work”.63
Pašić sensed that Taušanović was becoming a threat and did what 
was necessary to get rid of him. It doesn’t seem that either Taušanović or 
Djaja ever had any suspicions about the identity of the person who actu-
ally incited their departure from the ranks of the Radical Party. Protić and 
Gluščević were used as Pašić’s baits. As simple as that. So typical of Nikola 
Pašić and his understanding of politics. 
During the formative period of Serbian Radicalism, the group of 
peasant popular tribunes had been particularly visible. Three outstanding 
representatives of this faction were Ranko Tajsić64 from Čačak region, Dim-
itrije Katić from Svilajnac region, and the priest Milan Djurić from Užice.65 
Their political attitudes was characterized by unconditional opposition to 
any agreements or compromises and, moreover, by a stubborn emphasis on 
the interests and expectations of the peasantry (the most radical Radicals, so 
to speak). Although none of them had belonged to the top Party leadership 
(none of them was ever appointed to the Radical Main Board), they were 
particularly active as representatives in the National Assembly. This faction 
of the Party was named “les monagnards”, “les jacobins” or even “l’extrème 
gauche” of the Radical Party.66 It was reportedly Dimitrije Katić,67 the best 
educated among them, who stated in 1893: 
“It is not the Liberals I fear, but the traitors in my own Party...”68 
62 ASANU, no. 11806.
63 Ibid.
64 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
65 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1889, Beograd, December 24, 1889.
66 Ibid.
67 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
68 AS, the fund of Milutin Garašanin, no. 1734.
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According to the same source, Katić decided to stop collaboration 
with Nikola Pašić, but did not withdraw his membership from the Party.69
Naturally, the Radicals’ peasant faction enjoyed enormous popular-
ity among the rural population. The peasantry showed a special respect for 
Ranko Tajsić. A peasant sent him a note in 1883:
“Long live Ranko Tajsić! He is the mother of the poor. If God would 
make him King of Serbia, we would need this one no longer!”70
Even Sl. Jovanović, a Serbian historian who usually showed very little 
sympathy for populism of any kind, admitted that Ranko Tajsić had been 
one of the most outspoken Radicals in the National Assembly.71 
The right wing of the Radical Party could also be labeled as a group 
of opportunistic Radicals. It consisted of intellectuals who had joined the 
Party after 1883, accepting compromises with other parties and especially 
the Crown. They were mostly active and influential during the 1890s and 
early 1900s. 
It was the French envoy in Belgrade who pointed out the compromis-
ing bloc among Radicals in his dispatch dated January 1888.72 In December 
1889, he reported that the Radical leadership was “sharply divided” between 
the right, the center, and the left73. His sympathies were obviously with the 
moderates. The French diplomat described Sava Grujić as “assez capable”:
« Il a un caractère des manières agreables dans les fonctions 
diplomatiques... »74 
Further on, he wrote about Mihailo Vujić: 
« Celui qui parait devoir jouer le premier rôle est 
Mr. M. Vouitch, qui apparti tout au moins aux Ministère des Fi-
nances des habitudes de travail inconnues jusqu’alors. »75
69 Ibid.
70 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183.
71 Jovanović, Političke i pravne rasprave, I, 319.
72 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1887–88, Belgrade, January 6, 1888.
73 AMAE, C P Serbie, 1889, Belgrade, December 28, 1889.
74 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1887–88, Belgrade, January 6, 1888.
75 Ibid.
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Rather unsurprisingly, the French Minister accorded particular respect 
to Milovan Dj. Milovanović,76 who had studied in Paris and was fluent in 
French:
« Mr. Milovan Milovanovitch de Belgrade, docteur en droit de la 
faculté de Paris, publiciste très distingue et dont un récent ouvrage à 
fait quelque impressions dans le monde savant... »77
The Chairman of the Progressive Party, Milutin Garašanin comment-
ed more than once that Milovan Dj. Milovanović was “a genuine Radical”.78 
Andra Nikolić was also associated with the group of moderate Radi-
cals.79 This faction of opportunists among the Radicals emerged after the 
Timok Rebellion, and represented a counterbalance to the militancy of 
the Radical emigrants in Bulgaria. They served as a bridge between the 
Obrenović dynasty and the Radical Party and were chiefly responsible for 
the Radicals’ rise to power in 1887.
A few members of the merchant and businessmen class joined the 
Radical Party from the outset.80 Some of Yugoslav Marxist historians have 
used this as key evidence of the “bourgeois” character of the Radical Party, 
denying its complex social structure and eclectic ideology.81 
It is worth mentioning that the Radicals also had several women in 
their ranks.82 They stood as a unique example in Serbian politics of the nine-
teenth century. Even though they did not have any substantial influence in 
the Party, the very fact of their Party affiliation was a remarkable achieve-
ment.83 Most of them were wives or relatives of the Radicals’ male members. 
76 See Chapter 6 (The Leaders).
77 AMAE, CP Serbie, 1889, Belgrade, January 27, 1889.
78 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1921.
79 ASANU, no. 9287/111, Avakumović, 8.
80 Jovan (Joca) Jovanović, a merchant from Šabac; Luka Ćelović, a businessman 
from Herzegovina; Rista Popović; Arsa Drenovac and Steva Stevanović; Kosta 
Taušanović, etc.
 See R. Milošević, Timočka buna, 52.
81 See Dragoslav Janković, Radjanje parlamentarne demokratije. Političke stranke 
u Srbiji XIX veka, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 1997; see also V. Čubrilović, Istorija 
političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka, Beograd, 1958.
82 Archival sources mention Marija Barjaktarević from Kragujevac and Mara 
Stojanović from Valjevo as members of the Radical Party; Vaja Taušanović, Milica 
Ninković, Draga Ljočić and Marija Zibod were also registered members of the Rad-
ical Party in Belgrade.
83 A. Pavlović, Radikalna stranka u Srbiji pre Timočke bune prema arhivskoj gradji iz 
zbirke muzeja u Smederevu, Smederevo, 1981, 7–8, 55, 85.
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* * *
The organizational structure of the Radical Party was the most powerful 
source of its political might.
There were three basic structural entities: the Main Board, as the 
highest decision-making body; the parliamentary group made up of Radi-
cal elected assemblymen; and local and regional network of local boards. 
Vertical and horizontal lines of communication between them were the key 
to the Radicals’ organizational and electoral success.
Radical newspapers were published twice or three times a week and 
immediately distributed across the country. They also used personal mes-
sengers, i.e. Party activists who traveled back and forth on business. The 
same method was used for the distribution of booklets, brochures, leaflets 
and proclamations of any sort. 
Printing was just as important as distribution. The Radical Party 
owned its own printing unit or, at times, used printing equipment belong-
ing to its members.
Financial resources were mostly collected from affluent members. 
Campaigns were financed by the nominees’ and candidates’ personal funds. 
From the very beginning, a symbolic semi-annual membership fee was in-
troduced. This charge could be waived “in cases of verified poverty”.84
Belgrade members of the Main Board traveled regularly to various 
parts of the country. Each was assigned a certain area, usually the region 
which he had come from. 
In 1882, Kosta Taušanović toured western Serbia, starting in Šabac, 
Valjevo and Loznica, passing through Čačak, Užice, and Bajina Bašta, and 
finally arriving in Niš.85 According to a report from Ljubovija, he made 
contacts with Radical boards in every place he visited and distributed the 
Party’s brochures.86
 In July 1883, Raša Milošević traveled to central Serbia, passed 
through Ćuprija and continued to Kruševac, and Aleksinac.87 The local po-
lice reported to the Ministry of the Interior that he had met with a number 
of prominent local Radicals and “held secret talks with them”.88 The same 
84 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 276.
85 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 531.
86 Ibid.
87 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183.
88 Ibid.
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source revealed that the purpose of his visit were discussions about the Rad-
icals’ constitutional proposal.89
In August 1883, Ranko Tajsić traveled all over Serbia, visited the re-
gions of Čačak, Rudnik, Kragujevac and Užice, established contacts with 
local Radicals, gave speeches, and distributed money to local boards.90
From 1881 onwards, the Radicals established local party boards 
throughout the country, with the major objective of organizing and spread-
ing their Party organization. In 1881 and 1882, Radical campaigners held 
formative meetings in almost every village and town in Serbia.91 
Contemporary reports from the countryside mentioned about 400–
500 people being present at those meetings, at least half of them joining the 
Radicals.92 Already in March 1883, the Party had 12 regional boards and 
over 100 local boards.93 
According to an instruction issued by the Main Board in 1883, the 
local boards were responsible for distributing Radical publications, as well 
as for collecting fees and sending them to the central cashier in Belgrade.94 
Many local boards reported: 
“The number of new members is rapidly growing, but not many pay 
the full fee and some are registered without paying anything”.95
Close collaboration between the Radicals’ leadership and member-
ship was maintained by frequent visits of the representatives to Belgrade. 
In April 1883, eighteen deputies arrived in the capital, where “they 
discussed the prospects of a constitutional reform” with the members of the 
Main Board.96 
An instruction of the Main Board issued in March 1883 stated that 
the delegates from the interior of the country “must be invited to Belgrade 
whenever the Party needed to decide about its future political strategy”.97
89 Ibid.
90 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/184.
91 ASANU, no. 9783/20 and 9783/41.
 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 644 and no. 135.
92 Ibid.
93 ASANU, no. 9730.
94 ASANU, no. 9731.
95 ASANU, no. 9783/17.
96 AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/184.
97 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 276.
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The Radical press acquired a special place in the organizational struc-
ture of the Party.
 In 1882, Samouprava was sent to 1100 addresses,98 while Odjek was 
printed in over 900 copies in 1885.99 According to an official report from Ub 
(August 1883), eleven copies of Samouprava were arriving every week.100 In 
May 1883, the Minister of Education Stojan Novaković wrote to the Minis-
ter of Interior Milutin Garašanin concerning the popularity of Samouprava:
“We distribute Samouprava to villages by official channels. Very stu-
pid and naive. The newspaper is sent by mail. But, where there is no 
post office, it is sent together with our official documents by regional 
public officials”.101
Several other publications were distributed to the Radical member-
ship as well.
In a letter to the Main Board, the local board in Lenovac asked for 
150 copies of the brochure The Work of the Radical Assembly in Kragujevac 
and 50 copies of The History of French Peasant.102 The local board in Gornja 
Lepenica demanded 50 copies of the first brochure and 50 copies of a book-
let about regional autonomy in Dragačevo.103 
A student from the Teachers’ School in Bresnica wrote a letter to 
the Main Board asking for a free subscription to Samouprava, because he 
“couldn’t afford to pay for it”.104
According to the Radical Statute of 1881, the Main Board represented 
the executive organ of the Grand Radical Assembly.105 The Assembly was 
the supreme body of the Party and consisted of representatives from all lo-
cal boards.106 The Statute stipulated that “every important decision must be 
based on the membership’s majority opinion”.107 
By 1882, three sections were organized within the Main Board in or-
der to elaborate specific issues: the constitutional proposal, the principle of 
98 ASANU, no. 9729.
99 Ibid.
100 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 704.
101 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 680.
102 ASANU, no. 9783/20.
103 Authored by Lj. Jevremović. AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 9783/7.
104 AS, Milutin Garsanin Fund, no. 9783/9.
105 ASANU, no. 9731.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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local self-government and the organization of the central government.108 
The Radical leadership was chiefly interested in spreading the Party. In Feb-
ruary of 1882, Nikola Pašić wrote to Stojan Protić:
“Keep in mind that the men who join us today have wandered 
around various political groups until yesterday: it is up to us to orga-
nize them”.109
* * *
The Radical Party has been described either as a peasant-democratic move-
ment 110 or as a petty bourgeois political organization111. Objectively, it in-
cluded the elements of both. On one hand, the Radicals heralded the voice of 
Serbian peasantry and introduced it to politics. Their main base of support 
was the village. On the other hand, they appealed to the emerging middle 
class, which was to become the promoter of free market economy, national-
ism and modern democracy. 
A more appropriate and less Marxist classification of Serbian Radical-
ism would be to delineate it as a political alliance or a political movement, 
since its complex social structure made the Radical Party a conglomeration 
of various social strata. Basically, the entire Serbian society of the late nine-
teenth and the early twentieth centuries was mirrored in the ranks of the 
Radical Party. During these decades, Serbia was experiencing profound so-
cial changes; the Radical Party could not but follow that course of historical 
development. The process of social stratification had begun; however, it was 
still far from complete. From a sociological standpoint, the Radical Party 
was an “umbrella” organization, meaning that it was ideologically, political-
ly and, in terms of composition, sufficiently wide, open and flexible to meet 
the needs and expectations of the great majority of the Serbian population. 
108 AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 276.
109 ASANU, no. 9783/19.
110 Jovanović, Vlada Milana Obrenovića, III, 11.
111 Čubrilović, 358.
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Table 1
Registered Radical Membership in Certain Areas (1883)112
Rečka  1200 Timok  329
Svrljig region  1022 Gruža  200
Brza Palanka  797 Aleksinac  184
Pirot  659 A. Banja  134
Boljevac  600 Knjaževac  128
Zaglava  591 Ivanjica  124
Vratarnica  547 Gornja Lepenica  122
Donja Lepenica  493 Šabac  91
Lenovac  470 Siječa Rijeka  76
Donja Kragujevac  412 Valjevo  65
Ub  400 Užice  61
Požarevac  50
Table 2
Social Structure of Radical Membership
In Certain Areas (1883)113
112 These are the only available statistics regarding Radical membership. 
 ASANU, no. 9783/75–160.
113 Ibid.
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Chapter Six
THE LEADERS
The final chapter of this work deals with the Radical leadership. These are brief biographies or, rather, mere sketches of their lives, in which we 
tried to describe not only who they were and what they stood for, but also 
their social and family backgrounds. They all belonged to a single genera-
tion born in the span of twenty years (1840s to 1860s). 
Most of the individuals portrayed here have already been mentioned 
in various contexts and in more or less detail. Even so, put one next to an-
other, these short life stories should hopefully provide additional insight 
into the history of the Serbian Radical Party and its ideology in its initial 
stage of development.
Most of the Radicals’ leaders belonged to the countryside or pro-
vincial bourgeoisie. Most of them were the first in their families to receive 
higher education. Only a few of them had been born in Belgrade, while the 
rest had moved to the capital while in secondary school or at university. 
With a couple of exceptions, the Radical leaders came from anony-
mous backgrounds, climbing the social ladder alone. 
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Svetozar Marković
(1846–1875)
Svetozar Marković was born in 1846 in Zaječar,1 small town in eastern Ser-
bia. He lost both parents early in his life and was raised by relatives in Jago-
dina in the central part of the country. Until recently, Jagodina was consid-
ered his birthplace and bore his name (Svetozarevo) for several decades in 
the 20th century (during the Communist era).
His older brother Jevrem2 (1839–1878) was a colonel in the Serbian 
army who attended gymnasiums in Kragujevac and Belgrade. He enrolled 
in the Military Academy in 1861. The older Marković took part in the Polish 
uprising of 1863, acted as a commander in the Serbo-Turkish wars (1876–
78) and was elected deputy to the Serbian National Assembly (1878) as a 
member of the Radical opposition. In 1878 he was charged with partici-
pating in a conspiracy and rebellion against Prince Milan Obrenović and 
his government,3 sentenced to death and executed. In 1882, Jevrem’s widow 
Jelena-Ilka Marković, vengeful and desperate, tried to kill Milan Obrenović, 
who had in the meantime become the King of Serbia. The attempt failed. 
Ilka was first sentenced to death and then pardoned. She soon died in prison 
under suspicious circumstances. 
We have already discussed Svetozar Marković earlier in this volume. 
At this point, we can only repeat that he was a Balkan representative of Eu-
ropean socialist and radical-socialist thought and, at the same time, the ide-
ological forerunner of the People’s Radical Party in Serbia. As has already 
been explained, he authored the first program of Serbian Radicalism and 
coined the name of the future political organization.
Svetozar Marković was an unusually gifted young man, the leader of 
his generation and a sharp critic of his predecessors’ views on politics as well 
as literature. A champion of literary realism and modernism, he espoused 
some concepts of socialism, ranging from Russian left revolutionaries to 
Marxism. Svetozar Marković was a man of passion more than a man of ra-
1 Nikola Pašić was born in the same town a year earlier. 
2 Jovanović D., Jevrem Marković, Ispred svog vremena, Jagodina, 2009.
3 The so-called Topolska buna (Topola Rebellion).
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Milan St. Protić 124
tio. Despite his materialistic convictions, there was something of a Balkan 
idealist in him. Deep down, he was a dreamer. Many notions popular in his 
time – radicalism, socialism, social sciences, realism, positivism, secular-
ism, etc. – existed and competed in his empathic world of ideas. Svetozar 
was not an anti-nationalist: his nationalism was merely subjugated to his 
liberalism. And his socialism was not of the authoritarian kind: he believed 
in freedom as much as he believed in equality.
Marković studied technical engineering, first in Russia and later in 
Zurich, but never graduated. He was a personal friend of Nikola Pašić and 
other future Radicals. They collaborated closely in Switzerland and later in 
Serbia.
Svetozar Marković was a man of enormous energy and courage, one 
of those 19th century personalities of a fanatical determination. He was a 
fearless fighter and polemicist, as well as a born leader. His untimely death 
prevented him from making an outstanding political career.4
The Radical Party itself considered Svetozar Marković its original 
founder, hero and saint, even though the Radical ideology had, in subse-
quent decades, considerably moved away from his socialist beliefs.
4 See Slobodan Jovanović, Svetozar Marković, Beograd, 1920; Jovan Skerlić, Svetozar 
Marković, njegov život, rad i ideje, Beograd, 1922; Woodford McClellan, Svetozar 
Markovich and the Origins of Balkan Socialism, Princeton, 1964.
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Adam Bogosavljević5
(1843–1880)
Born in eastern Serbia, Adam Bogosavljević was Nikola Pašić’s senior by two 
and Svetozar Marković’s by three years. Together they formed the “Zaječar 
trojka” of early Serbian Radicalism. Unlike the other two, Bogosavljević 
came from an affluent agrarian family.
He left Velika škola before graduation to return to his native village, 
choosing the life of a peasant over a career in the city. He devoted plenty of 
time and energy to helping his fellow villagers in modernizing their produc-
tion and their overall emancipation, social as well as political.
From 1874 on, Bogosavljević led the Radical opposition in the Na-
tional Assembly, becoming the most outspoken opponent of government 
policies. Marković’s writings and revolutionary activities were accompanied 
by Bogosavljević’s speeches and actions in the Serbian Parliament.
His sensitivity towards the Serbian peasant mellowed the rigor of Sve-
tozar Marković’s theories to certain extent. Actually, Adam had an instru-
mental role in mobilizing the rural population of Serbia and introducing 
them to politics. It was largely due to his groundwork that the Radical Party 
proved capable of establishing such a strong and lasting influence among 
the Serbian peasantry.
Adam Bogosavljević was the epitome of a genuine Radical: he was an 
intellectual deeply rooted in the Serbian village. A master of simple rhetoric, 
a self-taught orator, speaking the language of ordinary folk, he was also the 
first Radical demagogue. 
His populism brought him fame; his bravery determined his fate.
Basically, his violent and sudden death in 1880 triggered the forma-
tion of the People’s Radical Party in 1881. 
What really happened?
Adam Bogosavljević was arrested on several years old criminal charg-
es of illegal managing of communal grain.6 The arrest took place in his na-
5 For more details, see: Rastislav Petrović, Adam Bogosavljević, Belgrade, 1972.
6 At that time, there were special municipal stocks of grain to be distributed in cases 
of crisis under the supervision of the local authorities.
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tive Zaječar. He spent a night in jail; his health abruptly deteriorated. The 
next morning, he was transferred to the local hospital, ill with pneumonia. It 
was too late. Bogosavljević died on the following day. It was March 19, 1880.
The Radical opposition immediately accused the regime of having 
murdered Bogosavljević, exploiting the incident for political propaganda.
Nikola Pašić remained the only survivor of the “Zaječar trojka”. 
Svetozar Marković and Adam Bogosavljević did not live to participate in 
the creation of the Radical Party. Their martyrdom became legendary. If 
Marković was the Radical apostle and Pašić was the Radical mastermind, 
then Bogosavljević was its most popular tribune. 
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Nikola Pašić
(1845–1926)
Nikola Pašić was born into a humble baker’s family in Zaječar (as were 
Marković and Bogosavljević), not far from the Serbo-Bulgarian border. 
His father, most probably, came from Macedonia. Those two facts had a 
substantial impact on his latter relations with Bulgaria and the Bulgarians. 
Other than that, little is known about Pašić’s childhood and adolescence. He 
was an average student in high school. At Velika škola in Belgrade, he did 
not particularly excel in his studies, but did earn a government scholarship 
to study abroad.7
He never pursued the career of a civil engineer, since he turned to 
politics already while in Switzerland.
In 1878, he was elected to the Serbian National Assembly. His career 
lasted for over half a century; he led the nation through three wars and in 
two different states, under two dynasties and four kings.8
He was twice accused of treason and sentenced to capital punish-
ment; both times he managed to avoid this tragic scenario. In 1883, after the 
Timok Rebellion, he escaped to Bulgaria. In 1899,9 he accepted a deal with 
the authorities and testified against his Party colleagues10.
Pašić married late in life, at the age of 50. His bride came from a 
prominent and wealthy Serbian family from Trieste.11 They had a boy and 
two girls. His son12 was later implicated in a serious financial fraud, which 
7 He studied civil engineering at the prestigious Eidgenoessische Polytechnische 
Schule in Zuruch.
8 The First and Second Balkan Wars and World War One; Serbia and Yugoslavia; 
Obrenovićs and Karadjordjevićs; Milan and Aleksandar Obrenović; Petar and 
Aleksandar Karadjordjević. See Vasa Kazimirović, Nikola Pašić i njegovo doba 
1845–1926, Beograd 1990
9 The so-called Ivanjdanski atentat.
10 As a result, Pašić was pardoned, while a few of his associates were sentenced to 30 
years of hard labor (Stojan Protić and Ljubomir Živković).
11 Djurdjina Duković.
12 Radomir (Rade) Pašić married three times and had five children.
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caused a huge public scandal in the 1920s. His elder daughter was married 
to a Serbian diplomat and politician,13 while the younger one’s husband was 
a wealthy ship-owner from Dubrovnik.14
Nikola Pašić’s political-psychological profile could be summed up 
like this:
1) He did not care much for ideologies. His ideology was power itself. 
Perhaps in his youth he did believe in socialism and radicalism. As soon as 
he entered into real politics, however, he became a keen pragmatist of the 
Machiavellian sort. 
2) He never developed close personal ties with his political associates 
and conspired with very few. His relationship with his comrades was based 
on mutual interests. He was quick to break up with people, remove and re-
place them. There was nothing personal about his relationships.
3) He was not a man of political ideas, but a man of political schemes. 
The power struggle was the name of his game. His lust for power had no 
limit: he died at 81 after a meeting with the King about the prospects of 
forming another cabinet. Politics are about power, he thought.
4) He had an unmistakable instinct for danger, always sensing from 
where and whom it might come. He was a born survivor, a political animal 
in the Aristotelian meaning of the term. Pašić knew when to step up; even 
more so, however, he knew when to back off or run away.
5) He had no distinctive talents, except a talent for political maneu-
vering. He was what they call a “Jack of all trades”. Merciless when domi-
nant, kind when pushed against the wall. 
6) Paradoxically, Radicalism was for him nothing more than a simple 
vehicle for personal prominence. He was a skeptic rather than a believer; a 
realist rather than a visionary.
Deservedly or not, but in the minds of many Serbs Nikola Pašić still 
stands on his pedestal as the greatest statesman in modern times. His legacy 
has evolved into a legend. Longevity was his secret key to immortality, was 
it not?
13 Dara Pašić was married to Božidar Purić, Yugoslav ambassador in Paris (1935–
41) and Prime Minister 1943/44.
14 Petrosava (Pava) Pašić married Stefan (Stefi) Račić.
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Petronije (Pera) Todorović
(1852–1907)
Undoubtedly, Todorović was the most influential figure of the Radical Party 
in its opening phase of existence (1881–1883) – the body and soul of Ser-
bian Radicalism.
Pera Todorović was an adventurous spirit, soldier, revolutionary, pro-
pagandist, organizer and essayist. He was a man of enormous energy and 
zeal, unique talent and panache, yet one of those personalities whose glow 
was so bright that it could not last for long.
Todorović’s career was brilliant, but short. 
Due to his colorful temperament and eventful life, he has been the 
most popular idol to a number of historians. More biographies were writ-
ten about him than about any other Radical, excluding, of course, Nikola 
Pašić.15
Pera Todorović’s parents were members of affluent peasant bourgeoi-
sie from the provincial town of Smederevska Palanka about 55 miles south-
east of Belgrade. He studied in Zurich, but left the university to join Svetozar 
Marković as one of his most ardent supporters. He traveled through Europe 
spending most of his time in Paris. He volunteered in the Serbian army and 
participated in the war against Turkey (1876–1878). His military adventures 
were published under the title A Volunteer’s Journal.16 
Todorović was among the founders of the People’s Radical Party. He 
authored its original political program and was the editor of the Radical 
newspaper Samouprava.
Pera Todorović was largely responsible for the swift success of the 
Radical Party and its popularity among the general population. He pio-
neered the use of political demagoguery in Serbian politics, both in his 
writings and his speeches. Famous for his candor and wits, he was admired 
among the ordinary citizens of Serbia. Never becoming a government of-
ficial or a Member of Parliament, Pera Todorović was a kind of national 
superstar. Only for a moment, though. 
15 For details see the Bibilography at the end of this book.
16 Pera Todorović, Dnevnik jednog doborovoljca, Beograd, 1938.
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Implicated in the preparations for the Timok Rebellion, he was appre-
hended by the police and brought to trial for conspiring against the Obrenović 
dynasty and the legitimate government. He was persecuted together with a 
group of Radical leaders accused of the same crime. Initially, Todorović’s 
verdict was death by firing squad. Luckily, he was granted clemency by the 
King. While in prison, the monarch himself paid him a secret visit, one 
night in 1886. The offer included a truce between the Crown and the Radi-
cals, the formation of a coalition cabinet and freedom for Todorović. Upon 
his release, he made a formal proposal of the deal to the Party’s Main Board, 
but was rejected. As a consequence, he was expelled from the Radical Party. 
He spent the later years of his life as a journalist of a tabloid newspaper.
Here is a fragment characteristic of Todorović’s literary style in the 
early 1880s:
“What does Nikola Hristić (acting Prime Minister) mean? Nikola 
Hristić is nothing but Garašanin (former Prime Minister) in a negli-
gee. Garašanin just had a mask of constitutionalism over his uncon-
stitutional face. Nikola Hristić went out on the streets naked as God 
had created him.... His government means only another unmasked 
edition of the Progressivist regime.”17
He died at the age of 55.
17 Pera Todorović, “School For the People”, Samouprava, October 8, 1883.
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Stojan Protić
(1857–1923)
Stojan Protić was born in Kruševac in southern Serbia into a fairly mod-
est family. His father was a local tailor, but a descendent of well-known 
ancestry. Stojan’s great-grandfather, originally from Kosovo, had been an 
“oborknez”18 in the Razanj area and a warlord during the First Serbian In-
surrection against the Turks (1804–1813). He was captured and publicly 
executed, while his elder son managed to survive, becoming a higher priest 
in the town of Varvarin. 
Stojan graduated from Belgrade Velika škola to be appointed profes-
sor at Svilajnac gymnasium, teaching Serbian language and literature. At the 
age of 24 he received an invitation from Nikola Pašić to join the headquar-
ters of the Radical Party in Belgrade and take up the editorship of its news-
paper Samouprava (1881). From that point on he turned to professional 
journalism and politics. 
Stojan Protić acted as editor-in-chief of most of the Radical press, 
writing countless articles and editorials over the next forty or so years. 
Aside from being the leading author and defender of the Party’s posi-
tions, he was also very interested in constitutional reform and the theory 
of parliamentarism. A disciple of W. Bagehot and a follower of the British 
system of government, Protić took an active part in drawing up the Ser-
bian Constitutions of 1888, 1901 and 1903. Equally, he was concerned with 
Balkan regional questions, dealt with Serbo-Croat, Macedonian and Bul-
garian issues. He translated extensively from French, German, Russian and 
English. 
Protić was regarded as the leading political theorist of the Radical 
Party and its most talented writer. Because of his ideological firmness and 
uncompromising attitudes towards his opponents, he was nicknamed “stub-
born Stojan”.19 There is a story that he kept a signed resignation in his pocket 
even before he would take up public office. The American phrase My way or 
the highway perfectly applies to his belligerent character.
18 Regional representative chosen by their fellow neighbors.
19 “Bandoglavi Stole”.
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He was imprisoned on three occasions during the 1880s for printing 
offenses, serving two and a half years in jail; in 1899, he was sentenced to 20 
years of hard labor (pardoned in 1901).20 
Protić was first elected to the Serbian parliament in 1887. In 1903, he 
entered the government for the first time as the Minister of the Interior, the 
post he held often during the period preceding and during WW1. He was 
also the Minister of Finance. 
Stojan Protić played a key role in the Yugoslav unification process. In 
December 1918, he was appointed the first Prime Minister of the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia). He led the Yugoslav cabinet 
one more time in 1920. Both his governments were unstable coalitions and 
hence short-lived.
He broke up with Pašić and the Radical Party in 1921. His indepen-
dent attempt to organize a new political organization and enter the Yugoslav 
Parliament turned out to be a failure. He died soon after that, in 1923.
With Nikola Pašić and Dr. Lazar Paču, Stojan Protić formed the 
“Three Ps” or the “Holy Trinity” of the Serbian Radical Party. 
20 The Ivanjdan assassination attempt. See Dejvid Mekenzi, Stojan Protić – srpski 
novinar i državnik, Beograd, 2008
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Dr. Lazar Paču
(1853–1915)
Paču was born in Čurug in southern Hungary (Vojvodina), then a part of 
the Habsburg Empire. His father was a Serbian Orthodox priest of Aro-
mainan21 ethnicity. His ancestors moved northward during the mass migra-
tions of the Serbs in the 18th century.
Paču began his studies in medicine in Zurich, where he joined the 
Bakuninist group of future Radicals. He befriended Pera Todorović, both 
considering themselves followers of Svetozar Marković. Paču left univer-
sity in order to publish a political journal in Novi Sad (Straža22). After his 
political activities were suppressed by the authorities, Paču returned to his 
medical studies, graduating from the University of Berlin. He then moved to 
Belgrade and established a private practice there. In addition, he was one of 
the founders of the People’s Radical Party and a member of its Main Board.
Belonging to mainstream Radicals, he acted as the director of the na-
tional agency for monopolies (tobacco and salt) throughout the 1890s.
After the dynastic change in 1903, he entered the Radical cabinet in 
January 1904 as the Minister of Finance and was reelected in 1906 and 1912. 
While in charge of Serbian finances, he managed to balance the budget; the 
domestic currency reached full external convertibility and the entire sum of 
the national debt was reprogrammed. 
In 1914, Dr. Lazar Paču was deputy prime minister dealing with the 
Sarajevo assassination and the Habsburg ultimatum (with Stojan Protić) in 
Pašić’s absence.23
He is remembered as a very thrifty minister and the finest expert in 
public finances and budgetary matters in Serbian modern history.
21 Aromanians (Tsintsars or Vlachs) are an indigenous people of Latin origin who 
live throughout the Balkan Peninsula.
22 The Guard.
23 Pašić was busy campaigning in the countryside.
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Sava Grujić
(1840–1913)
Of all Radical leaders, Grujić was the oldest, the only military man and prob-
ably the most flexible. Some contemporaries and historians have questioned 
his loyalty to the Radical Party, suspecting that he never truly stopped being 
a Liberal.
Grujić was born in the village of Kolari near Smederevo, approxi-
mately 45 miles east of Belgrade. His uncle was a district chieftain during 
the Serbian revolts against the Ottomans and so was his father. Young Sava 
was, therefore, destined to choose the career of an army officer. 
He was educated at military academies in Belgrade, Prussia and St. 
Petersburg. As a young commander in the Serbian army, he took part in the 
Serbo-Turkish wars (1876–78) and was promoted to the rank of colonel.
He was a general in the Serbian army (since 1887), prime minis-
ter on five occasions,24 minister of armed forces and foreign affairs and a 
diplomat.25
At first, Sava Grujić was affiliated with the Liberals. After the forma-
tion of the Radical Party, however, he became politically closer to Pašić and 
his associates. Each time the Radicals were seeking compromise and a coali-
tion government, he was the person assigned the job of premiership.
Unlike the rest of the Radical leadership, he was no partisan whatso-
ever. On the contrary, it seems that his modest and dedicated personality 
had been agreeable to everyone: the Court as well as rival political parties.
In general, Sava Grujić represented a perfect example of a public bu-
reaucrat in the best sense of the word.
24 1887–88, 1889–92, 1893–94, 1903–04, 1905–06.
25 Grujić served as minister to Athens, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.
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Svetomir Nikolajević
(1844–1922)
Nikolajević was originally from western Serbia (the town of Ub), a son of 
fairly humble parents, who would go on to become a distinguished Serbian 
politician, scholar and academician. Svetomir Nikolajević was a member 
of the Radical Party very briefly, despite being one of its founders. In 1881, 
he was elected Deputy Chairman of the Party’s Main Board, but was soon 
estranged due to his amicable relations with the Crown and the ruling es-
tablishment. At odds with the Radical mainstream, he abandoned the orga-
nization never to return.
Nikolajević served as Mayor of Belgrade (1887) and Prime Minister 
(1894). After 1903, he went to Athens to take the position of the Serbian min-
ister to Greece.
Svetomir Nikolajević attended universities in Belgrade, Berlin, Bern, 
Paris and London, enjoying government scholarships. After his return, he 
became a professor at Velika škola and later the University of Belgrade. He 
taught comparative literature and introduced Shakespeare, Milton and Lord 
Byron to Serbian students. There was nothing rebellious about Svetomir 
Nikolajević. He was no rebel, even less a revolutionary. His nature was sub-
tle and calm; his approach – partly enigmatic. He spoke in a quiet voice and 
avoided mass gatherings. He was a typical representative of the “nouveau 
riche” intelligentsia. Svetomir’s intellectualism had an elitist note to it. A 
true academic, he was also a perfect snob.26
Nikolajević was a well-known freemason: the longtime Grand Master 
of the Belgrade freemasonic lodge Pobratim.27
26 See Božidar S. Nikolajević, Radikalna stranka i Svetomir Nikolajević, Beograd 1938
27 “The Stepbrother”. Other prominent freemasons among the Radicals were: Lazar 
Paču, Milovan Dj. Milovanović, Andra Nikolić, Petar Velimirović, Jovan Djaja and 
Mihailo Vujić. Nikola Pašić and Stojan Protić did not belong to Freemasonry.
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Milovan Dj. Milovanović
(1863–1912)
Milovanović has already been mentioned in this volume when we discussed 
the Balkan alliance of 1912. Here we added some biographical data that 
might help us understand his individuality and policies.
Milovanović was born in Belgrade. He came from a distinguished 
family: his father was a well-respected judge at the Court of Appeals, a for-
mer Minister of Justice and a state councilor.
After graduating from high school in Belgrade, he went to Paris to 
study law. Milovan Milovanović graduated in 1884 and received his doctor-
ate in 1888.28 He was instantly given a position at the Belgrade Law School, 
where he taught public law and constitutionalism. As such, he was appoint-
ed by the King to proceed as a Secretary of the Committee for constitutional 
reform (1888). In that capacity, he traveled across Europe, learning about 
the political systems in Belgium, France and Denmark. It was his idea to 
take the Belgian Constitution of 1831 as the most suitable model of parlia-
mentary monarchy for Serbia.
Milovan Dj. Milovanović was viewed as a moderate Radical, not alien 
to the Obrenović Court. Due to his age, parental background and confi-
dence-inducing character, he was labeled “the most acceptable Radical”. 
Still, he was forced out of the University for political reasons. Consequently, 
he successfully ran for Parliament in 1893. In 1896–97, he served as the 
Minister of Justice in the conciliatory government led by Djordje Simić.
During the Radical persecution 1899–1900, he was in exile. Not long 
afterwards, he joined the government again, this time as the Minister of 
Finance. In 1901, a compromise between the Crown and the Radical Party 
was reached (y compris drafting of the new constitutional proposal). That 
tactical arrangement was, to a large extent, a result of his efforts.29
Milovanović’s political career exploded after 1907. He had spent the 
previous four years as the Serbian ambassador to Rome. He was the coun-
28 His doctoral dissertation was in the field of international public law. The title was: 
“Les Traités de garantie au XIXe siècle” (Guarantee Treaties in the 19th century).
29 The so-called “Fuzija” (Fusion) of 1901.
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try’s representative in the proceedings at the Second Conference in The 
Hague, and was responsible for the French editing of the convention’s final 
text.
Milovan was appointed Foreign Minister in Petar Velimirović’s cabi-
net in 1908, never to leave politics until his death in 1912. It has already 
been mentioned that he was appointed Prime Minister in 1911–12.30
Milovan Dj. Milovanović was perhaps the most capable, most mod-
ern and best educated leader of the Radical Party. A genuine European, spe-
cialist in constitutional theory and foreign relations equally, negotiator of 
exceptional talent with an excellent understanding of the Balkans as well as 
Europe, and a polyglot, he stood out as the true statesman of the new age. 
30 See D. Djordjević, Mllovan Dj. Milovanović, Beograd, 1962.
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Andra Nikolić
(1853–1918)
Nikolić was the quiet one. Despite the fact that he belonged to the inner cir-
cle of the Radical leadership, his standing in Serbian history remained if not 
entirely irrelevant than certainly sidelined. He was Belgrade-born, raised 
and educated in a typical late 19th-century middle class environment. In 
terms of his education, Nikolić was a lawyer, although he never practiced 
law.
Lazar Paču, Stojan Protić and Andra Nikolić formed a threesome of 
closest political associates and personal friends. The other leadership duo 
consisted of Nikola Pašić and Aca Stanojević.31 
Nikolić had rather good relations with the group of younger Radicals 
who split in 1901, launching a new political organization called the Inde-
pendent Radical Party (Party of Radical Democracy), but decided not to 
join them (1901–03).
Andra Nikolić served in several governments after 1903, acting as 
Minister of Education and Foreign Affairs, Speaker of the National Assem-
bly and the head of the diplomatic mission in Paris. He was also a profes-
sor of comparative literature and a literary critic. In 1897, he was elected a 
member of the Serbian Royal Academy. Nikolić was one of the co-signers of 
the London Peace Treaty, which ended the Second Balkan War in 1913. He 
died in Paris in September 1918.
Andra Nikolić was another moderate at the top of the Radical Party. 
One could argue that it was in fact Nikolić who symbolized the voice of 
reason and common sense and, at the same time, maintained unity and co-
hesiveness in the Radical Main Board.
31 For details see: Milan St. Protić Sr., “Pašić i Protić pre 1914”, Istorijski glasnik, 
Belgrade, 1971.
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Aleksa (Aca) Stanojević
(1852–1947)
Stanojević was another Radical leader from eastern Serbia (the town of 
Knjaževac), one of the founders of the Party and an influential member 
of its Main Board. He was the son of a well-to-do peasant and landowner. 
Without any higher education, Stanojević never married and remained very 
much attached to his native milieu. He was heavily involved in the prepara-
tions for the Timok Rebellion (1883) and was officially indicted as one of its 
key coordinators. As a consequence, he left the country, escaping capture.
During his long career in politics, he was elected deputy to the Na-
tional Assembly numerous times and also served as its Speaker.
Aca Stanojević developed a special and intimate rapport with Nikola 
Pašić early on. Both from eastern Serbia and implicated in subversive activi-
ties against the Crown, they lived together in exile and became a sort of a 
conspiratorial duo within the Radical leadership. Stanojević was considered 
Pašić’s sidekick, confidant and most trusted ally. Still, on his visits to Bel-
grade, he used to stay at Stojan Protić’s home, where he had a private room.
Aca Stanojević outlived all other Radicals of the first generation and 
succeeded Pašić as the Party’s chairman after the latter’s death in 1926. How-
ever, he held no public office thereafter.
After World War Two, he endorsed the Communist regime in Yugo-
slavia and hosted Tito personally upon the latter’s visit to Stanojević’s home-
town. With his death in 1947, the People’s Radical Party ceased to exist. 
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Petar (Pera) Velimirović
(1848–1921)
Velimirović was born in the provincial town of Negotin (also in eastern Ser-
bia) and shared a common regional origin with Svetozar Marković, Nikola 
Pašić and Aca Stanojević. He studied at the Eidgenoessische Polytechnische 
Schule in Zurich at the same time as Marković and Pašić. Together they 
formed the “inner three” of the so-called “Zurich group” of future Serbian 
Radicals.
In 1876, he was accused of taking part in civil demonstrations or-
ganized by Marković’s radical-socialists in Kragujevac (central Serbia).32 
Chased by the police, he managed to escape to Hungary. In 1880, he ran for 
the Serbian Parliament and won.
After the Timok Rebellion, Velimirović immigrated again, this time 
to Bulgaria, where for a while, he taught at a gymnasium in Sofia.
He was the minister of public works in several coalition and Radi-
cal governments in the late 1880s, 1890s and early 1900s. Twice he led the 
government as its Prime Minister: the first cabinet under his presidency was 
very short-lived (1902); his second lasted for seven months (July 1908–Feb-
ruary 1909).33
Petar Velimirović’s life and political career resembled that of the Rad-
ical Party itself. He began as a radical-socialist with revolutionary tenden-
cies, but gradually moved towards the center, becoming simultaneously a 
respectable member of the Serbian social elite and political establishment.
32 The so-called “Red Banner” demonstrations; Pera Todorović was a participant 
too.
33 During the international crisis over the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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Kosta Taušanović
(1854–1902)
If Svetozar Marković was a radical-socialist, Kosta Taušanović was a radical-
capitalist. He definitely epitomized the right wing of the People’s Radical 
Party in Serbia in its formative period.
Taušanović was born in Aleksinac, a small town about a hundred 
miles south of Belgrade in a petty bourgeois social environment. He stud-
ied agriculture in the Austrian Empire (Tabor, Bohemia) and economy in 
Germany (Hohenheim). Being among the small group of Radical original 
founders and a deputy in the Serbian Parliament (1880–1883), he was held 
in high esteem by the Radical rank and file.
Kosta Taušanović was sentenced to eight years in prison for his al-
leged role in organizing the Timok Rebellion and nine years in prison for the 
1899 Ivanjdan assassination attempt on the former King Milan Obrenović: 
he was pardoned both times after two years in jail. In the meantime, he was 
responsible for the Liberal-Radical agreement of 1886, was a co-chairman 
of the Grand Constitutional Council (1888) and Minister of Interior and 
Economy (1889–1892). In the mid-1890s, he confronted Nikola Pašić, thus 
jeopardizing his foremost position in the Party. As a result, he and Jovan 
Djaja were eventually expelled from the Radical Party.
A very successful businessman, Taušanović was by far the wealthiest 
Radical politician. His investments and business affairs ranged from bank-
ing and insurance to the tobacco industry and commerce.
Most likely due to his health having deteriorated while he was impris-
oned, Kosta Taušanović died in 1902 at the age of 48. 
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Jovan Djaja
(1846–1928)
Djaja was a gymnasium professor, politician, journalist, translator and dip-
lomat. Born in the vicinity of Dubrovnik, he was of Serb Catholic origin 
and came from a rather modest family. He graduated from the Dubrovnik 
high school and studied in Vienna before settling in Belgrade.34 At first, 
the young Ragusan demonstrated no interest in politics, but did join the 
Radicals in 1882, quickly coming to prominence. He was a very active con-
tributor to the Party’s press (Samouprava, Odjek) throughout the 1880s and 
1890s. From 1896 to 1906, he was the editor-in-chief and leading author of 
the newspaper Narod.35 He authored two important booklets: Pictures from 
the Classical Age36 (1882) and The Union of Serbia and Bulgaria37 (1904). 
Together with Kosta Taušanović, Jovan Djaja stood on the right wing 
of the Radical political spectrum and was ousted for resisting the official 
Party line. He served in Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs and Interi-
or. He was the head of the Serbian diplomatic missions in Athens and Sofia.
Djaja spent the latter part of his life away from politics, devoted to his 
translation work from Italian, French and Latin.38 
34 The apocryphal story goes that he once met Jovan Ristić in Vienna, who invited 
him to come to Serbia and promised him help and assistance. 
“Fine, but you won’t remember me”, said the Serbian student. “Oh, yes, I will, I cer-
tainly will”, replied the old statesman. 
Djaja accepted the invitation and the leader of the Serbian Liberal Party, prime min-
ister and member of Royal regencies kept his word. 
35 The People.
36 Slike iz klasičnog doba.
37 Savez Srbije i Bugarske.
38 From French, he translated Victor Hugo’s Quartrevingt-treize; from Italian, 
Alessandro Manzoni’s The Betrothed; from Latin, Tacitus’ Annals. 
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Raša Milošević
(1851–1928)
Another of the Radical founders born in Aleksinac, Milošević; was edu-
cated in Belgrade and St. Petersburg; he was seen as the major theorist of 
the People’s Radical Party until 1883; he was a National Assembly deputy 
1880–1883 and was sentenced to death for high treason (masterminding 
the Timok Rebellion), but received clemency prior to execution; he was 
jailed until 1886 and served as the minister of national economy in multiple 
governments (early 1890s).
Milošević contributed to all Radical publications; wrote numerous articles 
and two relevant brochures;39 his political memoirs appeared in 1923.
His wife Dr. Draginja (Draga) Ljočić Milošević (1855–1926) was the 
first female physician in Serbia. She graduated from Zurich Medical School 
in 1879 as the top of her class and started a private practice in Belgrade 
(early 1900s).40 She was a pioneer of feminism in Serbia, arguing tirelessly 
in favor of women’s voting rights. She volunteered in World War One and 
gave birth to four children. In the second part of his life, Milošević withdrew 
from active politics, keeping the position of CEO of the national Monopo-
lies agency.
His son-in-law was Momčilo Ninčić41 (1876–1949), a long-time for-
eign minister and high-ranking diplomat in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and President of the Assem-
bly of the League of Nations (1926–27). 
39 One on local decentralization and communal self-government, and another 
about the 1893 Royal coup. See Raša Milošević, Timočka buna 1883 godine, Beo-
grad, 1923; Raša Milošević, Državni udar odozgo: 1 aprll 1893: svrgnuće krnjeg 
kraljevskog namešnistva, Beograd, 1936.
40 In order to do that, she needed a special permit issued by the Ministry of Interior.
41 A notable Radical of the second generation.
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Gligorije (Giga) Geršić
(1842–1918)
Gligorije Geršić was a well-respected jurist, writer and politician. Originally 
a Serb from southern Hungary (Bela Crkva), he attended law schools in 
Budapest and Vienna, before getting a teaching job at Belgrade Velika škola 
(1866).42 
As a young intellectual, he was initially allied with the Liberals and 
was their fervent advocate. In 1881, however, he decided to switch sides and 
joined the founders of the People’s Radical Party.
In 1883, Professor Geršić was charged with conspiracy against the 
Crown (Timok Rebellion) and brought to trial: fortunately, he was acquit-
ted. He served as the Minister of Justice in three different cabinets between 
1888 and 1892. Geršić’s contribution to the drafting of the 1888 Constitu-
tion carried special weight since he was regarded as the prime authority in 
the field. He was twice elected to the Serbian State Council (1889–1894; 
1901–1907).
In 1888, he was elected a member of the Serbian Royal Academy.
Gligorije Geršić was a prolific writer and the author of two textbooks 
for law students.43
More of an academic than a politician, he did not fit in with the most 
assertive group of Radical leaders. After the Timok episode, his public be-
havior became increasingly lenient and cautious. Intellectually, he belonged 
to the very top of the Radical Party. Politically he did not.
42 Lecturing in Roman and international public law.
43 Sistem rimskog privatnog prava (System of Roman Private Law), 1882; Današnje 
diplomatsko i konzularno pravo (Contemporary Diplomatic and Consular Law), 
1898. 
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Ranko Tajsić
(1843–1903)
Tajsić was a peasant from western Serbia, a “radical” Radical, a staunch op-
ponent of the Obrenović dynasty and an extraordinarily gifted tribune. His 
ancestors were renowned members of the local community (Dragačevo re-
gion) and local commanders during the Serbian revolts against the Turks 
(first decades of the 19th century).
Having remained in his native village, Ranko was largely self-ed-
ucated. His interest in politics increased with the appearance of Svetozar 
Marković and his movement. In 1874 he was elected to the Serbian National 
Assembly, where he represented the radical-socialist opposition against the 
ruling establishment.
Due to his attachment to the ordinary folk and his unique talent for 
popular rhetoric, Tajsić enjoyed vast recognition across the country. He nev-
er held any public office except multiple terms in the Serbian Parliament.44 
Despite the fact that the 1888 Constitution basically reflected Radical ideas 
and concepts, he decided to vote against it, stating that the text was a “rotten 
compromise” with the enemies of democracy.45
Tajsić avoided indictment after the Timok Rebellion because his re-
gion had remained peaceful, but was taken to the Criminal Court in 1893 
and accused for political conspiracy; he was freed due to a lack of evidence. 
In 1897, he fled to Montenegro, enjoying the hospitality of the Montenegrin 
Royal family. In 1899, in absentia, he was found guilty of conspiracy in the 
Ivanjdan assassination attempt and sentenced to capital punishment.
Rehabilitated in 1900, he returned to Serbia in a bad psychological 
state and died less than three years later.46
44 Tajsić led seventeen successive and successful electoral campaigns.
45 Only two Radical deputies voted against it: Ranko Tajsić and Dimitrije Katić.
46 See Dragoje Todorović, Narodni tribun Ranko Tajsić, Beograd, 1981.
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Mihailo Vujić
(1853–1913)
He was one of the few Radicals born in Belgrade in a typically urban middle 
class Serbian family. He received his B.A. degree in philosophy from Velika 
škola and earned his Ph.D. in economy in Germany in 1879. Vujić later be-
came a university professor of political economy, which he remained until 
his death.
Vujić represented a faction of the Radical Party that developed spe-
cial ties with the Obrenović dynasty and was hence pejoratively nicknamed 
the “Court Radicals”. 
He was the minister of finance from 1887 to 1892, again in 1893–94 
and 1896–97, mostly in coalition governments. Remembered for certain 
positive steps in budget balancing and his multiple attempts to reprogram 
Serbian foreign debts, as a minister he was mainly responsible for nation-
alizing of tobacco and salt monopolies, as well as the railway. In February 
1901, he was chosen to run the Foreign Office; a year later he formed his 
own cabinet, keeping the portfolio of foreign affairs; it was a Radical-Pro-
gressivist coalition government; Vujić resigned in November 1902.
As the head of Serbian diplomatic missions, he served in Paris (1901), 
Vienna (1903), Berlin (1906) and Rome (1909). 
He was elected to the Serbian Royal Academy in 1901.
Professor Mihailo Vujić wrote a number of seminal books in the fields 
of finance and economy.47
47 Načela narodne ekonomije I-III (Principles of National Economy I-III),1895–1898; 
Osnovna prethodna pitanja i istorijski razvitak nauke o narodnoj privredi (Basic 
Questions and Historical Development of National Economy), 1895; Ekonomska 
teorija (Economic Theory), 1896.
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Dimitrije Katić
(1845–1899)
Together with Bogosavljević and Tajsić, Katić was the third Radical who 
came from the countryside and spoke on behalf of the Serbian peasantry. He 
was born in central Serbia, but went to a commercial secondary school in 
Belgrade. After two years of apprenticeship in the capital, he returned to his 
native village and rural life. Starting out as a Liberal, he was elected Member 
of Parliament in 1874, as were his two peasant Radical friends. He remained 
a Serbian assemblyman for the next twenty four years.
Katić and Tajsić were the only Radical deputies who voted against the 
1888 Constitution. In 1891, he was appointed the Speaker of the House, a 
position he held for several years.
Katić was a life-long member of the Radical Main Board and an influ-
ential voice of the Serbian popular interests.
His political views were rather different from Tajsić’s. Katić was a rea-
sonable man, patient and very polite. His ideological firmness did not need 
additional manifestations of belligerence. Quite the contrary: his savvy be-
havior and prudence contributed to the weight of his political stands and 
action.
Admired even by his most bitter adversaries, Dimitrije Katić earned 
the respect of all sides, including the Crown. 
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Dr. Lazar Dokić
(1845–1893)
Dokić is remembered as the epitome of a pro-Obrenović Radical. Born in 
Belgrade, he was a student of medicine in Vienna and Prague and a univer-
sity professor of anatomy, physiology and zoology. He was the personal doc-
tor of the Royal family, especially responsible for taking care of the young 
heir Aleksandar Obrenović (1883 onwards). Dokić served as the President 
of the State Council since 1889. 
On April 1, 1893, he was appointed Prime Minister following the 
Royal coup of his former protégé Prince Aleksandar. His cabinet survived 
only a few months. He died in December. 
We decided to include Dr. Lazar Dokić in the list of the most distin-
guished Radical leaders even though he really did not belong there. The rea-
son is that he has remained known in Serbian history as the person whose 
acts testify to the Radical tendency to make any kind of compromise in or-
der to reach power. 
The truth of the matter is that the official Radical Party organs, as well 
as the most influential Radicals, remained opposed to the ruling govern-
ment until 1901.
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EPILOGUE
The Context
In the course of the 19th century, Serbia followed, for the most part, the path of more advanced European nations. Its history was, essentially, not 
that different to that of its neighbors, Bulgaria or Greece. The entire cen-
tury was chiefly marked by a long-lasting process of modernization, nation-
building and social emancipation.
During the 20th century, however, two key events altered Serbia’s road 
to modernity. The first was World War One (1914–1918) and the creation 
of Yugoslavia (1918); the second was the triumph of Communism in 1945.
After centuries of Ottoman rule, in early 1804 Serbian warlords rose 
against the Turks in the First Serbian Insurrection. Despite their consider-
able successes in liberating the country, followed by the beginnings of state 
building, the Serbian rebels could not endure long against a more powerful 
adversary. Their supreme commander was Karageorge Petrović (aka Black 
George), an affluent peasant from central Serbia with some previous mili-
tary experience as a frontier fighter for Austria against the Ottomans in the 
1790s. The Serbian war of independence lasted until 1813, when it was fi-
nally crushed by the Ottomans.1
1 Russia and Turkey previously concluded a peace treaty in Bucharest (1812).
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Two years later (1815), another prominent Serb notable, Miloš 
Obrenović, launched the Second Serbian Insurrection with the identical 
objective as his predecessor: to free the country from foreign rule and win 
national sovereignty and international recognition. Unlike his predecessor, 
however, whose struggle was one of constant armed conflicts, Prince Miloš 
sought to negotiate, finally achieving an autonomous status for Serbia in 
1830, including hereditary princedom for himself.
It turned out that the two leaders of the two national revolutions 
founded the two rival dynasties (Karadjordjevićs and Obrenovićs), whose 
representatives replaced each other on the Serbian throne throughout the 
entire 19th century, until 1903. 
Along with the war against the Ottomans, Serbs met multiple chal-
lenges along the way to developing their independent government and state 
administration. Knowing little about public institutions and governance, 
their early experiences were mostly inherited from the Ottomans: unlim-
ited power of the ruler, voluntarism of the ruling elites, widespread abuses 
of authority and bitter power struggles among the warlords. Initial efforts 
to adopt a Constitution in 1835, for instance, proved a victory in terms of 
its modern and democratic content (it was drafted by a Serbian intellectual 
Dimitrije Davidović from Vienna); this act, however, was short-lived, since 
the Serbian Prince Miloš would accept no boundaries to his absolute pre-
rogatives.2 The major European powers were equally disenchanted by the 
sudden Serbian shift to democracy.
Political, economic and cultural ideas from Western Europe gradu-
ally reached Serbiain the late 1850s and continued to penetrate in the fol-
lowing decades. Their champions were the members of the first generation 
of Serbs to receive higher education abroad. Strongly influenced by the ideas 
of romantic liberalism (National liberation and individual freedom are two 
sides of the same coin), they shared the dreams of their mentors from Italy, 
Germany or Poland. The concept of a cultural and political unification of all 
Serbs in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires (developed in the well-known 
document entitled Načertanije3 in 1844) reflected national agendas of na-
tionalist movements from all over Europe. Polish nationalist Adam Czarto-
rysky’s agent of Czech origin, František Zach, was the one to encourage and 
2 He abdicated in 1839 and left Serbia, only to be called back to the Serbian throne 
in 1858. He died in 1860. Serbia was ruled by Karadjordje’s son Prince Aleksandar 
Karadjordjević for 16 years before he was removed from power by a popular vote 
in 1858.
3 “The Draft”. The document was secret until the late19th century.
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assist the Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin in drawing up the document 
that would later become the cornerstone of the Serbian national program. 
From 1860 to 1868, Serbia was ruled by Prince Mihailo Obrenović, 
Prince Miloš’s younger son, an enlightened despot inspired by European 
culture and manners rather than by its political beliefs and institutions. Well 
educated, Mihailo dreamed about an all-Balkan alliance against the Turks, 
but did not live to see his vision come to fruition. He was killed in an assas-
sination plot (1868), the background of which has never been fully revealed. 
The war between Serbia and Turkey (1876‒1878) was triggered by the 
Serbian revolt in Herzegovina in 1875. Serbia did not come out victorious in 
military terms, despite Russia’s involvement (1877). Rather, it was imperial 
Russia that used the victory to impose its own order of things in the Bal-
kans. According to the provisions of the San Stefano Treaty (March 1878), 
Greater Bulgaria was created (stretching from the Black to the Aegean Sea) 
as an exponent of Russian interests in South-Eastern Europe. 
Alarmed by this outcome, European powers called for an interna-
tional conference presided over by the German Chancellor Otto Von Bis-
marck (Congress of Berlin, June/July 1878). The final stipulations of the 
treaty granted full independence to both Serbian states Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, including certain territorial enlargements to the south; allowed 
the Habsburg Empire to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ottoman territory) 
and establish military control over former Sanjak of Novi Bazar (an Otto-
man dominion located between Serbia and Montenegro); Greater Bulgaria 
was to be dissolved, creating two separate entities, Eastern Rumelia and the 
Principality of Bulgaria, both under Ottoman sovereignty.
In 1882 Serbia became a Kingdom; its first King in modern history 
became Milan Obrenović, the grand-nephew of Prince Miloš Obrenović.4 
Strong pressures from the opposition forced the King to endorse a 
democratic Constitution in 1888, introducing a parliamentary system with 
nearly universal male suffrage (very low tax census) and strict limitations to 
monarchical prerogatives, free press, local self-government and free educa-
tion. King Milan soon abdicated in favor of his son Aleksandar Obrenović 
and left the country. Serbia’s new ruler was no more a democrat than his 
father and quickly abolished the Constitution in 1894.
King Aleksandar Obrenović and his wife Draga were assassinated 
in 1903, in a coup organized and executed by a group of young army of-
ficers disgusted by the couple’s public behavior and numerous scandals. The 
1888 Constitution was restored; Prince Petar Karadjordjević, the grandson 
4 In 1881 King Milan signed the so-called Secret Convention with Austria-Hungary 
that made Belgrade completely dependent on Vienna. 
http://www.balkaninstitut.com
Milan St. Protić 152
of Karageorge, was elected the new King and the Radicals finally came to 
power.
The period from 1903 to 1914 has often been described as the Golden 
Decade in modern Serbian history. Serbia was structured as a parliamentary 
monarchy with a functional democratic system; its economic growth was 
steady and budgetary discipline strict. 
From 1904 on, Serbia held general elections on a regular basis. Its do-
mestic political life was characterized by an extremely flamboyant free press. 
One of the main independent daily newspaper in the Balkans, Politika, was 
launched in Belgrade in 1904.5 Belgrade’s Velika škola (“Grand School”) 
was upgraded to the rank of university in 1905. New political parties were 
founded; the most interesting among them being the Serbian Social- Demo-
cratic Party created in 1903.
Serbia not only emerged triumphant from an economic clash with 
Austria-Hungary (the so-called “Tariff War” 1906–1911), but was success-
ful in freeing its foreign trade from Habsburg dominance.6 Serbia’s economy 
was mostly agricultural, its produce reaching markets all over Europe and 
bringing back substantial foreign exchange. During this particular period, 
Serbia achieved solid economic development, which in turn facilitated the 
stability of its domestic currency (dinar), which was fully convertible.
Throughout the 19th century, Serbia was going through an overall 
Westernization, slowly abandoning old Ottoman and local traditions to 
gradually embrace European lifestyles, ways of thinking and social organi-
zation. A land reform carried out as early as the 1830s facilitated this pro-
cess.  
Unofficial, yet continuing, political influence wielded by the mili-
tary officers who conspired against King Aleksandar Obrenović cast a dim 
shadow on an otherwise prosperous Serbia in the onset of the 20th century. 
By 1911, they had control over a large secret organization within the com-
manding corps of the Serbian army.7 Their program was based on modern 
nationalism (liberation and unification of all Serbs and Serbian lands), ap-
plying military methods in achieving their goals. The secret organization 
posed a serious threat not only to the neighboring countries, but to Serbia’s 
political order as well.
5 Politika celebrated its 100th anniversary in 2004.
6 Until then about 90% of Serbia’s foreign trade was with Austria.
7 The official title was Unification or Death, better known as the Black Hand.
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The decision of Vienna to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 almost 
triggered a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The local Serbs8 re-
sponded harshly as did the government in Belgrade. The Russian Emperor 
(Nicholas II) intervened at the last minute and the crisis was averted. As a 
result, the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia deteriorated even 
further. 
Serbia’s foreign policy at the time turned from pro-Austrian under 
King Milan to pro-European under the Radicals. In 1912 and 1913, Serbia 
participated in two Balkan wars and emerged victorious from both.9  Con-
sequently, it gained territories to the south (Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia), 
driving Turkey out of the Balkans with only a small area around Adrianople 
left.10
Serbia’s name can be found in every history book due to the assas-
sination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, in 
Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. The assassin was a young Serbian nationalist and 
the conspiracy was logistically supported by the secret Serbian organization 
(Unification or Death, also known as the Black Hand). The incident twas 
used by powers as a pretext for World War One.
In 1914 the Serbian army pulled off several surprising and heroic 
victories against the far stronger Austrian army, at one point completely 
liberating the country. However, after a combined Austro-German attack 
and a Bulgarian campaign from the southeast (October 1915), the Serbian 
armed forces together with its government and the Parliament embarked 
on a lengthy and arduous retreat across the Albanian mountains in the hope 
of reaching the coast of the Adriatic Sea. Suffering heavy losses, the Serbian 
soldiers finally found refuge on the Greek island of Corfu in early 1916. Af-
ter recovering and regrouping, the Serbian army was transferred to north-
ern Greece, where it joined the Allied forces (French, British, Italian and 
Greek) to form the Salonika front.
A robust military campaign was launched in September 1918 and 
ended successfully by November. Serbia emerged from the war as one of the 
great victors against the Central Powers.
The effect of five years of warfare was disastrous. Serbia lost almost 
third of its population and its army suffered severe casualties, while the 
country was ravaged after three years of foreign occupation.
8 According to official Austrian figures, ethnic Serbs accounted for 44% of the popu-
lation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1910.
9 First against Ottoman Turkey, the Second against Bulgaria
10 Albania was recognized as an autonomous  State. 
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In summer 1917, the Serbian government led by Nikola Pašić and 
the Radicals opened talks with the representatives of South Slavs from Aus-
tria-Hungary.11 The two parties issued a declaration after the conference, 
expressing willingness to create a common Yugoslav state after the war, ral-
lying all South Slavs in the Balkans and joining their territories (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) with the Kingdom of Serbia. They also agreed 
that the new State would be a monarchy ruled by the Serbian Karadjordjević 
dynasty.12
The Yugoslav unification took place in Belgrade on 1 December, 
1918. The official name of the new State was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. A few days prior to the event, Montenegro and Vojvodina 
declared their unconditional unification with Serbia.
Sadly, Yugoslavia was an unfortunate creation from its very incep-
tion. Rifts between the two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and Croats13 
and their political elites, marked the period between the wars in Yugoslavia.
The first confrontation arose on the question of the 1921 Yugoslav 
Constitution. The majority of Croats was rallied in a single political party 
(Croatian Peasant Party) and supported a federal type of state organization, 
giving Croatia a high level of autonomy. The Serbs were divided among 
many political parties (Democrats, Radicals, Agrarians and several smaller 
parties) and proposed a number of options for the new Constitution, rang-
ing from centralism with a strong monarchical figure to decentralization 
with local self-governments and autonomous regions based on the historical 
principle. No form of federalism, though, was acceptable to the Serbs. After 
more than two years of bitter political debates, the acting King (Aleksandar 
Karadjordjević, the great-grandson of Karadjordje Petrović) imposed his 
view of a centralized state with powerful royal prerogatives. The Constitu-
tion was passed in the Parliament by a narrow majority in June 1921, since 
the Croat Peasant Party and the Communists boycotted the vote. Instead 
of a national safeguard, the 1921 Constitution became a source of tensions 
between the Serbs and Croats.
11 The Austrian South Slavs were represented by the Yugoslav Committee, a politi-
cal organization founded in Paris in 1915. It is worth noting that Austro-Hungarian 
South Slavs repeatedly requested to be allowed participation at the Versailles Peace 
Conference, but were rejected every time. 
12 The document known as the Corfu Declaration
13 It is important to note that Serbs are Eastern Orthodox Christians who estab-
lished their independent (autocephalous) church early in the 13th century, while the 
Croats are Roman Catholics.
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In the following years, the political climate in the country, triggered 
by the Croatian nationalism, deteriorated to the point of open conflict. The 
crisis culminated in 1928, when a Serbian nationalist, provoked by their 
insulting remarks, shot three Croatian deputies during a session of the Par-
liament. Stjepan Radić, the chairman of the Croatian Peasant Party and the 
undisputed political leader in Croatia, was mortally wounded and died soon 
thereafter.14 Yugoslavia was on the brink of a civil war.
In January 1929, King Aleksandar I issued a royal decree assuming 
full political authority. He outlawed all political parties and dissolved the 
Parliament. It was a coup d’état followed by Aleksandar’s personal rule.15 
Beside its authoritarian character, the new regime was strongly rooted in 
so-called “integral Yugoslavism”, and thus hoped to ease ethnic frictions. 
Despite immense effort, it achieved little. By 1931, the King terminated his 
personal regime and offered a new Constitution, which practically legiti-
mized his personal rule allowing certain severely limited civil liberties. The 
King’s firm control over Yugoslav politics remained intact.
In October 1934, Aleksandar I was assassinated in France by a Mace-
donian terrorist during a visit to Marseilles. The plot was organized by a 
Croatian fascist organization (the Ustasha) supported and financed by 
revisionist circles in Italy and Hungary. The Ustasha were never held ac-
countable, although the debate about their involvement continued until the 
breakout of World War Two.
Naturally, the tragic incident aggravated the situation and deepened 
the distrust between the Serbs and Croats, escalating towards pathological 
ethnic hatred.
The King was succeeded by his first cousin Prince Pavle, who as-
sumed royal prerogatives in the name of Aleksandar’s underage son King 
Petar II Karadjordjević.16 A British disciple and a champion of the “policy of 
appeasement”,17 Prince Pavle Karadjordjević avoided confrontation with It-
aly and Germany. The international course Yugoslavia pursued at that time 
can be best defined as “active neutrality”. Seeing major European powers re-
treating before Hitler and making important concessions and the domestic 
14 The tragic incident took place on 20 June, 1928. Stjepan Radić died 49 days later 
on 8 August, 1928. 
15 Sometimes referred to as the “Dictatorship of King Aleksandar”.
16 The Royal Regency consisted of three members; Prince Pavle was the first Regent, 
while the other two regents had practically no political influence.
17 The architect of that particular foreign policy was the British diplomat Neville 
Henderson, Prince Pavle’s close friend and confidant.
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situation extremely volatile, Prince Pavle and his government tried to stay 
out of European conflicts.
At home, Prince Pavle felt it necessary to address the disturbed re-
lations between the Serbs and Croats. In August 1939, an agreement was 
reached proposing an enlargement of the Croatian territory and the broad-
est autonomy (Banovina Croatia). The effect was not what Pavle had hoped 
for. Now that the Croats were satisfied, the Serbs felt betrayed. Prince Pavle 
saw the maneuver as a segment of a larger picture of the “policy of appease-
ment”. Influenced by his London friends, he followed their example with 
loyalty so typical of the British. 
But by 1941, this policy was no longer in effect. Yugoslavia was forced 
to choose a side. In March, Prince Pavle went to Germany to meet Hitler 
and a deal was struck: Yugoslavia was to join the Axis formally, but it was up 
to her own independent judgment to choose when it would become actively 
involved. In the meantime, Yugoslavia had no obligations toward the Axis, 
except to allow German supply shipments to pass through the country on 
their way to Greece. Hitler guaranteed Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity as 
well. The pact was signed on March 25, 1941.18
The next day, large-scale demonstrations against the pact broke out 
in Belgrade. Traditional anti-German sentiments were inflamed among the 
Serbs by a network of British agents who flooded Belgrade in 1940–1941, 
which sparked another political crisis. 
A speedy and bloodless military coup took place early in the morn-
ing of 27 March. Prince Pavle and his government were dismissed and the 
young King Petar was declared of age, which enabled him to assume com-
plete royal duties. The new cabinet was headed by an Air Force general and 
included a few prominent Serbian and Croatian politicians.
The Luftwaffe attacks started at the crack of dawn on April 6, 1941. 
Yugoslavia capitulated eleven days later.
What followed was the Armageddon of World War Two: Nazi oc-
cupation, dismemberment, terror, civil war, ethnic atrocities, Communism.
18 Hitler obviously wanted to secure Southeastern Europe as soon as possible prior 
to his major campaign in the Soviet Union. He already had Romania and Bulgaria 
on his side and was mainly concerned about Yugoslavia and Greece. 
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The Overview
1
Indeed, the People’s Radical Party was the first modern political party in 
Serbia.
Due to their massive following among the Serbian peasantry and ef-
fective organizational structure, both horizontal and vertical, the Radicals 
were able to broaden their base and include most of the Serbian population 
into politics. This process of political mobilization had twofold consequenc-
es. On one hand, it did contribute to the general democratization of the 
country; on the other, it opened the doors to shallow populism and dema-
goguery. Instead of an oligarchic rule of the monarch and a narrow circle of 
national elite from the previous era, the Radical Party introduced a type of 
partisan regime as a result of its dominant position within the electorate. 
During the twenty-year period (1881–1903) examined in this vol-
ume, the Radical Party spent most of its time in the opposition, with a few 
brief intervals in power. This formative period in its history, therefore, was 
chiefly marked by its bitter political struggle against rival political factors, 
the King in the first place.
Other political parties in Serbia at the end of the 19th century never 
achieved such vast popularity and support. Both the Progressivists and the 
Liberals19 consisted of narrow circles of Belgrade intellectuals and high gov-
ernment officials. Belonging to the political and social establishment, nei-
ther of the two was ever really interested in serious electoral campaigning 
and popularization of their programs and ideas. They never championed 
universal suffrage, nor believed in the fundamental principles of democracy. 
They thought that reforms should be instigated from the top, believing that 
the illiterate Serbian villager could not comprehend the concept of public 
interest, civil duties and decision-making responsibilities; it was up to edu-
cated elites to lead the country in the best interest of the people and work 
on its emancipation before any democratic standards could be introduced. 
In other words, they thought that the Serbian society was not ready for de-
mocracy. 
19 Both were officially founded in 1881/82, even though they had already existed on 
the political scene for quite some time before their formal initiations.
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By contrast, the Radical Party insisted on constitutional limitations 
of powers, universal male suffrage, and freedom of press and free and fair 
elections, because those were the vehicles that could provide its accession 
to power. Having no match in the popular support, the Radicals emerged as 
the leading political force in Serbia, fighting for national sovereignty and a 
democratic government.
The Radicals are remembered for their clash with the Serbian 
Obrenović dynasty. Prince (later King) Milan Obrenović20 was their arch-
enemy and they fought him until his death in 1901. Earlier, the Radicals 
had an instrumental role in forcing him to abdicate and leave the country 
in 1889. His son Aleksandar,21 although underage, enjoyed some respect 
among a group of moderate Radicals, but soon after acquiring full royal 
prerogatives proved to be as authoritarian and anti-Radical as his father. To-
gether with his Serbian wife,22 he was assassinated in a military plot in 1903. 
As a result, the Radical Party finally came to power, passing immediately a 
new Constitution and establishing Serbia as a parliamentary monarchy led 
by the Karadjordjević dynasty.
At the turn of the century, Serbia was still a rather underdeveloped 
society. The country of small rural land owners, with an extremely high 
percentage of illiteracy, virtually no industry and only several cities, Ser-
bia stood on the European periphery, and not just in geographic terms. A 
thin layer of urban intelligentsia educated abroad and a handful of wealthy 
merchants nurtured by state monopolies represented the nucleus of Serbian 
bourgeoisie. But the vast majority of peasants – who had won freedom and 
independence from the Ottoman Empire, became proprietors of land after 
the agrarian reform of 1830 and started trading livestock on the markets in 
the neighboring Habsburg Monarchy – were still the social backbone of late 
19th-century Serbia. 
* * *
In the early days, the Radicals tried to realize their goals by using violence. 
The Timok Rebellion of 1883 in eastern Serbia23 was an attempt to chal-
lenge the legal authorities and confront their abuses by violent means. The 
attempt ended in disaster. The Party leadership was arrested, its chairman 
20 Lived from 1854 to 1901; ruled from 1868 (1872) to 1889.
21 Lived from 1876 to 1903; ruled from 1889 (1893) to 1903.
22 Draga Masin (1864–1903). She was a widow, 12 years his senior. They married 
in 1900.
23 The birthplace of the Radical founder and life-long chairman Nikola Pašić.
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(Nikola Pašić) was forced to escape to Bulgaria, and many local rebels were 
court-martialed, executed or sentenced to long imprisonment. The Radi-
cals were blamed for subversive and revolutionary activities aimed at over-
throwing the legitimate government and the King himself. The failure of the 
Timok uprising had dire consequences for the future of the Radical Party. At 
first, it was outlawed and outcast; its members were persecuted all over the 
country; its political activities were prohibited. The party took a tremendous 
blow which jeopardized the very survival of the organization. Several years 
passed before the Radicals managed to recuperate, regroup and return to 
the Serbian political scene in full force.
The trauma of Timok Rebellion also contributed to the internal 
transformation of the Party’s strategies. The Radicals abandoned violence as 
a political tool for good, started negotiating with other political players in-
cluding the King and demonstrated a capacity to operate within the existing 
political framework and even form coalition governments (1886 onwards). 
However, a deep distrust between King Milan Obrenović and the Radicals 
remained intact until his abdication in early 1889. The Radical leader Nikola 
Pašić was allowed to come back from Bulgarian emigration only after the 
King had left.
No matter how tragic, the Timok episode was a sobering experience 
for the Radical Party and Serbia in general. It was the last of the armed 
rebellions that stamped 19th-century Serbia. Yet, it was not the last violent 
act in Serbian politics. Some of the bloodiest were to follow in the opening 
decades of the 20th century. 
* * *
The top leadership of the Serbian Radical Party was comprised of a group of 
Serbian intellectuals with socialist, non-Marxist, ideological backgrounds. 
Affiliated with the anarchism of Mikhail Bakunin24 in 1860s Switzerland 
and influenced by the Russian narodniki movement and especially the writ-
ings of Nikolay Chernyshevsky, the young Radicals returned to Serbia eager 
to storm into politics and reform its political system.
Besides, they became acquainted with the radical-socialist move-
ment in France and soon espoused its basic concepts believing that they 
were best suited for Serbia. Returning to a country with no industrial capi-
talism (or capitalism of any kind, for that matter), the future Radicals were 
24 Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin (1814–1876) was a Russian anarchist, theorist 
and revolutionary. He was the leading opponent and critic of Karl Marx, his phi-
losophy and practice in the First International (1864–1876).
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faced with a largely peasant society of small ownership very much opposed 
to any kind of collectivism. Serbian reality could hardly correspond to the 
socialist theories they encountered in Western Europe. The ideas of French 
Radicalism – including political reform, democratization, constitutionalism 
and regional decentralization (communal self-government) – appeared as a 
much more suitable agenda for the bulk of the Serbian agrarian population 
than the socialist concepts of compulsory collectivization of land.
Anti-monarchism soon emerged as one of the pillars of the Radical 
political program. Criticism of King Milan Obrenović’s rule and miscon-
duct became the trademark of Serbian Radicals’ politics, yet they never ad-
vocated open republicanism (unlike their French counterparts).
Nikola Pašić remained the untouchable front man of the People’s 
Radical Party from its formation (January 1881) until his death (December 
1926). A civil engineer educated at the Politechnische Academie (ETH) in 
Zurich, he started out as a sympathizer of the anarchist left. As a highly 
pragmatic person, however, he never considered himself a revolutionary. A 
master of political tactics, shrewd and flexible, Pašić led the Radical Party 
through the turmoil of constant internal instabilities and a World War. A 
diplomat rather than a commander, a tactician rather than a strategist, a 
realist rather than a visionary, Nikola Pašić was never very fond of political 
ideology. He was no doctrinaire; he was always ready to make a deal rather 
than deepen the conflict. Intrigues, political games and maneuvers were his 
favorite methods and the instruments of his greatest successes in politics.
Other Radical leaders were much more interested in Party ideology 
than their chairman. Pašić liked to have beside him men of strong convic-
tions, political fighters, individuals of integrity and belligerent spirit: his 
very opposites. Such a choice of associates provided Pašić with a comfort-
able position in the backstage and with enough space to act as a conciliatory 
negotiator or even an “honest broker”, a role he liked best. He was not the 
type of a commander who stands before his soldiers and leads the assault 
on the enemy; he preferred to remain in the headquarters and do the battle 
planning.
Bearded, tall and heavily built, often dressed in a redingote and a top 
hat, Nikola Pašić seemed like an early 19th-century academician or doctor. 
His oriental mysticism and European education made him a tough person 
to deal with. A man of few words, conspiratorial and covert, he attracted 
both attention and resentment.
Nikola Pašić’s career lasted over fifty years. A prime minister on more 
than forty occasions in Serbia and Yugoslavia, he earned the nickname 
“Pašić the Eternal”. 
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Beyond any doubt, Pašić was a democrat. He believed in the funda-
mental right of the people to elect their government. In terms of securing 
parliamentary majority, however, he was quite open-minded.
Worshipped by followers and detested by his enemies, Pašić marked 
an era not only in Serbian but also in European history at the end of the 19th 
and the beginning of the 20th century.
In Western historiography, Nikola Pašić’s name has frequently but 
with no tangible evidence been associated with the Sarajevo assassination 
of 1914.25
The truth of the matter is that neither the Radical Party nor Pašić 
himself ever enjoyed the trust of the military conspirators behind the Sara-
jevo murder. It is worth repeating that the Unification or Death movement 
represented a nationalist revolutionary secret society within the Serbian 
army (including several civilians, none of whom were members of the Radi-
cal Party) formed in 1911. Furthermore, the “Blackhanders” considered the 
Radicals as a major obstacle on the were members the completion of ulti-
mate Serbian interests.26 Owing a great deal to earlier clandestine organiza-
25 List of politically motivated assassinations in Europe 1881–1916:
 Monarchs and Presidents
1881 Alexander II of Russia (St. Petersburg)
1894 Marie François Sadi Carnot, President of France (Lyon)
1898 Elisabeth I of the Habsburg Empire (Geneva)
1900 Umberto I of Italy (Monza)
1903 Alexandar I (Obrenović dynasty) of Serbia (Belgrade)
1908 Carlos I and Luis Filipe (heir) of Portugal (Lisbon)
1913 George I of Greece (Thessaloniki))
1914 Franz Ferdinand, Austrian heir  apparent (Sarajevo) Prime-ministers 
 and high officials
1897 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Prime Minister of Spain
1903 Dimitrije Cincar Marković, Prime Minister of Serbia
1905 Pyotr Stolypin, Prime Minister of Russia
1905 Eliel Soisalon-Soininen, Attorney General, Finland
1905  Theodoros Deligiannis, Prime Minister of Greece
1911  Valde Hirvikanta, President of Turku Court of Appeal, Finland
1912  José Canalejas, Prime Minister of Spain
1913  Mahmud Şevket Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire
1914  Jean Jaurès, French socialist politician and pacifist
1916  Lord Kitchener, British Field Marshal and Secretary of State for War
1916  Count Karl von Stürgkh, Minister-President of Austria
26 Their highest officials repeatedly made life threats to Radical ministers. For ex-
ample, in 1912 Gen. Damnjan Popović publicly assaulted Stojan Protić, the Minis-
ter of Interior. 
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tions of a similar sort (the Italian “Carbonari” for example), the militants of 
the Unification or Death sought national freedom through violent means. 
The simple fact was that the Serbian government headed by the Radicals 
was too weak to neutralize its subversive activities.27 The real question is 
not whether Nikola Pašić and the Serbian Radicals were implicated in the 
assassination, but how it was possible for a group of military men to acquire 
such power and influence so as to be able to endanger the very foundations 
of the Serbian constitutional system. This question remains open to this day: 
was there anyone from outside Serbia, among the European powers or their 
secret services, who had backed the activities of the Unification or Death? 
Certain indications do point in that direction...28 
2
Beyond any doubt, the ideology of the People’s Radical Party in Serbia owed 
a lot to the British parliamentary theory and practice. Besides, the Serbian 
Radicals, not only in name, represented an offshoot of the French Radical 
movement and stood under its strongest impact.
Bulgarian and Greek Liberals also tried to move in a similar direc-
tion, making substantial progress in democracy building. Neither of the 
two, however, reached the level of internal organization and electoral popu-
larity of the Serbian Radical Party.29
27 In July of 1917, the conspiracy was revealed and the leaders of the “Unity or 
Death” were court-martialed for high treason. Their chief commander Col. Dragu-
tin Dimitrijević-Apis was sentenced to death and executed together with two of his 
associates. Others received verdicts of long time imprisonment. This took place in 
the midst of the war, in Thessaloniki (Greece), under a Radical government headed 
by Nikola Pašić.
28 That particular scenario was not the topic of this work, but it would be worth 
considering more closely.
29 Bulgarian Liberals (f. 1879) were unable to preserve their party’s unity. Despite 
initial parliamentary victories, numerous factions and splits characterized its early 
history. Founders: Petko Karavelov and Dragan Cankov. They established close per-
sonal and political ties with the Serbian Radicals.
 See: “Bulgaria”, The Times, London, April 6, 1880; “The Bulgarian Elections”, The 
Times, London, September 25, 1894.
The Liberal Party of Greece (f. 1910) was featured by an ideological mixture of liberal-
ism and nationalism. Its founder and leading figure until 1936 was Eleftherios Veni-
zelos, several times Greek Prime Minister 1915–1933. Ally of Nikola Pašić.
See: Victor Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: 
Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question, Praeger Publishers, 2002; D. Alas-
tos, Venizelos, Patriot, Statesman, Revolutionary, Lund, Humphries & Co, London, 
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Yet, the ideologies of all three had certainly originated from the same 
source.
* * *
The philosophical background of Radicalism as a political ideology could 
be found in the teachings of English philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748–
1832) and James Mill (1773–1836), namely their theory of utilitarianism 
and parliamentary reform.30 In Bentham’s own words: “It is the greatest hap-
piness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”31
The Radical understanding of parliamentarism was very much in-
fluenced by the writings of the British political author Walter Bagehot 
(1826–1877) and his book The English Constitution published in 1867.32 In 
this volume, Bagehot discussed the nature of British constitutionalism and 
especially the relations and interdependence of the Parliament, the Council 
of Ministers and the Crown.
The Serbian Radicals favored the system of coherent parliamentary 
democracy (“The government is born, lives and dies with parliamentary 
majority”) over any other political system. They believed that the English 
example would suit the Serbian environment best for two fundamental rea-
sons: England was the cradle of parliamentarism and Serbia was also a mon-
archy.
In terms of a constitutional reform, the Radicals have chosen the Bel-
gian Constitution of 1831 as a model. It was relatively new and concise, as 
well as fairly easy to translate from French to Serbian. In the early 1880s, the 
Radical experts translated and published American, Swiss and the afore-
mentioned Belgian Constitution in preparation for drafting the constitution 
of Serbia (finally passed in 1888).  
1942; P. Kitromilides, Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship. University 
Press, Edinburgh, 2006.
30 For more details, see: John Dinwiddy, Bentham: selected writings of John Dinwid-
dy, Stanford University Press, 2004; Charles W. Everett, Jeremy Bentham. Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, London, 1966; Ross Harrison, (1983) Bentham, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1983; P.J. Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Ben-
tham and the Civil Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
31 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government. Preface, London, 1776.
32 Chapman and Hall, London, 1867; 2nd edition, 1872; reprinted by Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
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* * *
French Radicalism could be traced back to Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin 
(1807–1874), a prominent political figure in France in the first half of the 
19th century and a presidential candidate of the Left in 1848.33 
The French Radicals continued to participate in politics during the 
second half of the 19th century as an informal movement. In the 1860s, it 
was Léon Gambetta who acted as the leading figure. Later, in the 1890s, this 
role was assumed by Léon Bourgeois. Finally, in the following years, it was 
Georges Clemenceau who was seen as the undisputed Radical front man. 
The French Radical Party was formally founded in 1901.34
With regard to ideological concepts, the French Radical influences 
on their Serbian counterparts can be discerned in a comparative analysis 
of their respective political programs. Not only did they belong to the same 
epoch, but the resemblance of their agendas appears rather astonishing.35 
3
Generally, there were four external variables in the Balkan geo-strategic 
equation: Turkey, Russia, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Western Pow-
ers. Of these, only Russia was genuinely concerned with supporting local 
nationalisms. Russia’s vital interest was to gain control over the Straits36 and 
thus secure an outlet to the Mediterranean. The Russo-Ottoman conflict, 
therefore, decided the fate of the Balkan nations. The Slavic origin of the 
33 He won a modest 370,000 votes. Others consider Louis Blanc (1811–1882) an-
other forefather of French Radicalism. 
34 See also: F. Tarr, The French Radical Party: from Herriot to Mendès-France, 1980 
Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic from its origins to 
the Great War, 1871–1914, 1988.
35 The main difference being, of course, that the Radicals in France were ardent re-
publicans, while the Radicals in Serbia never dared challenge the monarchical rule 
in Serbia, even though they did develop a strong anti-dynastic sentiment. Another 
was that the French Radicals had a program of fierce anti-clericalism, opposing the 
presence of the Roman Catholic Church in education and public life in general, 
whereas the Serbian Radicals did not need to be at odds with the Serbian Orthodox 
Church since a number of local priests were active members of the Radical Party 
in Serbia. Finally, the French Radicals preserved the adjective “radical-socialiste” 
in their official name (Parti Républicain Radical et Radical-Socialiste). Despite their 
socialist origins, the Serbian Radicals were not identified with socialism in title or 
otherwise.
36 Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
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Balkan nations only contributed to their pro-Russian inclinations. In Ser-
bia, the shift towards Vienna resulted from the profound disappointment 
after the San Stefano treaty of 1878 and the creation of Greater Bulgaria. 
Since 1903, however, with the Radical Party in command, the role of Russia 
re-emerged. Simultaneously, the controversy in relations with Austria-Hun-
gary heightened, leading towards full-scale conflict: first economic, then 
political and finally armed.
Russia prevented Serbia from declaring war on the Habsburgs in 
1908, when the government in Vienna proclaimed a unilateral annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
At last, the People’s Radical Party prevailed and formed a govern-
ment in 1903. Until 1918, it ran the country with almost no interruption, 
although it was forced to accept coalitions on a few brief occasions. 
The Radical policies of that period became increasingly national-
istic. The wave of European nationalism of the 19th century reached Bal-
kan shores with some delay, but found fertile ground among Southeastern 
peoples. National liberation and unification emerged as the major political 
objective all over the region, with Serbia joining the party. Crowds shouting 
“The Balkans to the Balkan peoples” could be heard in Belgrade, Sofia and 
Athens, in 1908, 1910 or 1912 alike.
The Balkan alliance of 1912 (sponsored by the Russian Tsar Nicholas 
II) that pushed the Ottomans out of Europe was the sole successful attempt 
at making a joint effort of all Balkan states. This proved possible largely due 
to the negotiating skills of the Serbian Radical leader and diplomat Milo-
van Milovanović,37 at the time both Prime and Foreign Minister of Serbia. 
Equipped with a French doctorate in public law from Paris University and 
a long experience in Serbian and regional politics, Dr. Milovanović man-
aged to bring the competing Balkan states together (Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bulgaria and Greece). Unfortunately, he did not live to see the fruits of his 
endeavor. He died in June of 1912.
The First Balkan War broke out a few months later, in October 1912 
and ended in the triumph of the Balkan Alliance over the Turks.
During the Second Balkan War which ended in Bulgarian defeat,38 it 
was the Radical leader Nikola Pašić who headed the Serbian government. 
37 He was among the youngest and most educated leaders of the Radical Party 
(1863–1912) and the only one capable of contesting the leading position of Nikola 
Pašić in as the Chairman of the Party. Unfortunately, he died at the age of 49.
38 The Balkan Alliance broke down due to quarrels over territorial gains after the 
war: Bulgaria was the greediest. 
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He remained at the country’s helm throughout the hardships of World War 
One.
* * *
Yugoslavism was not in the focus of the Radical Party’s policies either 
in the late 19th or the early 20th century. Until the outbreak of the Great 
War, the Radicals were quite busy trying to achieve Serbia’s national goals, 
i.e. enlarging the country’s territory to the South. 
The so-called Niš Declaration represented the first public statement 
by Serbian officials concerning the prospects of a potential Yugoslav union. 
The document was issued by the Serbian National Assembly in December 
1914 under the pressure of the opposition MPs. Pašić personally expressed 
caution at the idea.
The Radicals remained quite reserved towards the prospects of a Yu-
goslav unification until mid-1917. Nikola Pašić, in line with his usual modus 
operandi, quietly encouraged and subsidized the formation and work of the 
Yugoslav Club,39 an organization of South Slav politicians from Austria-
Hungary sympathetic to the unification cause.
It seems that there were two fundamental motives for the turn of the 
Radical stand on Yugoslavia. The first had to do with the developments in 
Russia during 1917 leading up to the revolution, in which case Serbia could 
count no more on Russian support. The second dealt with the possibility of 
Austro-Hungarian survival after the war, an outcome absolutely unaccept-
able to Serbia and detrimental to her most vital interests. 
In July 1917, on the island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea, under the chair-
manship of Nikola Pašić, the two delegations (the Serbian government and 
the Yugoslav Club) finally met in order to discuss the details of the merging 
process. 
The Corfu Declaration issued at the end of the conference called for 
the creation of a unified Yugoslav state of three ethnicities (Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes), organized as a parliamentary monarchy with the Serbian 
Karadjordjević dynasty at its head. It was agreed that the new Constitution 
would be passed “by a qualified majority” without additional clarifications:
 “This State [Yugoslavia] will be a guarantee of their national inde-
pendence and of their general national progress and civilization, and 
a powerful rampart against the pressure of the Germans.”40
39 Founded in Paris in 1915, but soon moved to London; two of its most prominent 
figures were both Dalmatian politicians: first Frano Supilo and later Ante Trumbić.
40 A passage from the original text of the Corfu Declaration.
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The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed on De-
cember 1, 1918 in Belgrade. Nevertheless, the misunderstandings among 
the key participants continued.
The People’s Radical Party (together with King Aleksandar I 
Karadjordjević) emerged as the driving force of centralism and a stubborn 
opponent of any compromise over the question of national unity. As the 
Prime Minister, Pašić was instrumental in passing the centralist Constitu-
tion (June 1921), whose adoption was seriously challenged by a number of 
non-Serbian political parties, namely the Croatian Peasant Party and the 
Communists, both preferring republicanism and federalism, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons.41
Controversy over the character of the unified state dominated Yugo-
slav politics until the outbreak of World War Two. Throughout that period, 
it was the Serbian Radicals or their individual representatives42 who insisted 
upon the so-called ‚‘unitary state‘‘ at any cost, despite the profound political 
crisis and rising ethnic frictions.
A compromise between the Serbs and Croats was reached in Au-
gust 1939. The Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetković and Croat leader Maček 
signed an agreement (The “Sporazum”), creating a Croat corpus separatum, 
the so-called Banovina Hrvatska. Instead of being a stabilizing factor, the 
agreement became the point of further grievances.
* * *
During World War Two, the Radical Party was represented in the Yugoslav 
government-in-exile in London. Its leader Miloš Trifunović43 held the posi-
tion of Prime Minister in 1943.44
The formal chairman of the Radical Party since the death of Nikola 
Pašić in 1926 was his closest and most intimate friend Aca Stanojević, who 
died in his native town in eastern Serbia in 1947, at the age of 95.
After the war, the Radical Party survived for a few years with no po-
litical significance whatsoever. The Communist revolution in Yugoslavia de-
clared any political activity illegal; banned the existence and work of all po-
41 Of 419 MPs in the Constituent assembly, 223 voted in favor, 35 against , with 161 
boycotting the vote. The document became known as the Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day) 
Constitution, because it was promulgated on June 28, 1921.
42 A group of top Radical leaders left the Party in 1935, forming the Yugoslav Radi-
cal Union (in power until 1941).
43 In December 1946, he was arrested, tried and sentenced to 8 years of prison by 
Yugoslav communist authorities.
44 From June to August.
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litical parties except Communist Party of Yugoslavia and introduced a “dic-
tatorship of the proletariat”, in line with the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. 
In the early 1990s, there were several unsuccessful attempts to revive 
the work and the organization of the People’s Radical Party. 
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The End
1
Democracy could be defined as a political system of representative and re-
sponsible government. In other words, this means that the government is 
chosen by the people, comprised of the people and supervised by the peo-
ple45. Democracy usually includes checks and balances of the three branch-
es of power (legislative, executive and judicial). As Montesquieu put it over 
250 years ago:
“There is no word that has admitted of more various significa-
tions or made more different impressions on human minds than 
that of Liberty. Some have taken it for a facility of deposing a per-
son on whom they had conferred a tyrannical authority; oth-
ers for the power of choosing a person whom they are obliged 
to obey; others for the right of bearing arms, and of being thereby 
enabled to use violence, others in fine for the privilege of being 
governed by a native of their own country or by their own laws. 
Some have annexed this name to one form of government, in exclu-
sion of others: Those who had a republican taste, applied it to this 
government; those who liked a monarchical state, gave it to monar-
chies. Thus they all have applied the name of liberty to the govern-
ment most conformable to their own customs and inclinations: and 
as in a republic people have not so constant and so present a view 
of the instruments of the evils they complain of, and likewise as the 
laws seem there to speak more, and the executors of the laws less, it is 
generally attributed to republics, and denied to monarchies. In fine as 
in democracies the people seem to do very near whatever they please, 
liberty has been placed in this sort of government, and the power of 
the people has been confounded with their liberty.”46
And further on:
“Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. 
Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and 
even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no 
45 A paraphrase of the famous words by U.S. President A. Lincoln (The Gettysburg 
Address, November 19, 1863).
46 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (L’esprit des 
lois), Book XI, Chapter 3, Paris 1748.
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abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man in-
vested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far 
as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has 
need of limits?
To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things 
that power should be a check to power. A government may be so con-
stituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law 
does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law 
permits.”47 
Necessary prerequisites for the successful implementation of democ-
racy as a workable mechanism of decision-making could be summed up as 
follows:
– equality before law (equal civil and political rights for all)
– universal suffrage 
– guaranteed civil liberties (freedom of press, public speech and po-
litical association).
Yet the keystone of democracy, its supreme guarantor and safeguard 
is – the Constitution. It represents the highest legal document that speci-
fies the prerogatives and limitations of power, establishes the hierarchy of 
authority (central and local), introduces principles of the judiciary and pro-
vides a bill of rights.
Democracy is hardly feasible without a Constitution, but a Consti-
tution does not automatically mean democracy. These are compatible no-
tions, but not synonyms. Constitutionalism can exist without democracy, 
but there can be no democracy without a Constitution.
Parliamentary democracy is just one of the possible subsystems of 
representative democracy. The truth of the matter is that parliamentarism 
is also the most frequently applied and probably the most effective of these 
subsystems.
2
The People’s Radical Party was the herald of constitutionalism, parliamen-
tarism and democracy in Serbia, as well as in the Balkan region generally. By 
the same token, it was the harbinger of general political and social progress. 
Its formative years (1881–1903) witnessed great changes in Serbian politics, 
culture and social values.
47 Montesquieu, Chapter 4.
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Serbia was on the road to becoming a modern European country 
based on free market economy, the rule of law and parliamentary democ-
racy. And the Radicals, their ideas and their practice, played a key role in 
this fascinating process. 
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